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In classical propositional logic (CPL) logical reasoning is formalised as logical entailment and can be 
computed by means of tableau and resolution proof procedures. Unfortunately CPL is not expressive 
enough and using first order logic (FOL) does not solve the problem either since proof procedures for 
these logics are not decidable. Modal propositional logics (MPL) on the other hand are both decidable 
and more expressive than CPL. It therefore seems reasonable to apply tableau and resolution proof 
systems to MPL in order to compute logical entailment in MPL. Although some of the principles in 
CPL are present in MPL, there are complexities in MPL that are not present in CPL. Tableau and 
resolution proof systems which address these issues and others will be surveyed here. In particular the 
work of Abadi & Manna (1986), Chan (1987), del Cerro & Herzig (1988), Fitting (1983, 1990) and 
Gore (1995) will be reviewed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disciples should be on their guard against the seductions of words and sentences and their illusive meanings, for by 
them, the ignorant and dull-witted become entangled and helpless as an elephant floundering around deep mud. 
Words and sentences .. cannot express highest reality . The ignorant and simple minded declare that meaning is not 
otherwise than words, that as words are, so is meaning . .. Truth is beyond letters and words and books. 
- The Tao Te Ching (LXXXI) 
1. HISTORY 
Throughout the ages psychologists have researched the acquisition of language. Many theories and 
approaches have been developed as a result of this research. Fundamentally the human species 
progresses through three stages of language acquisition. During the first stage they develop an 
understanding of their language, learning how to distinguish between different individual sounds of 
their language. Pre-linguistic speech follows shortly afterwards during which they attempt to imitate 
these sounds. Finally they enter the linguistic speech stage where the human learns not only to utter one-
word sentences but also grammatically correct verbal sentences. Once people know how to utter correct 
sentences they will focus on the context of a given sentence in order to understand the meaning of the 
sentence, that is, most people are aware that the same sentence may have different meanings in different 
circumstances. For example the phrase: "I am going to kill you!" will alarm people if uttered by an 
adversary. However, if the same phrase is uttered by an acquaintance, the phrase may mean that "I will 
be very upset if you pull the plug before I have saved my work on the PC!" 
Although these stages describe language acquisition amongst children in all countries, we could use the 
same approach to describe the acquisition of a second language. For instance, consider an English 
speaking person who wants to learn a different language, say French. This person will have to expose 
his/her ear to the sounds of the French language, learn to imitate and give meaning to the different 
sounds, and eventually learn how to form grammatically correct sentences in French such as: 'Bonjour, 
madame' (Good morning madam). 
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As with language acquisition, logic can also be developed along similar stages. Firstly, for every logical 
language we need to define the alphabet and punctuation symbols that we can use in the language. Once 
we know what the given language looks like we generally define rules that allow us to construct words 
for the language, and in turn we use these words to construct sentences for our language. Finally we 
define different contexts in which we can use the given sentences which allows us to assign meaning to 
these sentences. In contrast to language acquisition, we progress one step further in logic and use our 
sentences in their given contexts to derive new sentences. This process of derivation is known as 
automated reasoning. 
Artificial Intelligence is a field in computer science that concerns itself not only with tasks that require 
intelligence, but also tasks that can be performed on a computer. Since the ability to make logical 
deductions is considered to be an integral part of human intelligence automated reasoning, or theorem 
proving, has created widespread interest in Artificial Intelligence. 
The origins of theorem proving can be traced back as far as 1656 when Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz 
first devised a general decision procedure to prove theorems. In 1930 Herbrand introduced a 
mechanical theorem prover for a branch of logic known as first order logic (a logic that makes use of 
notions such as terms, predicates and quantifiers). What made this theorem prover noteworthy was that 
the theorem prover was based on an algorithm that would halt after a finite number of trials. The 
advantage of having a finite algorithm was that it was now possible for the first time in history to 
automate a proof procedure. This is exactly what Gilmore did in 1960, when he implemented 
Herbrand's procedure on a computer. 
With the advent of computers it became more and more important to find theorem provers that could be 
. 
implemented efficiently. It was in this light that J.A. Robinson's breakthrough in theorem proving in 
1965 was so important. He developed a theorem prover that used a single inference rule, known as the 
resolution principle. Compared to other theorem provers at the time, his theorem prover showed 
remarkable efficiency. Since then much research has gone into improving the resolution principle with 
regards to efficiency and automation. (Chang & Lee 1973.) 
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Aristotle (384-322 B.C) was perhaps one of the first investigators to explore logical relationships 
between the necessary, the impossible, the possible and the pennitted. C.l. Lewis in 1918 initiated the 
modem symbolic analysis of modality and Kurt GOdel in 1932 put forward a modal logic based on the 
ordinary propositional calculus (see chapter 2) with the schemata K (see chapter 3) and the rule of 
Necessitation. Shortly after Robinson's breakthrough G.E. Hughes published his book, 'Introduction to 
Modal Logic.' 
From 1959 to 1980 much research and thought went into modal logic which finally culminates in an 
axiomatic account of modal logics. During this period a young genius, Saul Kripke, laid down the 
foundations of modem propositional and predicate modal logic in several influential papers. His notion 
of a frame (see page 3 7) is probably his most noteworthy contribution in the field of modal logics. 
Somewhere between 1980 and 1988 the penny finally dropped. It's all very well to have a logic that 
concerns itself with expressions of various 'modes' in which statements may be true, but unfortunately 
the axiomatisations of these logics are very difficult to apply and are extremely time consuming. Since 
the life span of a logician is limited (and time costs money) there was clearly a need for more efficient 
theorem provers. It is therefore not surprising that a number of logicians decided to follow in the 
footsteps of Robinson with the development of a number of resolution theorem provers for modal 
logics. 
As with resolution, tableaux theorem provers were also initially designed for the automation of 
reasoning specifically for classical logics. Historically, tableaux systems have been divided into two 
fundamental groups, that of syntactic tableaux and semantic tableaux. Semantic tableaux systems have 
found prominence in fields of automated deduction, i.e. fields in which the primary emphasis is on 
finding proofs. Syntactic tableaux systems, on the other hand, have found prominence in fields of type 
. 
theory where the main emphasis has been on the ability to distinguish between different proofs in order 
to place computational interpretations on the proofs. Gerhard Gentzen was responsible for most of the 
work done in syntactic tableaux round about 1935. Curry appears to be the first logician to extend 
Gentzen's systems to modal logic. Beth on the other hand has been responsible for much of the original 
work in semantic tableaux, with Kripke once again extending his work to modal logics. Zeman in 1973 
gave an account of both syntactic and semantic systems and in 1983 Fitting published his well known 
work in tableaux systems which provides an exposition of tableau systems for most of the basic logics. 
(Gore 1995.) 
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Although modal logic was originally only of interest to philosophers it has recently had many 
applications in the fields of computer science and artificial intelligence. In particular some of these 
applications have been in temporal logics, formal program specifications, concurrency, hardware 
verifications (Gore 1995) and nonmonotonic logics in artificial intelligence. 
2. SCOPE 
Due to the effective application of resolution- and tableau- based proof systems in classical 
propositional logic as well as that of first order logic it seems reasonable to extend these systems to that 
of modal propositional logic. While some of the ideas of these proof systems, such as the use of 
refutation procedures, are still applicable, some of the advantages of these proof procedures do not 
carry over directly to propositional modal logic. For instance, the conversion of formulas into an 
appropriate normal form is difficult to attain as well as restricting the number of inference rules to a 
bare minimum. 
This thesis surveys attempts by a number of researchers to capture various aspects of these resolution 
and tableau proof systems in modal logic. In particular the focus will be on how these researchers use 
their systems to compute logical reasoning formalised as logical entailment. The systems surveyed here 
are those of Abadi & Manna (1986), Chan (1987), del Cerro & Herzig (1988), Fitting (1983, 1990) and 
Gore (1995). The description of these systems will focus on the three specific modal systems, KT4, 
KT4.3 and KT5, because they seem to be of real interest in Artificial Intelligence. 
The foundation for these topics are laid in chapters two and three. Chapter 2, covers the concepts of 
propositional logic and some of its respective approaches to theorem proving namely: axiomatic 
systems, resolution and tableaux proof systems. Note that although natural deduction and its 
applications in propositional logic is important it is not within the scope of this thesis. Chapter 3, builds 
upon the foundation of propositional logic and provides a synopsis of modal logic as well as 
introducing the reader to the normal systems of modal logic KT4, KT4.3 and KT5. Chapters 4 and 5 
constitute the main focus of this thesis and present the resolution and tableaux proof systems for modal 
logic as described by the different researchers. Chapter 6 concludes with suggestions to alternative 
applications of these modal resolution and tableaux proof systems to other branches of artificial 
intelligence in particular that of nonmonotonic logic. 
CLASSICAL PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC 
Interpreting a symbol is to associate it with some concept or mental image, to assimilate it to human consciousness. 
- PJ Davis & R Hersh 
1. SYNTAX 
When learning any language such as English we have to familiarise ourselves with the words in the 
language. Not only do we have to learn how to recognise the words but we also have to learn how to 
spell them correctly so that people from different walks of life can recognise that when we write 'cat' we 
mean a four legged creature that meows. As our learning progresses we learn how to combine the 
different words into meaningful sentences by means of the connectives such as not, if .. then, and, and 
or. Eventually, after much study, we are able to write a simple sentence that most people can relate to, 
for example: The cat sat on the mat. 
A propositional language is a precisely defmed formal language that can be acquired in much the same 
way as any other written language. We start off by defining the words in our language and what they 
look like. We refer to the words in the propositional language as 'symbols' and they can be represented 
by any one of the following: 
• A possible infinite set of atoms represented by the letters P, Q, R .... 
• The propositional connectives: -., ~ , 1\ , v , B . 
• The constants T, .l . 
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Informally we can define the above symbols by means of the following table. A more precise 
description ofthese symbols will follow in section 2.1. 
Symbol Meaning 
--, not 
~ if... then 
1\ and 
v or 
~ if and only if 
l_ false 
T true 
The items listed in the table. together with the atoms, make up the words of the language, from which 
sentences can be built up. However, as with the English language, we need to know what the rules are 
for forming sentences or formulas. These rules are defined below (Chang & Lee 1973:7): 
Definition 1 
Well-formed formulas, or formulas for short, in propositional logic are defined recursively as follows: 
1. An atom is a formula 
2. T and J. are formulas 
3. If A is a formula, then (-.4) is aformula. 
4. if A and B are formulas, then (A /\ B), (A v B), (A ~B) and (A H B) are formulas. 
All formulas are generated by applying the above rules. 
Note that the symbols'(' and')' are punctuation symbols and are not words in this language. 
Using this definition, we can formulate formulas in the propositional language. Say, for example, that 
we would like to formalise the statement: "Odie is my dog and Garfield is my cat". Firstly we need to 
define our atoms. Let 0 stand for "Odie is my dog" and let G stand for "Garfield is my cat" (note that 
we could have used any atom, we just chose 0 and G for convenience). If we refer back to definition I 
(I) we will find that we now have two formulas namely 0 and G. However, we would like to connect 
these two formulas. So we refer to definition I to see if there is a connective that can help us join these 
two formulas. Looking closely at statement 4 in definition I, and referring to the informal meaning of A 
above. we notice that the connective A will do the trick. So now we can join our two formulas to 
produce (0 A G). 
We can summarise these steps by looking at another example: "If Garfield is a cat then Odie is not a 
cat" 
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1. Define the atoms of our fonnula: 
Let G be "Garfield is a cat" 
Let 0 be "Odie is a cat" 
i.e. We now have "ifG then not 0". 
2. Replace the connectives with the correct symbols using definition I. 
G~-,0. 
7 
The reading of the fonnula (G ~ -,0) is quite straightforward, but this is not always the case when we 
deal with more complex fonnulas such as (G 1\ 0 v P). Without the use of punctuation symbols or 
precedence rules it will be very difficult to detennine whether this fonnula should be read as ((G 1\ 0) v 
P) or (G 1\ (0 v P)). At the same time the longer our fonnulas become, the more cumbersome the use of 
brackets will become. It is therefore useful to assign precedence rules to the connectives so that we may 
eliminate some of the brackets without creating ambiguity. We will assign the following precedence to 
our connectives in decreasing rank: B, ~. A, v, -,, requiring that the connective with greater rank 
always reaches further. Thus (G 1\ 0 v P) will mean (G 1\ (0 v P)). 
2. SEMANTICS 
2.1 Interpretations 
Semantics is related to meaning in language. For example what is the semantics of the sentence: 
Garfield is macf? In other words, what do we mean when we say that Garfield is macf? Are we 
referring to his mental capabilities, in which case we mean Garfield is insane or are we making a 
statement about his emotions, i.e. Garfield is annoyecf? Generally in the English language, we can 
detennine the meaning of a sentence in terms of the context in which the sentence was uttered. In other 
words, it is often very difficult to interpret a sentence in isolation. 
We have a similar phenomenon in propositional logic, in that we need to be able to assign meaning to 
propositional fonnulas. A fonnula such as P v Q has no meaning unless we understand what P and Q 
represent and in what context they are being used. In propositional logic we use the word 
interpretation, to refer to the context in which a fonnula is used. 
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Definition 2 
Given a propositional formula A, let A" A2, ••• , An be the atoms occurring in the formula A. Then an 
interpretation ofA is a.fimctionfrom the set of atoms to the set {T. F}, where T represents true and F 
represents false (Chang & Lee 1973:9). 
It is only when we are given an interpretation of the language that we can say something about the 
meaning of the formulas. Generally in propositional logic when we refer to the 'meaning of a formula' 
we mean that we would like to determine if the formula is true or false in a given interpretation. This 
begs the question, what do we mean by: A formula is true/false in an interpretation? 
Definition 3 
The truth of any well formed formulas in an interpretation I is recursively defined as follows: 
I. For every atom A, A is true in I if and only if /(A) = T. (A is false in I if and only if /(A) =F). 
2. For any well formed formula A, -.4 is true in I if and only if it is not the case that A is true in 1 
3. For any two well formed formulas A and B, A .11 B is true in I if and only if A is true in I and B is 
true in I. 
4. For any two well formed formulas A and B, A v B is true in I if and only if either A is true in I orB 
is true in I or both. 
5. For any two well formedformulas A and B, A -+ B is true in I if and only if either A is false in I or 
B is true in I, or both. 
6. For any two well formed formulas A H B is true in I if and only if A and B have exactly the same 
truth value in I (i.e. either both A and Bare true in I or both are false in/). (Chang & Lee 1973:8.) 
For example, the propositional logic language containing just the two atoms P and Q has four distinct 
interpretations. We can denote these interpretations by I 1, h, 13 and 14 represent them as follows: 
• lt(P) = T and 11(Q) = T 
• 12(P) = T and 12(Q) = F 
• 13(P) = F and 13(Q) = T 
• 14(P) = F and I4(Q) = F 
To determine if any well formed formula is true in a particular interpretation say h, we simply use the 
definition above. For instance, take the formula (P v Q). In 12 P gets the value T and Q gets the value F. 
From definition 3 (4) we see that this means that (P v Q) will get the value Tin l2. 
Note that for any interpretation I, and any formula A, A will either be true or false (but never both) in I. 
Definition 4 
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A formula is said to be valid ifand only if it is true under all its interpretations. A formula is said to be 
invalid if and only if it is not valid (Chang & Lee 1973: 11). 
In propositional logic. we refer to valid formulas as tautologies. We say that a tautology is a formula 
that is true under all its interpretations. Tautologies also have the added advantage that their semantics 
can be determined from their logical structure. For example, for any formula A, (A v -.A) is a 
tautology, that is, for any interpretation I, (A v -.A) will always be true in I. 
Definition 5 
A formula is said to be unsatisjiable if and only if it is false under all its interpretations. A formula is 
said to be satisfiable if and only if it's not unsatisfiable. An interpretation I satisfies a formula if and 
only if the formula is true in I and it satisfies a set of formulas r if and only if I satisfies each formula A 
E F(Chang & Lee 1973:11). 
By convention if a formula A is unsatisfiable then we refer to A as a contradiction. A propositional 
formula A is a contradiction if and only if it is false under all its interpretations. For example (P " -.P) 
is a contradiction as this formula can never be true for any interpretation I, since for any interpretation I, 
both P and -.P will have to be true and this is impossible in propositional logic. 
Definition 6 
For any two formulas A and B, A is logically equivalent to B if and only if (A H B) is true for every 
interpretation I. 
2.2 Semantic Entailment 
In the previous sections we defined the syntax and interpretations oT weU formed formulas. In this 
section the semantics of the propositional language is taken one step further in order to define the idea 
of one formula following logically from a set of other formulas. 
Definition 7 
A set of formulas r logical~v entails a formula A (written r o A) if and only if every interpretation I 
that satisfies all the formulas in r also satisfies the formula A. 
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To illustrate the above definition. Let r = {(P ~ Q), --.Q} and A be the formula --.P. To show that r 
logically entails A i.e. {(P ~ Q), --.Q} o --.P, we need to show that every interpretation I that satisfies r 
also satisfies --.P. One way of determining whether r logically entails A is to use a truth table. Consider 
the truth table for r u {A}: 
p Q P~Q --.Q --.P 
T T T F F 
T F F T F 
F T T F T 
F F T T T 
From the truth table we can see that any interpretation that evaluates all formulas in r to true also 
evaluates --.P to true. We can therefore safely say that r o --.P. 
If the set r is the empty set (denoted 0) then the only formulas that are entailed by r are the set of 
tautologies. In other words 0 o A if and only if A is a tautology. This means that if the empty set 
logically entails A then A is a tautology and if A is a tautology then A is logically entailed by the empty 
set. Generally we will write J A instead of 0 o A For example for the tautology (P v --.P) we have o 
(P v --.P). 
Logical entailment can also be defmed in terms of validity and unsatisfiability. 
Theorem 1 
Given a set of formulas T= {[/,I], ... , T,J and a formula A, T/ogically entails A if and only if(I/ .11 
I] .11 ... .11 T,J ~A is valid. 
(See Chang & Lee 1973: 16 for the proof.) 
For example if we want to show that --.P is logically entailed by {(P~Q), --.Q} we need to show, by 
theorem I, that (P ~ Q) 1\ --.Q ~--.Pis valid. We do so by means of the following truth table. 
p Q P~Q --,Q --.P (P ~ Q) 1\ --.Q ~ --.P 
T T T F F T 
T F F T F T 
F T T F T T 
F F T T T T 
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From the truth table we can see that (P ~ Q) " -,Q ~ ..,p always evaluates to T regardless of the truth 
values of the other columns, i.e. (P ~ Q) 1\ -,Q ~ ,p is true under all its interpretations and by 
definition 4 valid. It follows fl·om theorem I that we can conclude that ..,p is logically entailed by {(P 
~ Q), --,Q}. 
Alternatively, instead of using validity to show logical entailment we could use unsatisfiability (see 
definition 5), that is, in order to show that a formula A is logically entailed by a set of formulas r we 
can show that r u {--,A} is unsatisfiable. We record this result in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2 
Given a set of formulas r = { [/, 12 . ... , F,J and a formula A. r logically entails A if and only the set 
{F~o 12 . ... , Fn. -.4.} is unsatisjiable. 
(See Chang & Lee 1973: 16 for proof.) 
For example, if we want to show that ..,pis logically entailed by {(P ~ Q), --,Q} we need to show, by 
theorem 2, that {(P ~ Q), --,Q, --,--,P} is unsatisfiable. We do so by means of the following truth table. 
p Q P~Q --,Q ,p ,,p 
T T T F F T 
T F F T F T 
F T T F T F 
F F T T T F 
From the truth table we can see that there does not exist a row which contains all T's, that is, there is no 
interpretation that satisfies { (P ~ Q), -.Q, --,--,P} and by definition 5 it is therefore unsatisfiable. It 
follows from theorem 2 that we can conclude that ,pis logically entailed by {(P ~ Q), --,Q}. 
Note that from the results of theorem I it is sufficient in propositional logic to only look at the sets of 
tautologies when we want to determine logical entailment. However, this result does not hold for logics 
such as modal logic which we discuss in the next chapter. 
In the above example we were fortunate that r was a small finite set of sentences. However, in 
propositional logic, we don't always have this luxury. We often have to deal with infinite or very large 
sets of sentences. Clearly, when r is infinite we can't use truth tables to show logical entailment as we 
did in the above examples. It would therefore be useful to have a result ensuring that we need only 
concern ourselves with finite sets of sentences. The following theorem provides us with this result. 
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Theorem 3 (Compactness Theorem) 
(jiven an infinite set ojformulas r, and a formula A, rr J A ifand only if there is a finite subset To ofT 
such that T111 :A. 
(See Fitting 1990b:55 for proof.) 
3. PROOFPROCEDURES 
Thus far our study of propositional logic has focused on the syntax and semantics of propositional 
formulas. In this section we will extend our study to the analysis of the process of deduction. 
Informally a proof can be defined as a demonstration that a conclusion follows from a set of well 
formed formulas. A proof procedure on the other hand is defined as a procedure for finding proofs. 
The main aim of these proof procedures is therefore to determine whether a given formula A is a either 
logically entailed by a set of formulas r or not logically entailed by r. In other words we use proof 
procedures to determine whether or not it is the case that r o A. 
It is instructive to evaluate why we would even bother to go to all the effort of designing proof 
procedures when using truth tables, as shown above, would appear to do the trick. One apparent 
difficulty with truth tables is that in order to establish that a formula A is logically entailed by a set of 
formulas r we have to verify that each interpretation I that satisfies r also satisfies A. The problem is 
that the number of interpretations that satisfies r may be infinite. This means that it would be 
impossible to verify that A was logically entailed by r by means of truth tables in a finite amount of 
time. Since we would like to use the computer to verify the validity of A in r we are clearly going to 
need an alternative technique to solve this problem, as it is not practical to tie a PC up for an unlimited 
amount of time. Fortunately, there is an important theorem in logic that states that whenever a set of 
formulas f logically entails A, there is a finite proof of A from f. Hence the question of determining 
logical entailment is reduced to the problem of finding such a proof. ( Genesereth & Nilsson 1987.) 
In this section three types of proof systems are described namely: Hilbert proof systems, resolution and 
tableaux systems. A brief exposition of each procedure is provided, as well as a description of how 
these different proof procedures determine logical entailment. 
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3.1 Hilbert Style Systems 
The tirst proof procedures that we will look at were designed by Hilbert in the 1920's. These proof 
procedures are generally referred to as Hilbert style systems. There are many strains of Hilbert systems 
but if one was to analyse all the systems one would be able to extract the following common 
characteristics from these systems,. that is, all Hilbert systems have (Hughes 1968): 
l. A set of primitive symbols. 
2. A set of formation rules specifying which formulas are to count as well formed formulas. 
3. A selected set of well formed formulas, known as axioms. 
4. A set of transformation rules licensing various operations on the axioms and well formed formulas 
obtained by previous applications of the transformation rules. (Rules of transformation are often 
referred to as inference rules). 
Note that item 1 and 2 make up the symbols and the well formed formulas of the language. In this 
instance the set of primitive symbols and formation rules are those of the propositional language as 
defined in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter. 
To illustrate these concepts we will briefly look at a Hilbert system defined by Hamilton (1988): 
• An alphabet of symbols: 
...,, ~. (, ), P, Q, R ... 
• A set of well formed formulas defined recursively as: 
l. Each atom P, Q, R ... is a well formed formula. 
2. If A and Bare well formed formulas then (-,A) and (A~B) are well formed formulas 
3. The set of all well formed formulas is generated by 1 and 2 above. 
• Axioms, specified in terms of axiom schemes (i.e. in terms of sentence structures). 
l. (A~ (B ~A)) 
2. (A~ (B ~c )) ~ ((A~ B)~ (A~ C)) 
3. (((-,A) ~(-,B)) ~ (B ~A)) 
• Rules of deduction (also defined in terms of schemes): 
Modus Ponens: From A and (A~ B). B is a direct consequence, where A, Bare any well formed 
formulas of the system. 
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The discerning reader will notice that a number of the connectives that were listed in section I are not 
used by Hamilton in this example. The reason for this is that Hamilton defines the connectives defined 
in section I by means of the adequate set of connectives -, and ~- (Refer to Hamilton 1988: 19 tor the 
proof.) For example the formula A A B can be defined in terms of the connectives -, and ~ to obtain 
the equivalent formula -,(A~ -,B). 
Definition 8 
A proof in a Hilbert system from a set Tofformulas is a finite sequence Ah A2, .•• ,An of formulas such 
that each formula is either an axiom, or is a member of r or follows from applying the rules of 
iriference to well formed formulas earlier in the sequence. We call a formula A, a theorem of r. if A is 
the last line of a proof from r, i.e. if A =An. We will write To A to symbolise that A has a proof from r 
in the Hilbert system (Hamilton 1973:29). 
A special case of the above definition is when r is the empty set, that is r = 0. For this case we 
generally just write o A instead of 0o A. 
We will use the Hilbert system, as defined by Hamilton above, to illustrate this definition. Assume that 
we want to use this system to show that Q is logically entailed by {P, P ~ Q}. 
Looking at the definition of Hamilton's system it should be clear that there are three axiom schemas and 
one rule of inference that can be used to prove Q. Using definition 8 as the modus operandi the proof 





P ~ Q Given 
Q from I and 2 using Modus Ponens. 
Since Q is the last line of our proof we can conclude by definition 8 that Q is a theorem relative to {P, 
P~Q}. 
Note that it is customary, as demonstrated in the example, to display proofs by writing one formula per 
line. Generally, we will also indicate how we have derived the formulas by making notes to the right of 
the formulas. 
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3.2 Resolution 
Hilbert systems, as described above, can be inefficient since we often have to consider all the axioms 
and inference rules in the system in order to prove that a formula A is a theorem of a set of formulas r. 
In other words, for large Hilbert systems it is not always a trivial task to construct a proof for A from r. 
For example, try to find a prooffor o (P ~ P). 
Since the advent of computers there has been a number of attempts to improve the efficiency of theorem 
proving procedures in order to facilitate the automation of these procedures. One of these attempts was 
a proof system introduced by Robinson in 1965 referred to as resolution. What made this proof 
procedure so attractive at the time, was that it was simple to analyse and implement (Genesereth & 
Nilsson 1988). What added to the efficiency of the proof procedure was that it only made use of one 
very efficient inference rule known as the resolution principle (defined below). 
In this section we will provide a brief overview of the basics of resolution. Advanced resolution 
strategies such as semantic resolution, linear resolution, unit resolution are not within the scope of this 
dissertation and the interested reader is referred to works of authors such as Chang & Lee (1973) and 
Genesereth & Nilsson ( 1987) for more details. 
The notion of a refutation system is required for the remainder of this section. We therefore digress for 
a moment and describe briefly what a refutation system is. Essentially a refutation system is a proof 
system that uses given axioms and inference rules to obtain a proof of a formula A from a set of 
formulas r. The proof is obtained by negating A and using the predefmed Jlxioms and inference rules to 
derive a contradiction from r u {->A}. If we succeed in deriving a contradiction then we can safely 
conclude that A is logically entailed by r. In other words since r u {-,A} is unsatisfiable we can 
conclude by theorem 2 that r logically entails A. Note that different refutation proof systems will 
provide different definitions of what a contradiction is in their systems as well as. the means by which 
these contradictions are derived. 
In the English language resolution is defined as a separation into elements, decomposition, conversion 
into another form. Effectively this is what resolution is about in propositional logic. It hinges on the fact 
that we can decompose propositional formulas into sets of formulas. Once the transformation has been 
completed, the transformed set can be used to construct other sets of formulas. The proof procedure 
then involves showing how we can use this process of transformation to eventually derive a proof in 
terms of sets of formulas. 
Before we describe this process in more detail, we need to define what we mean by clauses and in 
order to do so we need to understand what literals are. 
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Definition 9 
A literal is an atomic sentence or the negation of an atomic sentence. An atomic sentence is a positive 
literal, and the negation of the atomic sentence is a negative literal. If A is an atom then the two 
literals A and -.A are said to be each other's complement (Genesereth & Nilsson 1987:64). 
Definition 10 
A clause is a set of literals. 
In propositional logic the symbol 'A' is often referred to as a conjunction. Similarly the symbol 'v' is 
referred to as a disjunction. A formula is in conjunctive normal form if it has the following structure: ( 
(A11 v A12 v ... v A1n) A (A21 v A21 v ... v A2m) 1\ ... 1\ (Ak1 v Ak2 v ... v Aks) ), where the Aij's are 
literals. These terms will be used in the following discussion. 
Due to the nature of resolution proof systems formulas are generally converted to clausal form in order 
to reduce the computational complexity of the formulas and to provide a uniform notation. This 
conversion from a well formed formula to clausal form is accomplished by means of the following 
algorithm. The algorithm provides a sequence of rules that can be applied to any well formed formula in 
order to convert it into its logically equivalent clause form, that is, the semantics of the initial formula 
remain intact during the conversion process. 
Conversion to clausal form (Genesereth & Nilsson 1987) 
I. Remove all the ~. B, f- from the formula using the following rules: 
1.1 A ~ B is replaced by -.A v B 
1.2 A B B is replaced by (-,A v B) 1\ (A v -,B) 
2. Replace T and J. as follows: 
2.1 T is replaced by (P v -,P) 
2.2 J. is replaced by (P 1\ -,P) 
3. Distribute the negation over the formula, until there is only one atom in the scope of every-,, 
using the following rules: 
3.1 -,-,A is replaced by A 
3.2 -,(A v B) is replaced by -,A 1\ -,B 
3.3 -,(A 1\ B) is replaced by -,A v --,B 
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4. Place the expression in conjunctive nonnal fonn using the following rules repeatedly 
4. I A v (B 1\ C) is replaced by (A v B) 1\ (A v C) 
4.2 (B A C) v A is replaced by (B v A) 1\ (C v A) 
5. Eliminate the connectives using the following rule: 
5. I (A11 v A12 v ... v A1n) 1\ (A21 vAn v ... v Azm) 1\ ... 1\ (Akt v Ak2 v ... v Aks) is replaced by 
{Att, A12 .... Atn}, {Azt. A22, ... Azm} ... { Akt, Ak2, ... Aks} 
Conversely the finite set of clauses { {A11 , A 12, ... A10}, {A21 , A22, ... A2m} ... { Akt, Ak2, ... 
Aks}} can be rewritten as the following well fonned fonnula (A11 v A 12 v ... v A1n) 1\ (A21 v 
A22 v ... v Azm ) 1\ ... A (Akt v Ak2 v ... v Aks) 
Note that a clause represents the disjunction of its literals and occasionally clauses will be treated as if 
they are fonnulas. 
Let's illustrate this routine with a simple example say -,(P ~ Q). 
1. Remove the ~. 
Rule 1.2 is used to convert 
-.(P ~ Q) to-,(( ...,p v Q) A (P v -,Q)). 
2. Distribute the negation. 
Rule 3.3 is used to convert 
--,(( -,P v Q) A (P v -.Q)) to -,( -,P v Q) v --,(P v -,Q). 
Then rule 3.2 is used to convert 
--,( ...,p v Q) v -,(P v --,Q) to ( -,-,P 1\ -.Q) v ( -,P A -,-,Q). 
Finally the fonnula is refined using rule 3.1 to get: (P 1\ --,Q) v ( ...,p 1\ Q) 
3. Place the formula in conjunctive normal form. 
Thus (P 1\ --,Q) v (-,P 1\ Q) becomes ((P 1\ --,Q) v -,P) 1\ ((P 1\ --,Q) v Q) 
Refining this fonnula further yields: 
(P v -.P) 1\ (--,Q v ...,P) 1\ (P v Q) 1\ (-.Q v Q). 
4. Eliminate the connectives. 
Hence (P v --,P) 1\ ( --,Q v --,P) 1\ (P v Q) 1\ ( --,Q v Q) can be reduced to the following clauses: 
{P, --,P} {--,Q, --,P}, {P, Q} and {-.Q, Q} 
Classical Propositional Logic 18 
We now have clauses but we still have no idea how to use them in proving anything. This is where we 
need to define the resolution principle (Genesereth & Nilsson 1987). 
Definition 11 (Resolution Principle) 
For any two clauses C1 and C2, if there is a literal L1 in C1 that is complementary to a literal L2 in C2, 
then delete L1 and L:: from C1 and C2 respectively, and construct the union of the remaining clauses. 
The constructed clause is called a resolvent ofC1 and C2. 
For instance, from the example above the two clauses {P, Q} and {-.Q, Q} will be resolved with each 
other since Q is in the one clause and -,Q is in the other, thus giving {P, Q} as resolvent. 
The notion of a proof in a resolution system follows from the following definition: 
Definition 12 
A unit clause is a clause with only one literal. An empty clause is a clause with no literals. 
A proof system using resolution can be described in terms of a refutation system, that is, in order to 
show that there exists a proof for a formula A from a set of formulas r, A is negated and the resolution 
principle is used to derive a contradiction from r u {-,A}. A contradiction is found once two clauses 
are derived that have the form {A} and { -,A}. Applying the resolution principle to these two clauses 
results in the empty clause. In other words, if we succeed in deriving the empty clause we have 
effectively found a contradiction. We define this process formally by means of the following definition. 
Definition 13 
Given a set r of clauses, a resolution (deduction) of A from r is a finjte sequence A" A2, ... Ak of 
clauses such that each A; is either a clause in r or a resolvent of clauses prec;ding A; where A = A~o A 
deduction of the empty clause from r u {-.A} is called a refutation or proof of A from r (Chang & 
Lee 1973:73). 
A is defined as a theorem of r if the empty clause is deduced from r u {-,A}. Hence it follows from 
this definition that if we want to show that a formula A is a theorem of a set of formulas r all we need 
to do is negate A, convert A and r into clausal form and then try to deduce the empty clause. 
This definition is illustrated by showing that Q is a theorem of {P ~ Q, P}. The formulas are 
converted to clause form using the conversion rules above. 
I. 
2. 
P ~ Q is replaced by 
P is replaced by 
{-,P,Q} 
{P} 
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From the discussion above it should be clear that in order to prove that Q is a theorem of the set of 
clauses given in l and 2 above, we need to negate Q, write it in clausal form and try to derive the empty 
clause. Negating Q and writing it in clause form gives us the following clause: {-.Q} and as a result the 
following set of clauses { {-.P, Q}, {P}, {-.Q} }. Listing these clauses sequentially the final result is 
proved as follows: 
I. {-.P,Q} Given 
2. {P} Given 
3. { -.Q} Given 
4. { -.P} From I and 3 (Q, -.Q) 
5. {} From 2 and 4 (P, -.P) 
In general resolution proofs are shown in a stepwise format as done in the example above. Also note 
that we could have applied the resolution principle in more than one way. For instance, we could have 
used the following proof instead ofthe one given above. 
I. {-.P,Q} Given 
2. {P} Given 
3. { --,Q} Given 
4. {Q} From 2 and I (P, -.P) 
5. {} From 3 and 4 (Q, -.Q) 
It follows therefore that resolution proofs are not unique. This phenomena will also be apparent in the 
resolution systems that are presented in chapter 4. 
3.3 Tableaux Systems 
As with resolution, tableaux proofs are also refutation systems, that is, in order to prove that A is a 
theorem of a set of clauses r, we negate A and attempt to fmd a contradiction using a tableau system. 
This section will therefore provide a brief overview of tableau systems and how they can be used to 
determine whether a formula A is logically entailed by a set of formulas r. 
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In computer science we often refer to data structures known as trees. These are merely structures that 
are made up of different nodes that branch to the left or right of a central node. We call a tree structure 
a binary tree if every node has a left and right child (refer to the left most diagram below). Each node is 
usually assigned a meaning such as, one node for every state, one node for every formula, one node for 
each class. The branches are used to connect the nodes in order to allow the traversing of the tree in a 
forward or backward fashion. The shape of the tree is therefore determined by the way the nodes are 
connected via the branches. For example, a tree with seven nodes may have one or none of the 
following shapes: 
The end nodes of the trees are often referred to as leaf nodes of the tree. The binary tree on the left, for 
instance, has four leaf nodes. 
In artificial intelligence these tree structures are used to construct tableaux proofs. For instance the 
nodes in the tableaux proofs in this section will be made up of propositional formulas and as the proof 
advances new nodes and branches will be created. As with resolution our main aim is to find a 
refutation proof for A from a set of formulas r. We prove this result by listing -,A and the set of 
formulas r sequentially as the branch of a tree. We then use a number of f1!1es to expand the formulas, 
which in turn expands the tree, until we reach a contradiction. In the rest of this section we will look at 
what rules we may use to expand a tree in tableaux systems as well as how to recognise a contradiction. 
In tableaux systems we refer to the rules used to expand the initial set of formulas as tableau 
expansion rules. For the purpose of this dissertation we will use the tableau expansion rules as 
described by Fitting ( 1990b ). In order to do so we need to look at two types of formulas referred to as a. 
and p types. 
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a type formulas are formulas that have the same structure as the formulas that appear on the left side 
of the following table. These formulas are generally considered as and formulas, that is, if the a 
formula in the left column is true then both the formulas listed under a 1 and a 2 will be true as well. For 
example, if we are given that (A 1\ B) is true then we can safely assume that A is true and that 8 is true. 
The same result holds for the other formulas in the table. 
a al az 
(A A B) A B 
-.(A v B) --,A --,B 
--,(A~ B) A --,B 
A~B A~B B~A 
13 type formulas are formulas that have the same structure as the formulas that appear on the left side of 
the following table. These formulas are generally considered to be or formulas, that is, if the 13 formula 
is true then either 13 1 or 132 or both will be true. So for instance if we are given that (A v B) is true then 
we can safely assume that A is true or B is true or both. Similarly for the other formulas in the table. 
13 131 13z 
(A v B) A B 
--,(A A B) --,A --,B 
(A~B) --,A B 
--,(A~ B) --,(A~ B) --,(B ~A) 
Tableau expansion rules: 






13 13t I 13z 
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Consider any tree T and any branch R of the tree. We can expand the tree using the tableau expansion 
rules defined above as follows (Fitting 1990b:37): 
• For every occurrence of the formula -,-,A on R, extend R by adding a node labelled A to its end. 
• For every occurrence of the formula-, Ton R, extend R by adding a node labelled ..L to its end. 
• For every occurrence of the formula -...Lon R, extend R by adding a node labelled T to its end. 
• For every occurrence of the formula a on R, extend R by adding two nodes, one below the other. 
Label the one node a 1 and the other node a 2• 
• For every occurrence of the formula~ on R, extend R by adding a left and right node. Label the one 
node ~ 1 and the other ~2• 
For example, we can transform the formula ( -.(P " -.Q) " P " -.Q) into the following tree using the 






~P ~ Q 4 
I 
Q 
Although the munbers on the right are not part of the proof we have nevertheless used them to make the 
following discussion clear. Step 1 in the tree is the root node of the tree and is labelled by the initial 
formula. Step 2 is the result of applying the a expansion rule to the initial formula. Step 3 is the result 
of applying the a expansion rule to the formula P " -.Q. Step 4 is the result of applying a ~ tableau 
expansion rule to -.(P " Q). Finally step 5 is the result of applying the first tableau expansion rule, as 
shown in the table above. 
This process of constructing and expanding a tree is formalised in the following definition. 
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Definition 14 
Let {A~o ... ,An} be a finite set of'propositionalformulas: 
I. The following one branch tree is a tableau for {A~o ... , A,J 
A, 
2. If T is a tableau for {A~o ... , A,J and T* results from T by the application of a Tableau 
Expansion rule then T* is a tableau for {A" ... , A,J (Fitting I990b:37). 
A tableau proof is defmed by means ofthe following two definitions. 
Definition 15 
A branch B of a tableau is called closed: 
I. if both A and -.4 occur on B for some propositional formula A 
2. or if ..L occurs on B. 
We say that a tableau is closed if every branch B is closed (Fitting I990b:38). 
Definition 16 
A tableau proof of a formula rl from a set of formulas r, is a closed tableau for r u { -.4}. We say that 
A is a theorem of Fif A has a tableau proof from F(Fitting 1990b:38). 
A tableau proof can be demonstrated by means of the following examp}e: 
Consider once again the example of Tweety and Garfield. Representing the formulas in terms of P and 
Q we show that Q is logically entailed by {P, P~Q} by means of a tableau proof. In other words by 
definition 16, we show that the tableau for {P, P ~ Q} u {-,Q} is closed. Applying definition 14 to the 







~ Q 2 
Step 1 is the root of the tableau and contains the initial formulas of our system. Step 2 is the result of 
applying the 13 rule to (P ~ Q ). Now by definition 15.1 if A and -,A appear on the same branch then 
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the branch is closed. If we look at the left hand side of our tree we notice that both P and .,p appear on 
the branch hence we can close the left branch. Similarly if we look at the right hand side of the tree we 
notice that both Q and -,Q occur on the same branch so we can close this branch as well. Since both 
branches are closed we can conclude by definition 15 that our tableau is closed. Hence by definition 16 
we have a tableau proof for Q from {P, P ~ Q}. 
4. SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS 
Before we close this chapter we need to discuss some properties of the three proof systems that we 
have given above. The first property that we will look at states that if a proof exists for a formula A, 
from a set of formulas r, then we know that A is logically entailed by r. This property is known as 
soundness. The second property that we will look at is known as completeness. This property ensures 
that if a formula A is logically entailed by a set of formulas r then we know that a proof exists for A 
from r. 
4.1 Hilbert Proof Systems 
Theorem 4 (Hilbert Soundness) 
If a proof exists for a formula A from a set of formulas r, then A is logically entailed by r. i.e. if Fo A 
thenFoA. 
(See Fitting 1990b:75 for a proof.) 
Theorem 5 (Hilbert Completeness) 
If a formula A is logically entailed by a set of formulas Fthen there exists a proof for A from r. i.e. if 
FoA thenroA. 
(See Fitting 1990b:75 for a proof.) 
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4.2 Resolution Proof Systems 
We will focus on two variations of soundness and completeness for resolution proof systems. Firstly we 
will look at resolution soundness and completeness for the special case where r is the empty set. 
Secondly we will focus on what is known as strong resolution soundness and completeness i.e. 
resolution soundness and completeness for any sets of formulas r. 
We state resolution soundness without proof. 
Theorem 6 (Resolution Soundness) 
If A has a resolution proof, then A is a tautology, i.e. if 0 A then 0 A. 
Theorem 7 (Resolution Completeness) 
If A is a tautology then A has a resolution proof, i.e. if o A then o A. 
Proof: Before proving completeness we require the following definition and theorem (which we state 
without proof). (See Fitting 1990b for details.) 
1. Definition 
r is resolution consistent if and only if (if]) the empty clause cannot be derived from r 
2. Model Existence Theorem 
Let r be a finite set of clauses. If r is resolution consistent, then r is satisfiable, i.e. there is 
an interpretation I that satisfies every c E r 
We prove completeness as follows: Suppose that A is a tautology and that it is not the case that o A, 
that is, the empty clause cannot be derived from the set {-,A}. It follows by 1 that the set {-.A} is 
resolution consistent. By 2 this means that {-.A} is satisfiable for some interpretation I. This in turn 
means that -.A is true in I. But then A cannot be a tautology, that is, it is not the case that oA. o 
Theorem 8 (Strong Resolution Soundness) 
For any set ojformulas r, and any formula A: If ro A then ro A, i.e. if there exists a resolution proof 
for aformula A from a set of formulas Fthen Flogically entails A. 
(See Fitting 1990b:67 for a proof.) 
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Theorem 9 (Strong Resolution Completeness) 
For any set ojformulas r. and any formula A: lfFo A. then ro A, that is, if a formula A is logically 
entailed by a set of formulas r. then there exists a resolution proof for A from r 
Proof: The following results, stated without proof, are required in order to prove completeness. 
1. Lemma 
ro A if! there is a finite set rF s;;; rsuch that rF D A. 
2. Lemma 
Let FF = {A1.A2 . ... , An}. Then FFoA iff oA1 .11 ... A An -+A. 
Completeness is proved as follows: Assume that F[]A.. By the compactness theorem (theorem 3) it 
follows that there is a finite set rF s;;; rsuch that IF D A. Let rF = {Ah A2, ... , An} then by theorem 1, D 
A1 " A2 " ... " An ~ A is valid. From resolution completeness it follows that o A1 " A2 " ... 1\ An ~ 
A. Hence by the lemma in 2 above, we have FF 0 A, and therefore To A by 1. D 
4.3 Tableaux Proof Systems 
Similar to resolution, two variations of soundness and completeness for tableaux systems will be 
presented. In the first variation tableaux soundness and completeness will be presented for the case 
where r is the empty set. In the second variation a stronger version of tableaux soundness and 
completeness is presented where r is any set of formulas. 
Theorem 10 (Tableau Soundness) 
If A has a tableau proof then A is a tautology, i.e. if oA then oA· 
(Refer to Fitting 1990b:50 for the proof.) 
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Theorem 11 (Tableau Completeness) 
!fA is a tautology then A has a tableau proof, i.e. if oA then []A. 
Proof: Before we prove tableau completeness we need the following definition and theorem (stated 
without proof). (Details can be found in Fitting l990b.) 
I. Definition. 
A finite set r of propositional formulas is tableau consistent if there is no closed tableau for 
r 
2. Model Existence Theorem. 
If the set of formulas r is tableau consistent then Fis satisfiable. 
We now prove tableau completeness. Assume that A is a tautology and that it is not the case that []A. 
Then by definition there is no closed tableau for {-,A}. Then by I {-,A} is tableau consistent. But then 
by 2, -,A is satisfiable. Therefore A can't be a tautology, that is, it is not the case that o A. • 
Thus far we have been dealing with tableaux, that make use of finite sets of formulas, r. As with 
resolution the set r may be infinite. We therefore need to review what the impact of this infinite set 
may be on tableau proofs. By definition of a tableau proof we know that if the tableau for r u {...,A} is 
closed then A is a theorem of r. The problem is how to construct the tableau proof. Clearly, since r is 
infinite, we cannot list all the members of r at the top of the tableau as was done previously, since this 
would take an infinite amount of time. A new approach is therefore required that will permit the 
construction of a tableau for r u {-,A} in a finite amount of time. This tableau can be constructed by 
using the following r-rule as detined by Fitting (I990b). 
Definition 17 
The F-introduction rule for a tableau is: Any member A of r, where r is an infinite set of formulas, 
can be added to the end of any tableau branch. We write r o A if there is a closed tableau for {-.A}, 
allowing the F-introduction rule for a tableau. 
Essentially if r is infinite we v.ill start constructing a tableau by picking an arbitrary formula from r 
and extend the tableau by means of applying the tableau expansion rules. If we need another formula 
from r we will simply add it to a branch. We will keep repeating this process until we find a proof for 
some formula A e r. From these results we can now state strong tableau soundness and completeness. 
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Theorem 12 (Strong Tableau Soundness) 
For any set of formulas r, and any formula A: If r o A then r o A, that is, if there exists a tableau 
proojj'or a formula A from a set ofjormulas rthen A is logically entailed by T 
Proof: The following preliminary results are required, which are stated without proof: 
1. Lemma 
r C: A iff there is a finite set rF s;; r such that rF 0 A. 
2. Lemma 
Let rr = {AJ. A2, ... , An)· Then rr 0 A iff 0 A1 .11 ••• .11 An -+A. 
Suppose that r 0 A. Then, by 1 there is a finite set r F !:; r such that r F 0 A. It follows therefore that 0 
At 1\ A2 A ..• A An~ A by 2 above (where fp ={At. A2, ••• ,An}). Hence 0 At A A2 A ... A An~ A by 
tableau soundness and therefore by theorem I r F 0 A. Hence by the compactness theorem we have 
roA.o 
Theorem 13 (Strong Tableau Completeness) 
For any set of formulas r, and any propositional formula A: If ro A then ro A, that is, if a formula A 
is logically entailed by a set offormulas r, then there exists a tableau proof for A .from T 
Proof: Suppose fo A. Then by the compactness theorem there is a finite set fF!:; f, such that fp 0 A. 
Let fF ={At. Az, ... An}. Then by theorem 1, 0 At A A2 A .•. A An~ A. So by tableau completeness, 
oAt A A2 A .•. A An ~ A. Then by the lemma from 2 of theorem 12, f F [j A. Therefore f o A by the 
lemma from 1 oftheorem 12. c 
5. DECIDABILITY 
We conclude this chapter with the notion of decidability. In propositional logic we use the term 
decidable to describe a proof procedure that when given a formula A and a set of formulas f is 
guaranteed to terminate and output either a 'yes' (A is a theorem of f) or 'no' (A is not a theorem of f) 
answer. By 'yes' we mean that r logically entails A and by 'no' we mean that r does not logically entail 
A. We will discuss decidability with regards to resolution and tableau systems. Note that propositional 
logic is decidable for all finite sets r, but only semi-decidable for all sets r (i.e. including infinite sets). 
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5.1 Resolution 
To show decidability for resolution we need to describe a proof procedtu"e that meets the following 
requirements: 
• Accepts a formula A as input 
• Accepts a finite set of formulas r. 
• Uses resolution to find a proof of A from r, if one exists. 
• If there exists a proof for A from r then the procedtu"es terminates with a 'yes' answer otherwise the 
procedtu"e terminates with a 'no' answer. 
We will describe one such procedtu"e. This procedW"e is simplistic and inefficient but nevertheless 
illustrates the fact that resolution is decidable for finite sets of formulas. 
INPUT: 
• A formula A 










PROCEDURE RESOL VE(f) 
i = 1. 
REPEAT! 
IF length(r) < i THEN 
Return (Failure) 
END IF 
Classical Propositional Logic 
/* end of clause list no proof found */ 
Clause I= ChooseCiause(f, i) 
j = 1. 
REPEAT2 
IF length(r) < j THEN /*end oflist */ 
Exit Repeat2 
END IF 
Clause2 = ChooseClause(r, j). 
IF Clause I <> Clause2 THEN 
Resolvent= ResolveClauses(Clausel, Clause2) 
IF Resolvent is not the empty set THEN 














A = Negate(A). 
Concatenate (f, A). 
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Convert([) /*for example after conversion r = { {P}, {-.P,Q}, {-.Q, R}, {-.R}} */ 
Resolve([) 







Yes (there exists a proof for A from f) or No (there is no proof for A from f) answer. 
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The procedure Implications_ out systematically removes all the implications from the formulas in r, 
using a similar process to that defined in the conversion procedure (item 1) in section 3.2. This 
procedure will eventually terminate since r is finite and therefore there are only a finite number of 
formulas that need to be converted. Similar arguments hold for the remaining of the procedures listed in 
the procedure CONVERT. Replace _ _i and Replace_T follows the·same procedure as that of the 
conversion procedure item 2. Item 3 of the conversion procedure is performed by Negations_ in, item 4 
by Disjunctions_in and finally item 5 is performed by the procedure Connectives_out. It should 
therefore be clear that since r is finite each of the procedures listed in the procedure CONVERT will 
take a finite amount of time and as a result the procedure CONVERT will also take a finite amount of 
time and will eventually terminate with a finite list of clauses. 
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In the procedure RESOLVE the only other procedure that is listed is the procedure ResolveClauses. 
Essentially this procedure compares the literals in the two clauses with each other in order to ascertain 
if there are any complementary literals. Once two complementary literals have been identified their 
resolvent is derived. Note that for the sake of completeness it is assumed that this procedure will resolve 
all complementary literals. In other words the variable Resolvent may contain more than one clause, if 
there was more than one way to resolve the two clauses. For example if the clauses given to the 
procedure ResolveClauses are { -,P, Q} and { -,Q, P} then Resolvent={ {Q, -,Q},{-,P, P}} at the end of 
the procedure. Although this is not the most appropriate way to handle this dilemma it does avoid a lot 
of backtracking later on in the procedure. Clearly the procedure ResolveClauses will eventually 
terminate since there are only a finite number of literals in the two clauses and thus there is only a finite 
number of ways to resolve the literals with each other. 
The procedure RESOLVE systematically works through all the clauses in r attempting to resolve them 
with each other. Sooner or later all the resolvents of the clauses will have been added to r since there 
are only a finite number of clauses that can be resolved with each other. It follows therefore that this 
procedure will terminate in a finite amount of time and as a result the procedure START will also 
terminate in a finite amount of time. 
5.2 Tableaux 
To show decidability for tableaux systems with finite sets of formulas we need to describe a proof 
procedure that meets the following requirements: 
• Accepts a formula A as input 
• Accepts a finite set offormulas r as input. 
• Uses a tableau proof to find a proof of A from r, if one exists. 
• If there exists a tableau proof for A from r then the procedure terminates with a 'yes' answer 
otherwise the procedure tem1inates with a 'no' answer. 
Once again there are many different procedures that implement decidability for tableaux systems. We 
will only look at one such example. Although inefficient, it nevertheless works. This procedure can be 
described by means of the following pseudo code: 
Note that we will assume that if a node has only one child node then the child node will be referred to 
as the left node. 
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INPUT: 
• A fonnula A. 
• A finite set offonnulas r = {f1, f 2, ... , fn} 
PROCEDURE: 
Create the initial branch of the tree and list all the input fonnulas sequentially, that is -,A, ft. f 2, ... , fn· 
Number the tableau expansion rules sequentially. 
current node= root node. 
End of tree= false. 
WHILE not End of tree 
FOR each tableau expansion rule, ~. 
Expand the tree by applying the rule~ to the fonnula at the Current node 
END-FOR. 
New node found = false. 
REPEAT 
IF current node has an unmarked left child THEN 
current node = left child node. 
New node found = true. 
ELSE IF current node has a unmarked right child THEN 
current node = right child node. 
ELSE 
END-IF. 
New node found = true. 
mark current node. 
IF current node = root node THEN 
End of tree = true. 
ELSE 
current node = parent node. 
END-IF. 
UNTIL New node found OR End of tree. 
END WHILE 
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FOR each branch in the tree 
IF two fonnulas A and -,A appear on the branch or .1. THEN 
Mark the branch as closed. 
END-IF. 
END-FOR. 
IF all the branches are marked closed THEN 
End the procedure with a 'yes' answer 
ELSE 
End the procedure with a 'no' answer. 
END-IF. 
OUTPUT: 
A 'yes' ifr u {-,A} is unsatisfiable else 'no'. 
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This procedure expands the tableau tree by applying the expansion rules to each of the fonnulas at a 
given node. The expansion rules are applied to all the nodes on the left side of the tree and then to the 
nodes on the right side of the tree. Sooner or later all the expansion rules will have been applied to all 
the fonnulas at all the nodes, since r is finite. At this stage all we need to do is determine whether the 
branches of the tree are all closed or not. This will involve traversing each branch and detennining 
whether there are two propositional fonnulas of the type A and ....,A. Once we have completed this task 
we have to see whether we have a closed tableau or not. If we do, then we know that there exists a proof 
for A from r, and from tableau soundness and completeness we know-that r logically entails A. If the 
tableau is not closed we know that there does not exist a proof for A from r and therefore we can 
conclude that it is not the case that r logically entails A. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this survey of classical propositional logic the emphasis has been on highlighting the techniques 
developed by researchers to pem1it proofs to be generated in computer environments. From chapter 3 
onwards theses ideas and strategies will be extended to propositional modal logic. 
-1 ?: -
PROPOSITIONAL MODAL LOGIC 
It was a doorway to magic. mysterious, brain cracking worlds, worlds where you had to tread carefully, worlds where you 
made up your own rules, worlds where you had to accept complete responsibility for your actions. 
-Fynn 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modal logic, an extension of pure propositional logic, is an ancient subject devised by philosophers 
and modelled by mathematicians. Roughly speaking, it allows us to define the modes in which a 
proposition could be true or false. For example, the statement 'Garfield is on the mat' is an assertion of 
the indicative. The same statement could on the other hand be expressed in a different mood as the 
more conditional: 'Garfield might be on the mat' (i.e. it is possible that Garfield is on the mat), and 
even more forceful: 'Garfield must be on the mat' (i.e. it is necessary that Garfield is on the mat). 
To facilitate the expression of phrases such as 'it is possibly the case that' and 'it is necessary that' we 
introduce two unary propositional connectives 0 and D. The unary connective D expresses various 
modes of truth such as: 
• it is necessarily true that A; 
• it has always been true that A; 
• it is known that A; 
• it is provable that A; 
• throughout the computation, A; 
• along all future paths, A. 
The unary connective 0 expresses modes of truth such as: 
• it is possible I could be I might be that A is true; 
• probably A; 
• at the next state, A; 
• it will eventually be true that A; 
• it ought to be that A. 
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We call these unary connectives 0 and 0 modal operators and the systems of logic in which they are 
contained are called modal systems or modal logics. These systems are used extensively in various 
branches of artificial intelligence and computing sciences such as logics of knowledge and belief, logics 
of programs and for tasks such as the specification of distributed and concurrent systems. For example, 
for a set S of possible states of a computation process we can define a relation R on S such that sRt 
means that there is an execution of a non-deterministic program that starts in states and terminates in 
state t. Then we could define OA to mean that 'every terminating execution of the program brings 
about A', and OA to mean that the program enables A, i.e. 'there is some execution that terminates with 
A true.' 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to modal logic based primarily on the work of Chellas 
(1980). Section 2 introduces the syntax of propositional modal logic with the semantics of propositional 
modal logic presented in section 3. In section 4 we will introduce normal systems of modal logic and in 
particular we will define the normal systems KT4, KT4L and KT5. Section 5 covers soundness and 
section 6 completeness of these normal systems. Section 7 shows determination for these systems and 
section 8 concludes this chapter with a discussion on decidability for the normal systems KT4, KT4L, 
KT5. 
2. PROPOSITIONAL MODAL LOGIC 
This section is devoted to a recital of the basic syntactic concepts for the language of modal logic. 
The language is founded on: 
• A possible infinite set of atomic formulas represented by the letters P, Q, ~ .... 
• The logical connectives: -,,A, v, ~. B, 0, 0. 
• The constants T, j_ 
• The punctuation symbols "(" and")". 
To aid readability we will assign the following order of precedence among the connectives: 0, 0 -,,A, 
The set offormulas of propositional modal logic can be defined recursively as follows: 
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Definition 18 
I. Any atom A is a formula. 
2. Tis aj(Jrmula. 
3. .1 is aformula. 
4. !fA is a formula then -.A, DA, OA are formulas. 
5. If A and B are formulas then A /\ B, A v B, A -+ B, A H Bare formulas. 
6. All formulas are generated by applying the rules above. 
3. STANDARD MODELS 
3.1 Definition 
Recall that in chapter 2 we assigned meaning to the formulas in the propositional language in terms of 
interpretations. In modal logic we use standard models to represent a notion similar to that of 
interpretations in propositional logic. Standard models therefore determine the semantics of modal logic 
formulas. 
Definition 19 
M = < W, R, V> is a standard model if and only if (ijj): 
I. W is a set of possible worlds. 
2. R is a binary relation on W (i.e. R s;::; W x W). 
3. Vis a mapping of atoms to subsets ofW 
(i.e. V(P) s;::; Wfor an atom P).(Chellas 1980:68.) 
The term 'model' and 'standard model' will be used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
For example M=<W, R, V> where: 
• W={a.,p}, 
• R = {<a., a.>, <p,p>} and 
• V(P) ={a.} 
• V(Q) = {P} 
is a standard model, where P and Q are the only atoms in the language. 
The reader may encounter the notion of a frame in alternative sources of modal logic. A frame is 
simply the model M defined above without the mapping V, that is, F = <W, R> is a frame. 
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3.2 Truth 
Now that we have defined what a standard model looks like we need to define when a formula is true in 
a given standard model and when it is not. From the definition above it should be clear that standard 
models consist of a set of different worlds. Each of these worlds provide a different interpretation for a 
given formula. It is therefore possible for a formula, say A, to be true at one world and false at another, 
or for A to be true at all the worlds in a given model, or none of the worlds. We will write o ~ A to 
mean that A is true at the world a in a model M. 
The truth conditions for statements in a standard model are defined as follows (Chellas 1980:35): 
Definition 20 











For any atom P, 0 ~ P iff a E V(P) 
M 
Oa T 
It is not the case that o ~ ..1.. 
o ~ -,A iff it is not the case that o ~A. 
o ~A/\ B iff both 0 ~A and 0 ~B. 
o ~A v B iff eithero ~ A oro~ B, or both. 
o~ A -+B iffifo~ A theno~ B. 
0 ~ A H B iff 0 ~A if and only if 0 ~B. 
0 ~ A iff for every f3 in M such that aR/3. 0 ~A. 
o ~ OA iff for some f3 in M such that aR/3. 0 ~A. 
If a model M=<W ,R, V> exists such that for a E W we have o ~ A then we say that M satisfies A. 
Formally: 
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Definition 21 
Let M=< W.R, V> be a model and A any formula. We say that M satisfies A if there is a world a E W 
such that o ~~A . A is said to be unsatisflab/e if there isn't any model that satisfies the formula A 
(Chellas 1980:36). 
We will say that A is true at a model M if and only if it is the case that A is true at every world in the 
model M. This statement can be formalised into a definition. 
Definition 22 
A is true at a model M written oM A, iff for every world a in M, o ':A (Chell as 1980: 36). 
In propositional modal logic we can group models into classes of models. The definitions given so far 
do not define the truth of A in a class of models and therefore we require a further definition. 
Definition 23 
A is valid in a class C of models, written ocA, iff for every model Min C, oM A (Chell as 1980: 36). 
A number of formulas or sets of formulas have the interesting property that they are true in all classes of 
standard models. The first of these is the set of modal tautologies. 
If the modal language was to be treated as a propositional language (as defined in chapter 2) with atoms 
P, Q, ... OP, OQ, ... OOP, ... , OP, OQ, ... then formulas such as OP v ::oOP would be tautologies in 
terms of definition 4 in the propositional context. In the modal context, these formulas with their 
tautological structure, referred to as modal tautologies, are all valid in any class of standard models. For 
the remainder of this dissertation the set of tautologies will be the set of all propositional and modal 
tautologies. 
Theorem 14 
If A is a tautology, then ocAfor any class C of standard models. 
(Refer to Chellas 1980:37 for a proof.) 
Another set of formulas that are true in all classes of standard models are the formulas that have the 
form OA ~ --,0--,A denoted by oro. Note that all formulas that have the same structure as oro are said 
to be an instance of the schema (i.e. every formula of this form) Oro. For instance the formulas OP ~ 
--,0--,P and O(P ~ Q) ~ --,0--,(P ~ Q) are instances of the schema oro. 
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Theorem 15 
Let C be a class of standard models. Then every instance oft he schema Dj 0. OA H -,[]-,A, is valid in 
C. ie.;;cOA H---, --vi. 
(Refer to Chellas 1980:69 for details of the proof.) 
Although there are other schemas that are valid in all classes of standard models we will not cover them 
here as we do not require their results in the ensuing sections. The interested reader is referred to the 
work of Chellas (1980). 
From theorem 1 the reader will remember that we noted that for a given set of formulas r = { A~> A2, 
... , An} and a formula A, r logically entails A if and only if (A1 1\ A2 1\ .•. 1\ An) ~ A is valid. Modal 
logic on the other hand distinguishes between two types of logical entailment, namely local and global 
entailment. We look at local entailment first: 
Definition 24 
Let C be a class of models, r a set of formulas and A a formula. A is locally logically entailed by r, 
with respect to C, if and only if for every M=< W,R, V> of C and for every a E W, if 0:! Ai for every Ai 
M 
E Fthen Oa A. 
Global entailment, on the other hand, is defined as follows: 
Definition 25 
Let C be a class of models, r a set of formulas and A a formula. A is gfoballx logically entailed by r, 
with respect to C, if and only if for every Min C, if oM A, for every A, E r then oM A. 
For example, consider the two formulas P and DP. P globally logically entails OP but P does not 
locally logically entail OP. This is because when determining if P globally logically entails DP we 
consider every model M E C in which P is true at every world in the model M. It follows therefore by 
definition of the 0 that OP would be true at every world at which P is in the respective models M. 
This is illustrated by the circle on the left below. For local logically entailment all models M E C such 
that P is true at one or more worlds in M are considered. It follows therefore that there may be a model 
M such that P is true at a world w in M but OP is not true at this world, as illustrated by the circle on 
the right in the following diagram. 
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P does not locally 
logically entail DP 
The following theorem holds for both local and global entailment. 
Theorem 16 
41 
If the formulas A" ... , An (n ~ 0) are all valid in a class C of models and A is logically entailed by A" 
... , A,. then A is also valid in C. 
Proof: We show local logical entailment first. Suppose At. ... ,An (n ~ 0) are all valid in a class C of 
models and that A is a logically entailed by A" ... , An. We have to show that A is valid in C. 
Choose any model M=<W, R., V> inC, and any world a E W. By assumption, we have that A" ... , An 
are true in M and therefore A1. ... , An are all true at a in M, i.e. we have o ~ A1 1\ A2 ... 1\ An· Since A1. 
... , An logically entail A we know from definition 24 above that if o t;; A1 1\ A2 ... 1\ An then o t;; A. 
Since M was an arbitrarily chosen model in C, and a an arbitrary chose world in M we have that A is 
true at every world a in every model M of C, i.e. oeA. 
For global logical entailment, suppose that A1. ... , An (n ~ 0) are all valid in a class C of models and that 
A is a globally logically entailed by A1, ... , An. We have to show that A is valid in C. 
Choose any model M=<W, R, V> in C such that oM A1 1\ A2 ... 1\ An. Since A~. ... , An globally logically 
entail A we know from definition 25 above that if oM A1 1\ A2 ... 1\ An then oM A. Since M is an 
arbitrary model in C, we have that A is true in every model M of C, i.e. oeA. o 
Note that for both local and global logical entailment we have that if De A1 1\ A2 1\ ••• An ~ A then foe 
A, for any class of models C, formula A and set of formulas r = {A~> A2, ... An}. The converse, 
however, does not hold for both global and local entailment. Since, unlike local entailment, if r 
globally logically entails A then it need not be the case that De A 1 1\ A 2 1\ ..• An ~ A. For instance, 
from the example above it should be clear that P globally logically entails DP but it is not the case that 
De P ~ OP. 
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The following result concludes this section. This result is also applicable to all classes of standard 
models and is used in later sections. 
Theorem 17 
For n _:::: 0, and/or any class C of standard models ifoc(A 1 .11 A2 .... /\ A,J ~A, then oc(i A. 1 .11 .... /\ 
A,J ~ A. 
(Refer to Chellas 1980:69-70 for a proof.) 
3.3 The Schemas L,T, B, 4 And 5 
For the remainder of this chapter the schemas L, T, B, 4 and 5 will be considered for special attention. 
The focus is essentially on these schemas because of their historical prominence and because these 
schemas are important in defining different modal logics. 
These schemas are defined as follows: 
B. A~ OOA. 
L. O((A A DA) ~B) v 0 ((B 1\ DB)~ A) 
T. DA~A. 
4. DA~DDA. 
5. OA~ OOA. 
Initially, it is important to note that these schemas are not valid in all classes of standard models and 
they are not necessarily valid or invalid in the same classes of standard_. models. In other words there 
exists classes of standard models in which each of these schemas are invalid. this result is noted in the 
following theorem the details which can be found in Chellas (1980:76). 
Theorem 18 
None of the schema's B, L, T, 4 and 5 are valid in the class of all standard models. 
Despite the fact that none of the schemas D, T, B, 4 and 5 are valid in the class of all standard models 
they are, however, valid in specific classes of standard models. These classes have specific properties 
associated to the properties of the relations within their models. We will define the properties of the 
relations as follows: Let M = <W, R, V> be a standard model. The relation R is: 
• reflexive iff for every a E W, aRa; 
• symmetric iff for every a and I} E W, if aRI}, then I}Ra; 
• transitive iff for every a,!}, andy E W, if aRI} and I}Ry, then aRy; 
• weakly-connected iff for every a, !}, y E W, if aRP and aRy then pRy or I} = y or yRI}. 
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The model M itself is called reflexive, symmetric, transitive or weakly-connected if the relation R has 
these properties. [fall the reflexive models were to be grouped into a class of standard models and the 
same was to be done for all the symmetric, transitive and weakly-connected models the following result 
would be apparent with regards to the schemas defined above. 
Theorem 19 
Let C be a class of standard models. 
I. If all the models inC are reflexive, then Tis valid in C. 
2. If all the models in Care symmetric, then B is valid in C. 
3. If all the models in C are transitive, then 4 is valid in C. 
4. If all the models in Care weakly-connected, then L is valid in C. 
(Refer to Chellas 1980:80 for a proof.) 
4. NORMAL SYSTEMS OF MODAL LOGIC 
4.1 Introduction 
A system of modal logic is any set of formulas containing all the tautologies and that is closed under the 
rule of inference RPL, which states that from A~> ... ,An (n ::=:: 0) we can conclude A where A is logically 
entailed (i.e. logical entailment for propositional logic) by A~> ... , An Formally a normal system of 
modal logic is defined as follows: 
Definition 26 
A system of modal logic is defined to be normal if and only if it contains all instances of the schema 
DfOand is closed under the rule of inference (A 1 /\ ... /\ A,J -+A I (114. 1 /\ .. . /\U4,)--+ LZ4 (n _:::: 0) (read: 
from (A 1/\ ... /\ A,J --+A we can infer (;JA 1 /\ .. /\1 :A,) --+ i A (n _:::: 0)) called RK (Chell as 1980: 114). 
We will call the smallest normal system of modal logic K. K contains all instances of the schema DfO 
and is closed under the rule of inference RK. Since K is the smallest normal system of modal logic it 
follows that all normal systems of modal logic will contain K. To simplify naming normal systems we 
write KS1 ••• Sn to denote the normal system obtained by taking the schemas S~o ... , Sn as theorems. So for 
example KT4 is the smallest normal system produced by treating the schemas T and 4 (as defined 
previously) as theorems. By the notion of a theorem we mean those formulas that are contained in a 
system. Generally we will write orA to mean that A is a theorem of a system I. This statement can be 
formalised in a definition. 
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Definition 27 
IJl.-A iff A E L where I is a normal system ofmodallogic. 
4.2 The Schemas L, T, B, 4 And 5 
In this section we will discuss the normal extensions of K obtained by adding as theorems the following 
schemas: 
L. O(A A DA ~ B) ~ O(B A DB ~A) 
T. DA~A 
B. A~ OOA 
4. DA~DDA 
5. OA~ OOA 
Including K itself there are just 15 distinct normal systems produced by taking these schemas as 
theorems in all possible combinations. We will, however, only look at three combinations which have 
received a lot of attention in the realms of artificial intelligence. These are: 
1. KT4, the Lewis system S4. 
2. KT4L which was first studied by Dumment & Lemmon in 1959. This system is often referred 
to as S4.3 and we will define it in terms of the schemas K, T, 4 and L. The reader should be 
aware that other authors may define it differently, for instance, Gore (1995) defines it asK, T, 
4 and 3, where the schema 3 is defined as O(DA ~ B) v D(DB ~ A). 
3. KT5, the Lewis system S5. 
Although KT5 is defined in terms of the schemas K, T and 5 it can also be shown that KT5 contains the 
schemas B and 4, that is, all instances of the schema B and all instances of schema 4 are theorems of 
KT5. This result will be used extensively in the following sections and it is formally proved here. 
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Theorem ·20 
The sc:hema.1· B and 4 are theorems ofKT5. 
Proof: Before showing that KT5 contains the theorems B and 4 we require the following lemma, the 
proof of which can be found in Chellas ( 1980: 114-117). 
Lemma: Every normal system of modal logic has the following rules of inference and theorems. 
RM. A --+ B I DA --+ DB 
RE. A HBIOA HOB 
We show that all instances of the schema B are theorems of KT5 by means of the following proof 
where the right hand side provides the justification for the steps on the left. 
1. 0-.A~ -,A schema T 
2. A~ -.0-.A 1,RPL 
3. OAB-,0-,A DfO 
4. A~OA 2,3,RPL 
5. OA~DOA schema 5. 
6. A~DOA 4, 5, RPL 
We show that all instances of the schema 4 are theorems of KT5. In order to do .so we first need to show 
that ODA ~ DA and OOA B -.00-.A are theorems ofKT5. First we show that ODA B -.00-.A is a 
theorem ofKT5. 
1. DAB --,0-,A 
2. -.DA BO-,A 
3. 0-.DA B 00-.A 
4. -,0-,0A B -,00-,A 
5. OOA B -.0-.DA 
6. OOA B -,00-,A 
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Next we show that OOA ~ OA: 
I. 0--.A ~ 00--.A 5 
2. --.00--.A ~ --.0--.A I, RPL 
3. OA ~ --.0--.A DfO 
4. --.00--.A ~ OA 2,3, RPL 
5. OOA ~ --.00--.A proved above 
6. OOA~OA 4,5,RPL 













It follows therefore that the KT5 system contains all instances ofB and 4. o 
5. SOUNDNESS 
46 
From section 4 in chapter two the reader will recall that the notion of soundness was defined. In this 
section we would like to explore soundness further in terms of the normal systems of modal logic. 
Essentially what we will show is that for each of the normal systems of modal logic defmed above there 
exists classes of standard models in which all of the theorems contained in the normal system of modal 
logic are valid. For instance, if the normal system of modal logic is L: and the class of standard models 
is C then every theorem in L: is valid in C. 
Definition 28 
A system of modal logic I is sound with respect to a class of standard models C iff every theorem of I 
is valid inC, i.e. if orA then ocA (Chellas 1980:59). 
The following theorem provides the basis for proofs of soundness for normal modal logics with respect 
to classes of standard models. 
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Theorem 21 
Let .'h ... , Sn be schemas valid respectively in classes ofstandard models C~o ... , Cn. Then the system of 
modal logic K5it. .. Sn is sound with respect to the class C1 n ... n Cn. 
Proof: Let S~o ... , Sn be the schemas valid in the classes of standard models C1, ••• , Cn respectively. We 
want to show that KS 1 ••• Sn is sound with respect to the class C1 n ... n C". 
Firstly we show that all tautologies are valid in C1 n ... n Cn. This follows from theorem 14. Next we 
show that the class C, n ... n C" validates DfO. This follows from theorem 15. Finally, we show that 
validity in this class is preserved by the rules of inference RK and RPL. Now RK follows from theorem 
1 7 and RPL follows from theorem 16. This completes the proo£ o 
Soundness for the normal systems of modal logic KT4, KT4L and KT5 follows from the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 22 
The normal systems KT4, KT4L and KT5 are sound with respect to the classes of standard models as 






reflexive and transitive 
reflexive, transitive and weakly-connected 
reflexive, symmetriccmd t~ansitive 
Proof: K is sound with respect to every class of standard models, including the whole class, since this 
system is axiomatised (see section 8.1) by DfO, RK and RPL. 
By theorem 19 (1, 3) the schemas T and 4 are valid respectively in classes of reflexive and transitive 
standard models. So it follows by theorem 21 that the system of modal logic KT 4 is sound with respect 
to the class of reflexive-transitive standard models. 
By theorem 19 (1, 3, 4) the schemas T, 4 and L are valid respectively in classes of reflexive, transitive 
and weakly-connected standard models. Consequently it follows by theorem 21 that the system of 
modal logic KT4L is sound with respect to the class of weakly-connected, reflexive-transitive standard 
models. Note that we sometimes refer to the class of weakly-connected, reflexive-transitive standard 
models as the class of totally connected models. 
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In theorem 20 it was shown that Band 4 are theorems ofKT5. By theorem 19 (1, 2, 3) the schemas T, 
B and 4 are valid respectively in classes of reflexive, symmetric and transitive standard models. So it 
follows by theorem 21 that the system of modal logic KT5 is sound with respect to the class CR n Cs n 
Cr of standard models, where CR is the class of reflexive standard models, Cs is the class of symmetric 
standard models and Cr is the class of transitive standard models. o 
6. COMPLETENESS 
We stated in the previous section that a system of modal logic L, is sound with respect to a class of 
models C, if and only if every theorem of L is valid in C. Completeness on the other hand defines the 
converse relationship, that is, a system of modal logic L is complete with respect to a class of models C 
iff every formula A, that is valid in C, is a theorem of the normal system of modal logic, that is, if ocA 
then orA We will prove completeness by using canonical standard models i.e. standard models whose 
worlds verify just those formulas they contain. In order to do so we need to define the concepts of 
consistency and maximality. 
6.1 Consistency 
In order to defme the notion of consistency we need to understand what is meant by the term 
deducible. 
Definition 29 
Let I be a system of modal logic, r a set of formulas, and A any formula. A is deducible from r, 
denoted ForA iff there are A1, ... ,An E F(n2:0) such that mfA 1 '"' ... /\ A,J ~A (Chel/as 1980:47). 
A set of formulas r is said to be consistent in I (denoted Conrr) iff the formula _1_ is not I-deducible 
from r, i.e. r is inconsistent in I (denoted C$nrr) iff for_l_. 
Definition 30 
Let I be a system of modal logic and r a set of formulas. ConrF iff it is not the case that For..L 
(Chel/as 1980:47). 
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6.2 Maximality 
Intuitively, a set is maximal if it is consistent and contains as many formulas as possible without 
becoming inconsistent. 
Definition 31 
Let I be a system of modal logic and T a set of formulas. Tis maximal with respect to L written 
Max rF. if and only if: 
1. ConxT and 
2. for every A, ifConx(Tu{A}) then A E r 
If MaxrF. we say that Tis a };maximal set of formulas (Chellas I980:47). 
Before we list the properties of maximal sets of formulas we need to defme a };system. Since systems 
are simply sets of formulas their relative strengths can be measured in terms of inclusion. that is, a 
system is at least as strong as a system I iff it contains every theorem of I. If a system contains every 
theorem of I we refer to it as a I-system. 
Theorem 23 
Let Tbe a };maximal set offormulas, Then: 
I. A E Tiff TorA. 
2. I~r 
3. TET 
4. ..L ft! r 
5. -u4 E Tiff A ft! T 
6. A A B E Tiff both A E T and B E T 
7. A v B E Tiff either A E Tor B E Tor both 
8. A ~ B E Tiff A {/! Tor B E Tor both 
9. A H B E Tiff both A E T and B E Tor both A ft! T and B ft! T 
I 0. Tis a };system. 
II. OA E Tiff for every };-maximal set Ll such that {A I DA E .r}~LI. 
A ELl. 
12. OA E riff for every .Emaximal set Ll such that { OA I A E L1 }~r. 
A ELl. 
(See Chellas 1980:53,158 for proof.) 
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6.3 Lindenbaum's Lemma 
Due to the properties of maximal sets it would be convenient if we could determine whether every 
consistent set of formulas can be extended to a maximal set. Lindenbaum's lemma shows that this is in 
fact possible. 
Lindenbaum's Lemma 
Let .E be a system of modal logic and r a set of formulas. If Con rF. then there exists a L1 such that r k 
L1 and Max rLI. 
(Refer to Chellas 1980:55 for details of proof.) 
From Lindenbaum's lemma it follows that a formula is a theorem of a normal system of modal logic I 
if and only if it is a member of every maximal set of formulas of I. 
Theorem 24 
orA iff A E 4 for every L1 such that MaxrLI. 
(Refer to Chellas 1980:57 for a proof.) 
6.4 Canonical Standard Models 
We need one more concept before we can present a definition of canonical standard models. This is the 
concept of proof sets. 
Definition 32 
The proof set of a formula A relative to a system .E denoted lAir is the set of I-maximal sets of 
formulas containing A, i.e. lAir= { r1 Maxrrand A EI](Chellas 1980:60). 
Definition 33 
Let M = < W, R, V> be a standard model, and let .E be a normal system of modal logic. M is a 
canonical standard model for .E iff: 
1. W={rl Ma.;r:!:-I]. 
2. For every a in M. DA E a if! for every fJ in M such that aRfJ, A E f3. 
3. V(P) =!Pl.: for each atom P. (Chellas 1980:171.) 
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Note that it is not immediately obvious from this definition that there are any such models; that is, that 
there are relations R satisfying the condition in clause (2) of the definition. We defer to section 6.5 the 
proof that such models do indeed exist. It is however, clear from this definition, that the worlds in 
canonical standard models verify exactly those fonnulas which they contain. We prove this result in the 
following theorem. 
Theorem 25 
Let M=< W,R, V> be a canonical standard model for a normal system L Then for every a r: W. o ~A 
if!Ar:a 
Proof: Let I be a nonnal system of modal logic and let M=<W, R, V> be a canonical standard model 
for I. The proof is by induction on the complexity of A. For the inductive cases we make the 
hypothesis that the result holds for all fonnulas shorter than A. We will only consider those cases 
where: 
• A is atomic 
• A has the fonn --,B 
• A has the fonn B v C 
• A has the fonn DB 
If A is atomic, the result follows immediately from definition 33 (3). 
Suppose A has the fonn .B. Choose any a. in M. First, suppose that cr~ --,B. Then it is not the case 
. 
that o ~ B and by the inductive hypothesis, B e a.. From theorem 23 (5) it follows that --,B e a.. 
Conversely assume --,B E a.. It follows that B e a., since a. E W = {r I Maxrr}. By the induction 
hypothesis it follows that it is not the case that o ~ B, i.e. o ~ --,B by definition 20 ( 4 ). 
Next, suppose that A has the fonn B v C. and choose any a. E W. First, deem that o ~ B v C, i.e. 
o ~ B, or o ~ C, or both. If L ~ B then by the inductive hypothesis, B E a. and from theorem 23 (7), B v 
C e a.. Similarly if o ~ C then B v C E a. . Conversely assume B v C E a.. Then by theorem 23 (7) B E 
a., or C E a., or both. From the inductive hypothesis it follows that o ~ B, or o ~ C, or both. But then by 
definition 20 (6) we have :J ~ B v C. 
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Finally, presume that A has the form DB, and pick any a. e W. First suppose that o ~DB, i.e. for 
every 13 e W such that a.Rj3, u ~ B. By the inductive hypothesis B e 13 for every 13 such that a.RI3. 
Therefore from definition 33 (2) we have that DB e a.. Conversely assume that DB e a.. Then by 
definition 33 (2), for every 13 e W such that a.RI3, B e 13. But then by the inductive hypothesis o ~ B for 
every 13 e W such that a.RI3. By definition 20 (9) this is just o ~ DB.o 
From the theorem above it follows that the theorems of the normal system of modal logic are only those 
formulas that are true in any of its corresponding canonical standard models. In other words if 
M=<W,R,V> is a canonical standard model for a normal system of modal logic I then for any well 
formed formula A, A is true in M if and only if A is a theorem of:L. We prove this result below. 
Theorem 26 
Let M=< W, R, V> be a canonical standard model for a normal system I. Then oM A iff orA. 
Proof: Suppose oM A. Then by definition, o ~A for every a. e W. So by theorem 25, A e a. for every a. 
e W. By the definition of W, A e il, for every il such that Maxril. Therefore, by theorem 24, orA 
Conversely suppose =rA. By theorem 24, A e il for every Maxril. Thus A e a. for every a. e W since 
W={ill MaxrLl}. Then by theorem 25, o~ A for every a. e W, i.e. oM A. o 
6.5 Proper Canonical Standard Models 
As we mentioned in the previous section we do not as yet know whether ~a canonical model exists for a 
normal system of modal logic; merely what one looks like. In order to show completeness for the 
respective normal systems of modal logic, it is imperative that such models exist. Fortunately, we can 
construct models, known as proper canonical standard models, which can be shown to exist for all 
normal systems of modal logic. These constructed models have the advantage that they are canonical 
standard models and as a result we can use these proper canonical standard models to show 
completeness for the normal systems of modal logic. Proper canonical standard models are defmed as 
follows: 
Definition 34 
Let M = < W, R, V> be a standard model, and let I be a normal system of modal logic. M is the proper 
canonical standard model for I iff: 
1. W=(T! Maxrr} 
2. For every a and f3 in M. aR/3 iff {A: DA r:a} {;; P 
3. V(P) = !Pir for each atom P. (Chellas 1980:173.) 
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Clearly models in which R is defined as in the definition above, always exist. It follows therefore that if 
we can show that these models are canonical standard models then we have the result that canonical 
models exist for normal systems of modal logic. This result in turn ensures the completeness of normal 
systems of modal logic. 
Theorem 27 
Proper canonical standard models are canonical standard models. 
Proof: Let M be the proper canonical standard model for a normal system I. We need only to show 
that for every world CI-maximal set of formulas) a E W, OA E a iff for every p E W (i.e. MaxrP) 
such that {A IDA E a} <;;;; p, A E p. But this follows from theorem 23 (ll).o 
In general, to prove the completeness of a normal systems of modal logic with respect to a class of 
models it is sufficient to show that the proper canonical standard model for the system is contained in 
the class of models. Therefore, in order to show the completeness of KT4, KT4L and KT5 with respect 
to their associated classes of standard models, we need to show that the proper canonical models of 
these systems are contained in their respective classes of standard models. This result is shown in terms 
of the following theorem. 
Theorem 28 
Let M be the proper canonical standard model for a normal system L Then: 
1. M is reflexive if I contains T 
2. M is symmetric if I contains B. 
3. M is transitive if I contains 4. 
4. M is weakly-connected if I contains KT4L. 
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Proof: (See Chellas 1980:175 for the proofs of 1-3.) 
We prove 4. Let M=<W,R,V> be the proper canonical standard model for the nonnal system of modal 
logic L:. Assume that L: contains KT4L. Choose any a,~. y e W such that aR~ and aRy. Assume that 
R is not weakly connected, that is, it is not the case that ~Ry nor yR~ and ~~· Then, by the definition 
of a proper canonical standard model we have {A IDA e ~}g y. This means that there is a fonnula A 
such that DA e ~ but A g; y, i.e. o ~ DA and it is not the case that o ~A. Similarly {B 1 DB e y} g ~. 
thus there is a fonnula B such that DB e y and B g ~. i.e. o ~DB and it is not the case that o ~ B. 
Since L: contains T we know that R is reflexive by 1 of this theorem and hence we also have o ~A and 
o ~B. From o ~ DA, o ~~~A and not the case that o ~ B we can conclude that it is not the case that 
o ~ DA 1\ A ~ B and similarly we can conclude that it is not the case that o ~DB 1\ B ~ A. Since 
both ~ and y are reachable from a we hold that it is not the case that o ~ D(DA 1\ A ~ B) nor 
o ~ D(DB 1\ B ~ A). By definition this means that it is not the case that o ~ O(DA 1\ A ~ B) v 
D(DB A B ~ A), which is impossible since D(DA 1\ A ~ B) v D(DB 1\ B ~ A) is an instance of L 
which is contained in L:. It follows therefore from theorem 26 that oMD(A 1\ DA ~ B) v D(B 1\ DB 
~ A). Hence it follows that R must be weakly connected, that is M is weakly-connected if L: contains 
KT4L.o 
7. DETERMINATION 
Detennination is merely the combination of soundness and completeness. ~ other words, a nonnal 
system of modal logic L: is said to be determined by C, a class of standard models, only when it is both 
sound and complete, with respect to C. 
It was demonstrated in thl:! previous two sections that the nonnal systems of modal logic KT4, KT4L 
and KT5 are both sound and complete with respect to their corresponding classes of standard models. It 
follows therefore that these systems are also detennined by the same classes of standard models. This is 
fonnally shown by means of the following theorem. 
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Theorem 29 







reflexive and transitive 
reflexive, transitive and weakly-connected 
reflexive, symmetric and transitive 
Proof: Soundness follows immediately from theorems 21 and 22. For completeness it is enough to 
observe that the proper canonical standard models for each system are in the appropriate classes of 
models by theorem 28. 
For KT4, by parts 1 and 3 of theorem 28, the proper canonical standard model for KT4 is both a 
reflexive transitive standard model. Thus KT4 is determined by the class of reflexive-transitive 
standard models. 
For KT4L, by parts 1, 3, 4 of theorem 28, the proper canonical standard model for KT4 is both 
reflexive, transitive and weakly-connected. Thus KT4L is determined by the class of weakly-connected 
reflexive-transitive standard models. 
For KT5, by definition of KT5, T is a theorem of KT5. By theorem 20, B and 4 are also theorems of 
KT5. Therefore by theorem 28 (1, 2, 3) the proper canonical standard model for KT5 is reflexive, 
symmetric and transitive. Thus KT5 is determined by the class CR n Cs n CT where CR is the class of 
reflexive standard models. Cs is the class of symmetric standard models and CT is the class of transitive 
standard models. o 
As a result of the above theorem it is now possible to demonstrate that the three systems KT 4, KT 4L 
and KT5 are in fact all distinct. 
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Theorem 30 
The normal systems KTI, KT4L and KT5 are all distinct. 
Proof: In general. to show that a system L is distinct from a system I' it is sufficient to exhibit a model 
of:L that falsifies a theorem of:L', or vice versa. For example, to show that KT4::;: KT5, it is enough to 
describe a reflexive transitive standard model that falsifies an instance of the schema 5 of KT5. We 
follow this method in the proof below. Consider any model M=<W, R, V>, with 
W={a, ~}(a:;:~); R = {<a,a>, <~.~>,<a,~>} V(P)={a}. 
This is a reflexive transitive weakly-connected model that falsifies instances of 5 (P ~ OOP and 
OP~OOP at a). So it is a model ofKT4, KT4L. 
W ={a, p, y} (a:;:p:;:y); R ={<a,a>,<~,p>,<y,y>,<a,~>,<a,y>} V(P) ={a,~} V(Q) = {a,y}. 
This is a reflexive transitive model ofKT4 that falsifies instances ofL (O(P A DP ~ Q) v O(Q A OQ 
~ P)) at a. 
The foregoing remarks suffice to establish the distinctness ofKT4, KT4L and KT5.o 
8. DECIDABILITY 
Decidability was defined in chapter two as the ability of a given procedure to determine whether or not 
a formula A had a proof from a set of formulas r. This notion of decidability can also be extended to 
modal logic. In the realms of modal logic a decidable procedure would receive as input a set of 
formulas say r, contained in a normal system of modal logic say I and an arbitrary well-formed 
formula A. Once the information has been given to the procedure the procedure should attempt to find a 
proof for A from r. In so doing the procedure will in fact determine whether it is the case that focA 
where C is the corresponding class of models defined for I and o is defined as in definition 24 (i.e. this 
procedure computes local logical entailment). If the procedure finds a proof for A from r, then the 
procedure should terminate with some sort of 'yes' answer otherwise the procedure should terminate 
with a 'no' answer. As with the decidable procedures in propositional logic we need to define positive 
('yes') and negative ('no') tests for the modal decidable procedures. 
Positive tests in modal logic can be defined in terms of axiomatisability and negative tests can be 
defined in terms of the finite model property. In other words, if we can show that a normal system of 
modal logic is axiomatisable (section 8.1) and if it has the finite model property (section 8.2) we can 
safely conclude that the nom1al system of modal logic is decidable. 
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8.1 Axiomatisability 
We say that a rule of inference is reasonable if there is an effective way of telling when formulas are 
related to the rule of inference in terms of its hypothesis and conclusion. For example, the rule modus 
ponens is reasonable, since it is a decidable matter whether three formulas are of the forms A~B, A 
and B (if so, the first two are hypotheses of modus ponens and the last is a conclusion). 
Now, every system of modal logic 2: can be regarded as the set of formulas generated from some subset 
r of its theorems by a set of rules of inference. This is trivial, since 2: is always generated from 2: by 
the rule A/A But when r is a decidable set of formulas and the rules of inference are reasonable and 
finite in number, 2: is said to be axiomatisable, and r is said to be a set of axioms for 2:. Together the 
axioms and rules constitute an axiomatisation of the logic. 
Axiomatisable systems are important because they admit a notion of proof and hence a positive test for 
theoremhood. By the notion of a proof in an axiomatisable system we mean a finite sequence of 
formulas each of which is either an axiom or follows from previous formulas in the sequence by one of 
the rules of inference. Axiomatisation is shown via the following theorem. 
Theorem 31 
Each of the normal systems KT4, KT4L and KT5 is axiomatisable by a finite number ofschemas. 
Proof: It is sufficient to observe that in each case the logic can be axiop.atised by a finite number of 
schemas together with the rules of inference RPL and RK. In other words, each logic can be 
characterised by a finite set of axioms and it is a decidable exercise to determine whether any formula 
either matches an axiom schema or matches the structure of a given inference rule by means of its 
hypothesis and conclusion. 
KT4 is axiomatised by means of the schemas K, T, 4, DfO, the set of tautologies (see page 39) and the 
rules RPL and RK. These axioms form a decidable set and the rules are reasonable. 
KT4L is axiomatised by means of the schemas K, T, 4, L, DfO, the set of tautologies (see page 39) and 
the rules RPL and RK. These axioms form a decidable set and the rules are reasonable. 
KT5 is axiomatised by means of the schemas K, T, 5, DfO, the set of tautologies (see page 39) and the 
rules RPL and RK. These axioms form a decidable set and the rules are reasonable. o 
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8.2 Finite Model Property 
Since axiomatisability ddim:s a positive test for theoremhood the only outstanding requirement is the 
negative test for theoremhood. However, showing that normal systems of modal logic have negative 
tests for theoremhood relies on the finite model property (defined below) which in turn relies on the 
concept of filtrations. Before defining filtrations we need to ensure that we understand what we mean by 
a sub formula of a formula A. 
A subformula of a formula A is any formula that is a part of A, including A itself. This idea is captured 
in the following recursive definition of the set Sn(A) of sub formulas of A ( Chellas 1980:28). 
Definition 35 
I. Sn(P) = {P} for any atom P 
2. Sn(T) = {T) 
3. Sn(J.) = { ..1} 
4. Sn(-,A) ={-.A} uSn(A) 
5. Sn(A /\B)= {A/\ B) uSn(A) uSn(B) 
6. Sn(A v B) = {A v B} u Sn(A) u Sn(B) 
7. Sn(A -+B)= {A -+B) uSn(A} uSn(B) 
8. Sn(A HB) ={A HB} uSn(A) uSn(B) 
9. Sn(OA) = {OA} uSn(A) 
10. Sn(OA) = {OA) uSn(A) 
Note that a set of formulas is closed under sub formulas if and only if the set contains every subformula 
of every formula it contains. Also note that if a set of formulas r is finite then i!s set of sub formulas will 
also be finite. 
We can use the concept of sub formulas to define the equivalence relation = as follows: Let r be a set of 
formulas closed under subformulas. For any model M = <W, R, V> we define the equivalence relation 
=on the worlds in M by the stipulation that, for a, P E W, a= p iff for every A E [, o ~A if and only 
if o ~ A, that is, the worlds in M are equivalent under = iff they agree on every formula in r, the set of 
formulas closed under subformulas. Furthermore we define for each a in M the equivalence class [a]= 
{P E W I a=P}, as well as = -equivalence classes of sets of worlds in M by [X] = {[a]: a E X}, for 
every X ~ W. We define til trations formally ( Chellas 1980: 10 I). 
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Definition 36 
Let M = < W.R. V> he a slandard model, and let r be a set ojformulas closed under sub formulas. The 
filtration ofM through r is any standard model M* = < W*, R*, V*> such that: 
(1) W* = {W] 
(2) For every a and fJ in M: 
(a) ifaRfJthen[a]R*[fJJ; 
(b) if [ a]R*[fJ].thenfor every formula 1 /A E r, 
ifo~ A, then o~ A; 
(c) if [a] R * [ fJ]. then for every formula OA E r, 
ifo~ A. then IJ~ OA; 
(3) V*(P) = [V(P)] jar each atom Pin r(V*(Q) can be anything ifQ is an atom not in I). 
An important aspect of a filtration M* of M through r is that a world a. in M and its equivalence class 
[a.] in M* agree on every formula in r. This result is formally stated in the following theorem. 
Theorem 32 
Let M* = <W*, R*, V*> be a 1-jiltration of a standard model M = <W,R, V>. Then for every A E r 
(See Chellas: I OI for the proof.) 
If M*, M and A are defined as in the theorem above it should be clear that A will be true in M if and 
only if A is true in M*. Formally: 
Theorem 33 
Let M* be a T-filtration of a standard model M Then M and M* are equivalent modulo r, i.e. for 
every A E F.c 11A iJid''A 
(See Chellas 1980: I 02 for proof.) 
Once again if M, M* and A are defined as in the theorems above it should be clear that we can extend 
this result to classes of standard models, that is, A is true in every model M in a class of standard 
models, say C, if and only if A is true in every model M* in the class of [-filtrations of the models in 
c. 
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Theorem 34 
Let C he a class of standard models and let r(C) he the class of r-jiltrations of models in C. Then for 
every A E r. : cA i/J, lnoA. 
It is important to observe that a filtration through a finite set of formulas always yields a finite model. 
For if n is the number of fonnulas in f then a filtration through f is a model having at most 2" worlds, 
that being the maximum number of ways that worlds can agree on formulas in r. Note that 2" is finite if 
n is. 
Definition 37 
Two formulas A and B are said to be M-equiva/ent iff they are true at exactly the same worlds in a 
model M=<W,R, V>. A set of formulas ris logically finite relative to a model M if every formula in r 
isM-equivalent to one or another of a finite number of formulas in r(Chellas 1980:36). 
Generally, if a set of formulas r is logically finite relative to a model M, then every r -filtration of M is 
also finite. 
From the above results it follows that if a filtration can be defined for a standard model then it would be 
possible to show that the normal systems of modal logic such as KT4, KT4L and KT5 are determined 
by classes of finite standard models. The advantage of this result would be that a decidable procedure 
would only have to consider finite models when assessing whether a formula A is a theorem or not of a 
normal system of modal logic. 
The following two theorems provide the basis for the definition of finite s~andard models for the normal 
systems of modal logic KT4 and KT5. KT4L will be treated separately below.· 
Theorem 35 
Let M* =< W*. R*. V*> be a filtration of a standard model M=< W.R. V>. Then M* is reflexive if M is. 
Proof: Let M* =<W*, R*,V*> be a filtration of a standard model M=<W,R,V>. 
Suppose that M is reflexive. Then a.Ra. for every a. in M. By definition it follows that [a.]R*[a.] for 
every [a.] in M*, that is, M* is reflexive. o 
There are no analogous results for arbitrary filtrations of symmetric, transitive and weakly connected 
models. But we can define filtrations that do have certain combinations of these properties: 
Let r be a set of formulas closed under subformulas, and let M=<W,R,V> be a standard model. We 
consider the following conditions on worlds a. and P in M: 
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CI: for every lA E r if 'M [ lA thenc, M A ~' a ~~> p 
M M for every OA E f' if fl A then IJ a OA 
C2: for every lJA E r if ,_1 ~ LJA then c ~A 
for every OA E r if :~A then c ~ OA 
C3: for every DA E r if c ~ DA theno ~ DA 
for every OA E f if 0 ~OA theno~ OA 
Theorem 36 
Let M* = < W*, R*, V*> he a standard model in which W* and V* are defined as in a r -filtration of a 
standard model M=<W,R, V>. Then: 
1. If R* is defined by C 1 and C2 then: 
(a) M* is symmetric and 
(b) M* is a /-filtration of M if M is symmetric. 
2. If R* is defined by C 1 and C3 then: 
(a) M* is transitive, and 
(b) M* is a /-filtration of M if M is transitive. 
3. If R* is defined by CJ, C2 and C3 then: 
(a) M* is symmetric and transitive and 
(b) M* is a T-jiltration of M if M is symmetric and transitive. 
(See Chellas 1980:106 for the proof.) 
From the above two theorems it is now possible to define the finite standard models for the systems 
KT4, KT5. This is done as follows: 
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Theorem 37 
The following normal .1ys1ems are determined by the corresponding classes of finite standard models 




Finite Standard Model 
reflexive and transitive 
reflexive, symmetric and transitive 
Proof: Soundness in each case is a consequence of theorem 29. The completeness of all the systems 
may be proved using theorems 3 5 and 36. We refer the interested reader to Chellas (1980: 187) for the 
details. o 
Consider for a moment a formula A that is not a theorem of some normal system say L which is 
determined by a class of finite standard models C. In order to show that A is not a theorem of L we will 
have to find at least one model M=<W,R,V> inC such that A is not true in M. In order to show that A 
is not true in M we would have to find at least one world say a E W at which A is not true. Since M is 
finite, this task is finite. 
Definition 38 
A modal logic I has the finite model property if and only if each non-theorem of I is false in some 
finite model of I (Chell as 1980:62). 
Clearly if the systems KT4, KT4L and KT5 have the finite model property it will be possible to 
determine if a given formula is a non-theorem of either KT4, KT4L or KT5. The following theorem 
establishes this result. 
Theorem 38 
Each of the normal systems. KT4, KT4L, KT5 have the finite model property. 
Proof: Let L be any normal system. To prove that L has the finite model property we first prove that L 
is determined by a class of standard models C, that is for every A, orA iff ocA From this result, by 
means of filtrations, we show that I is determined by the class CF!N of finite standard models in C, that 
is, for every A, orA iff c c,,, A. Then we know that L has the finite model property i.e. if it is not the 
case that IJrA then there is a finite model M E CFIN such that it is not the case that oMA. 
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We will use this approach to prove the finite model property for KT4 and KT5. By theorem 29 we 
know that the normal systems KT4 and KT5 are determined by the respective classes of standard 





reflexive and transitive 
reflexive, symmetric and transitive 
Also by theorem 37 we know that KT4 and KT5 are determined by their corresponding classes of finite 
standard models as defined in the table above. Thus from the discussion above the result follows that 
KT4 and KT5 have the finite model property. 
KT4L has the finite model property. Although this result is not formally proved here the reader is 
referred to Hughes & Cresswell ( 1996: 157) for more details with regards to this result. o 
8.3 Decidability 
Recall that it was noted at the beginning of this section that a modal logic is decidable if it has both the 
finite model property and is axiomatisable by a finite number of schemas. In section 8.1 we showed that 
the normal systems KT4, KT4L and KT5 are axiomatisable by a finite number of schemas and in 
section 8.2 we demonstrated the finite model property for the same systems. It follows therefore that 
KT4, KT4L and KT5 are decidable. Formally: 
Theorem 39 
Each of the normal systems KT4, KT4L, KT5 are decidable. 
Proof: By theorem 38 KT4, KT4L and KT5 have the finite model property. In theorem 31 we showed 
that KT4, KT4L and KT5 are axiomatisable by a finite number of schemas. Hence it follows that the 
normal systems KT4, KT4L and KT5 are decidable. o 
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Let I be a normal system of modal logic that is axiomatisable and has the finite model property. Let 
M ,, M2, MJ, ... be a complete enumeration of the finite models of I. Let A be any formula. In order to 
show whether or not A is a theorem of I a decidable procedure would have to do the following: 
1. To determine if A is a theorem of I the procedure would have to determine if A either matches 
one of the axioms schemas or the structure of the inference rules as described in theorem 31. 
This task is a finite exercise since I is axiomatised by a finitely many schemas and rules of 
inference. 
2. To determine if A is not a theorem of I the procedure would have to proceed through each of 
the Mi U ~ 1) and determine the following: 
2.1 Determine whether the model Mi is a model of I. 
2.2 IfMi is a model of I, then determine whether Mi falsifies A. 
Consider task 2.1. By theorem 29 we know that the corresponding schemas of I are valid in the class 
of models corresponding to I. Therefore in order to determine whether Mi is a model of I, all the 
procedure needs to do is to determine whether the schemas that axiomatise I are valid in Mi. Since I is 
axiomatised by a finite number of schemas and Mj is finite, this task is finite. 
Task 2.2 is also a finite exercise since the Mj's are finite models. (Chellas 1980.) 
It follows that this procedure will eventually either fmd a model Mi fo~ some i that falsifies A in which 
case A is not a theorem of I. Alternatively the procedure will succeed in showing that A is a theorem of 
9. CONCLUSION 
Decidability concludes the study of propositional modal logic including the normal systems of modal 
logic KT4 KT4L and KT5. The interested reader is referred to the work of modal logic language 
researchers such as Hughes & Cresswell (1996) and Chellas (1980) for more details with regards to 
the modal language and that of other normal systems of modal logic. The next chapter will provide a 
survey of the different resolution proof systems available to propositional modal logic, using the normal 
systems of modal logic presented in this chapter to demonstrate the applications of these proof 
systems. 
CHAPTER4 
RESOLUTION WITHIN MODAL LOGIC 
Science does not provide one clear and uncontested explanation Its methods often provide a licence for 
different explanations at varying levels, which often are unlikely to be all equally right. 
- R Trigg 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As mentioned in chapter 1 resolution has enjoyed much prominence in logic due to its efficient proof 
techniques. In this chapter we will focus on work done in resolution where its application has been that 
of modal logic. This chapter is by no means a complete survey of all the work done with regards to 
resolution within modal logic. We have however, selected a broad range of articles that we hope will at 
least cover the majority of fields that are currently prevalent in modal logic with regards to resolution. 
Research articles that focus primarily on propositional modal resolution or alternatively provide some 
exposition on propositional modal resolution will be discussed fully in terms of KT 4, KT 4L and KT5. 
The following headings will be addressed for each of the selected articles. 
• An overview of the authors approach. 
• Notes on syntax and semantics. 
• Applicable rules for the respective resolution systems (proofs that use resolution) 
• Soundness and completeness results. 
• Applications of the resolution system. 
The reader should note that the focus of this chapter is on how these different resolution systems work. 
It is not therefore a formal exposition of these resolution systems or the theory that underlies them. The 
interested reader is referred to the respective research articles for the required technical details and 
other formalities. Also, note that for the sake of conformity with previous chapters, the notation used to 
describe the respective resolution systems may not correspond to that used in the original articles. For 
instance, this chapter may make use of'l.' instead of the constant 'false'. 
This chapter will be concluded with a brief comparative analysis of the different resolution systems 
presented here. 
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2. MODAL THEOREM PROVING 
2.1 Overview 
In this section we discuss a technique defined by Abadi & Manna ( 1986). Although they extend their 
technique to a large number of modal systems, we will only be looking at the application of this method 
to the propositional modal systems of KT4 and KT5. 
This approach is essentially a non-clausal approach, that is, the resolution system works with formulas 
and converts them on the fly in an attempt to prove a contradiction. A refutation proof using this 
resolution system is similar to the one defined in chapter 2 (see definition 13), that is, there is a 
sequence of formulas A1- A2, ••• , An such that A1 = ...,A, and An = j_ and A;+t is obtained from A; by an 
application of a rule. 
In this system finding a proof for a formula A effectively means that we have to show that focA where 
o is defined as local logical entailment (see definition 24), r is the empty set, and C is the class of 
standard models corresponding to the normal systems of modal logic KT4 or KT5. 
2.2 Syntax 
Abadi & Manna's ( 1986) resolution system makes use of formulas that are defined in terms of the 
adequate set of connectives: v, 1\ and ..., and the modal connectives 0, D. For the remainder of this 
section it will therefore be assumed that all the formulas that the resolution system has to work with 
are in this form. No conversion rules are supplied with this resolution system and it is therefore assumed 
that the reader may make use of the conversion rules defined in chapter) to eliminate the connectives 
~,~etc. 
2.3 Rules 
When applying resolution in this context there are two types of rules that can be used: 
1. Simplification rules 
2. Deduction rules. 
2.3.1 Simplification Rules 
Simplification rules have the form A1- A2, ... , An=:> A, and they are treated as replacement rules, that is, 
if A~, A2, ••• , An occur in any order, in any conjunction, we can replace them with A. For example if we 
are given the rule A, ...,A=:> j_ and the formula (Q v 0( ...,p 1\ Q 1\ P)) we can replace ...,p 1\ P with j_ so 
that the formula becomes (Q v O(Q 1\ l_)). 
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Abadi & Manna ( 1986) define the following simplitication rules. where A and 8 denote formulas: 
Name Definition 
true-false simplification .lvA=>A 
Av.l=>A 
.1, A=> .1 
0.1 => j_ 
-,A, A=> .1 
Negation rules -,OA => 0-,A 
,OA => 0-,A 
-,(A A B) => (-,A v -,B) 
-,(A v B) => (-,A A -,B) 
.T::::>.l 
-,.1 :::::> T 
Weakening rule A,B::::>A 
Distribution rule A,B1 vB2 v ... v Bn :::::>(A 1\ B1) v (A 1\ B2) v ... v (A A Bn), 
2.3.2 Deduction Rules 
Deduction rules are of the form A~> A2, ... An H A and are treated as addition rules, that is, if the 
formulas A~> A2, ... An occur in any order, in any conjunction, then another conjunction containing A 
can be added. For example, if the rule OA, OB H O(A A B), where A and Bare formulas, is applied to 
the formula Q v (OQ A R A OP), then the formula would become Q v (OQ A R 1\ OP A O(P 1\ Q)) after 
the application of the rule. 
Definition 39 
The scope of a well formed formula *A with *a modal connective is just A (Chan 1987: 158). 
According to the resolution principle (see definition 11) for the propositional case it is possible to 
delete complementary (see definition 9) literals from clauses and derive a resolvent. In propositional 
logic these complementary literals are always within the same scope. This is unfortunately not the case 
with modal operators. For instance, consider the formula P 1\ 0-,P. Although P and -,P are 
complementary literals they are not within the same scope, i.e. their truth values are interpreted at 
different worlds and they therefore do not necessarily contradict each other. It follows therefore that if 
one is going to apply resolution in the modal case one is going to have to ensure that complementary 
literals are interpreted at the same world. It is because of this difficulty that Abadi & Manna (1986) 
introduced the following resolution rule. 
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The resolution rule, denoted A(S, .... , S), B(S, ... ,S) H A(T) v B(.i), is an instance of a deduction rule 
and is applied as follows: If A and B have a common sub-formula S then we can derive the resolvent 
A(T) v B(.i) whereby we substitute T for the one or more occurrences of S in A (i.e. only those 
occurrences that we wish to replace) and .i for one or more occurrences of S in B, provided that the 
occurrences of S in A and B that are replaced by T and .i, are within the same scope. So for example, if 
we have the formula O((Pv Q) 1\ (-.P v Q)) we can apply the resolution rule to get O((Pv Q) 1\ (-.P v Q) 
1\ (.iv Q) A(-. Tv Q)) but we cannot apply the resolution rule to ((P v Q) 1\ 0(-.P v Q)) since ...,pis 
within the scope of a 0 and P is not. 
The following deduction rules are applicable to the two modal systems KT4 and KT5. Note that the 
rules are only applicable to their corresponding modal logic systems. For any formula A orB we have: 
System Rules 
KT4 Resolution Rule 
OA, OB H O(OA A B) 
DAHA 
KT5 Resolution Rule 
DA, OB H O(OA A B) 
OA, OB H O(OA 1\ B) 
DAHA 
AHOA 
Although Abadi and Manna ( 1986) list additional rules we have only extracted those that are relevant to 
the systems KT4 and KT5. The interested reader is referred to their article for the additional rules. 
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2.3.3 Summary 
The rules for each of the systems KT4 and KT5 can be summarised by means of the following table. 
System Rules 





DA, OB H O(DA 1\ B) 
DAHA 





DA, OB H O(DA A B) 





The systems of modal logic KT4 and KT5 are sound with respect to their corresponding classes of 
models. 
Proof: As discussed above the proof is based on the fact that the simplification and deduction rules are 
sound. In other words, if we start with a satisfiable formula we can only apply the simplification rules or 
deduction rules for KT 4 (KT5). If we apply the simplification rules it follows by the soundness of the 
simplification rules that we will derive a new satisfiable formula. Similarly, if we apply the deduction 
rules (which includes the resolution rule) of KT4 (KT5) it also follows by the soundness of the 
deduction rules that we will derive a new satisfiable formula. (Refer to Abadi & Manna 1986:175 for 
details of proof.) 1 J 
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2.5 Completeness 
Theorem 41 
The resolution systemsj(Jr propositional KT4 and KT5 are completef'or their corresponding classes of 
models. 
Proof: Although no formal proof is given for KT4 and KT5 a proof sketch is provided which is based 
on two notions that were initially introduced by Fitting (1983). The first of these is the consistency 
property which 'is a syntactic property of sets of sentences that satisfies certain conditions depending on 
the logic' (Abadi & Manna 1986: 177). The second is that of model existence which is a lemma that 
guarantees that 'if a set of sentences satisfies a consistency property then all the sentences in the set are 
satisfiable' (Abadi & Manna 1986: 177). The consistency property in this instance is shown to be 
'admissible' defined as: 
Definition 
A set of formulas r is admissible for KT 4 (KT5) if no finite conjunction of members ofF can be refuted 
in the resolution system for KT4 (KT5). 
Admissibility can be shown to satisfY the conditions for the consistency property for KT4 and KT5 as 
follows: 
For KT4 the admissible consistency property is defined as: 
• r does not contain A and -,A for any literal A.. 
• r does not contain l_ or-, T. 
• if(A 1\ B) E f then f u {A, B} is admissible 
• if -,(A v B) E r then r u {-,A, -,B} is admissible 
• if (A v B) E r then r u {A} is admissible orr u { B} is admissible 
• if -,(A 1\ B) E r then r u {-,A} is admissible orr u {-,B} is admissible 
• ifOA E r then {DB I DB E r} u {A} is admissible 
• ifDA E r then r u {A} is admissible 
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For KT5 the admissible consistency property is defined as: 
• r does not contain A and .A for any literal A .. 
• r does not contain .l or, T. 
• if(A A B) E r then r u {A, B} is admissible 
• if -,(A v B) E r then r u {-.A, -.B} is admissible 
• if(A v B) E f then f u {A} is admissible or f u { B} is admissible 
• if -,(A A B) E r then r u {-.A} is admissible or r u { -.B} is admissible 
• ifOA E r then {OBI OB E f} u {DC I DC E f} u {A} is admissible 
• if DA E r then r u {A} is admissible 
The Model Existence lemma can therefore be defined in terms of the admissible property as follows: 
If a set of formulas Tis admissible for KT4 (KT5) then Tis satisfiable. 
The proof is essentially based on a contrapositive argument, that is, we assume that there does not exist 
a proof for some formula A and then show that A cannot be valid in the corresponding class of models 
for KT4 (KT5). The reader is referred to Abadi & Manna (1986:177,8) and Fitting (1983) for the 
details of the proof. ::::J 
2.6 Applications 
In this section we demonstrate how to use the rules in this proof. Firstly from soundness we know that if 
there exists a proof for a formula A using this resolution system then A is satisfied by every model M ( 
in the appropriate class of models). So for the purpose of this example assume that we want to show 
that the formula D( -.(P A DP) v Q) v D( -.(Q A DQ) v P) is satisfiable in the class of KT5 models. 
From the discussion above this means that we start with the negation of this formula and attempt to 
derive .l. Note that we are working with the KT5 system and will therefore only use the deduction rules 
applicable to the KT5 system. 
Before the proof is demonstrated, a note on the application of the rules is necessary. Both the 
simplification and deduction rules are based on a type of pattern matching. We attempt to find a pattern 
on the left hand side of the formula that matches the left hand side of the rules and the apply the right 
hand side of the rules changing the initial formula accordingly. For instance if we look at the rule -.DA 
=> 0-.A and the formula -.D(P A Q) then it should be clear that this formula is an instance of -.DA. It 
follows therefore that we can apply the rule to obtain 0-.(P A Q). 
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In the proof below the fiJrmulas that are being worked on are on the left and justifications for the 
changes to the formulas are on the right. 
I. 
-,(0( -,(P A OP) v Q) v 0( -,(Q 1\ OQ) v P)) 
2. -,0( -,(P 1\ OP) v Q) A -,0( -,(Q 1\ OQ) v P) negation rules 
3. 0-,(-,(P 1\ OP) v Q) A 0-,(-,(Q 1\ OQ) v P) negation rules 
4. 0( -,-,(P 1\ OP) 1\ -,Q) A 0( -,-,(Q 1\ OQ) 1\ -,P) negation rules 
5. 0( -,( ...,p v ...,OP) A-,Q) A 0( -,( -,Q v -,OQ) A -,P) negation rules 
6. 0( ...,...,p 1\ ...,...,Op A-,Q) A 0( -,-,Q A -,-,OQ 1\ -,P) negation rules 
7. 0( ...,...,p A ...,o...,p A-,Q) A 0( -,-,Q A ...,0-,Q 1\ -,P) negation rules 
8. oc ...,...,p 1\ o...,...,p 1\-,Q) 1\ oc ...,...,Q 1\ o...,...,Q 1\ ...,P) negation rules 
9. 0(0....,-,P A -,Q) A 0( -,-,Q A 0-,-,Q A -,P) weakening rule 
10. 0( -,Q) A 0( -,-,Q 1\ 0-,-,Q A ...,P) weakening rule 
11. 0( -,Q) 1\ 0( -,-,Q 1\ 0-,-,Q) weakening rule 
12. 0( -,Q) 1\ 0(0-,-,Q) weakening rule 
13. 0( -,Q) 1\ 0(0-,-,Q) 1\ 0(0( -,Q) 1\ 0-,-,Q) KT5 rule 
14. 0(0-,-,Q) 1\ 0(0( -,Q) 1\ 0-,-,Q) weakening rule 
15. 0(0( -,Q) 1\ 0-,-,Q) weakening rule 
16. 0(0( -,Q) 1\ 0--,-,Q 1\ 0(0-,-,Q 1\ -,Q)) KT5 rule 
17. 0(0-,-,Q 1\ 0(0-,-,Q 1\ -,Q)) weakening rule 
18. 0(0(0-,-,Q 1\ -,Q)) weakening rule 
19. 0(0(0-,-,Q 1\ --,Q 1\ -,-,Q)) KT5 rule 
20. 0(0(-,Q 1\ -,-,Q)) weakening rule 
21. O(O(j_)) true-false simplification 
22. O(j_) true-false simplification 
23. j_ true-false simplification 
Since j_ was derived in the last step we can conclude by soundness that the class of models 
corresponding to KT5, satisfies the formula 0( -,(P 1\ OP) v Q) v 0( -,(Q 1\ OQ) v P). 
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To demonstrate the usc of the resolution rule we show that the fonnula -.DP v ODP is satisfied by the 
class of models corresponding to KT4. Negating the formula the proof follows: 
I. -.hOP v DOP) 
2. -.(0-.P v OOP) negation rules 
3. -.0-.P 1\ -.OOP negation rules 
4. 0-.-.P 1\ -.OOP negation rules 
5. 0-.-.P 1\ 0-.0P negation rules 
6. 0-.-.P A 00-.P negation rules 
7. 0-.-.P A 00-.P A 0(0-,,P A 0-,P) KT4 rule 
8. OO,P A 0(0-.-.P A 0-,P) weakening rule 
9. 0(0-,-,P A 0-,P) weakening rule 
10. 0(0-.-.P A O,P A O(O,,P A -,P)) KT4 rule 
11. 0(0-,P A 0(0,-,P A -.P)) weakening rule 
12. 0(0(0-,-,P A ,P)) weakening rule 
13. 0(0(0-,,P A .,p 1\ -,-,P)) KT4 rule 
14. 0(0(0-,,P A .,p A -,-,P)) A 0(0(0-,-,P 1\., T A -,-,_1_)) resolution rule 
15. 0(0(0-,,P 1\-, T 1\ -,-,_l)) weakening rule 
16. 0(0(0-,-,P A _l A -,-,_1_)) negation rule 
17. 0(0(0.-.P 1\ _l )) weakening rule 
18. 0(0( j_ )) weakening rule 
19. O(_l) true-false simplification 
20. j_ true-false silpplification 
It follows therefore that the original formula is satisfied by the class of standard models corresponding 
to KT4. 
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3. RECURSIVE RESOLUTION METHOD FOR MODAL LOGIC 
3.1 Overview 
This section is devoted to the recursive resolution method as developed by Chan (1987). The notion of 
recursion stems from the fact that modal formulas are recursive and therefore the method that is 
employed to resolve two modal clauses is a recursive method. The method was initially developed for 
the system KT4, and it is in this context that we will describe the method. 
In order to conclude fccA using recursive resolution we need to show that the set r u {-,A} is 
unsatisfiable, that is, if we succeed in showing that r u {-,A} is unsatisfiable then we may conclude 
focA where cis local logical entailment (see definition 24), r is any finite satisfiable set of formulas, 
C the corresponding class of standard models for the normal system of modal logic KT4, and A is any 
formula. 
An outline of the method can be given as follows (terminology used in the outline is defined in the 
ensuing sections): 
1. The finite set r (f = {A1, A2, ••• ,An} u {-,A}) of well formed modal formulas that are being tested 
for unsatisfiability (see definition 21) are converted to a set r• of modal normal forms called 
m( modal )-clauses. 
2. An algorithm is applied to the clauses to determine if they are modal-resolv~ble. 
3. A modal resolvent is generated if two clauses are modal-resolvable. 
4. Applying steps 2 and 3 repeatedly the empty clause will eventually be generated if the initial set was 
unsatisfiable. Otherwise the empty clause will not be derived. 
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3.2 Syntax and Semantics 
As discussed in section 2.3.2, the main issue with modal resolution is ensuring that complementary 
literals are evaluated at the same world. For example, in the modal formula P 1\ 0-.P, P and ,p are 
complementary literals but they are not true at the same world and can therefore not be resolved with 
each other. Chan ( 1987) resolves this issue by replacing the 0 with a new connective Ox where x is any 
integer. The justification for this replacement follows from the definition of 0. Recall that for a model 
M=<W,R,V> and a world a E W o~ OA if there exists a 13 E W such that aRI3 and c~ A. 
Informally it can be said that replacing the 0 connective with the Ox connective fixes the formula A at 
the world 13, that is, the modal formulas are evaluated at the worlds at which their literals are true. 
Formally the connective Ox can be defined as follows: 
Definition 40 
The skolem-world function fx: W ~ W, is a function which takes as its argument a world a E Wand 
gives as its value a world f3 E W such that aR/3, where xis some integer (Chan 1987:160). 
Definition 41 
The skolem world is an object of the set of possible worlds W defined by applying one of the skolem-
worldfunctions {fj,/J, ... ,fx, .. .} to a member ofW (Chan 1987:160). 
Definition 42 
The subscripts {1,2, .. ,x} in the connectives 01, 02, ... , Ox, ... , are called world indexes (Chan 
1987:160). 
Definition 43 
For any well formed formula A, model M=< W,R, V> and a E W: 0 ~' OxA if there exists fx( a) E W such 
that aRfx( a) and 0 ~~(a) A (Chan 1987: 160). 
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3.3 Rules 
3.3.1 Conversion to Normal Form 
As with ordinary resolution it is useful to reduce the formulas in the system to some form of minimum 
structure. This reduction is performed by means of the following conversion rules defined by Chan 
( 1987). 
1. Remove the ~ and ~ as defined in chapter 2 from A. 
2. Distribute any negations in A until they immediately precede their corresponding atoms using 
the following rules: 
2.1 -,-,A is replaced by A 
2.2 -,(A 1\ B) is replaced by -,A v -,B 
2.3 -,(A v B) is replaced by -,A A -,B 
2.4 -,OA is replaced by 0-,A. 
2.5 -,OA is replaced by 0-,A 
3. Replace each 0 in A by a new Skolem connective Ox, where xis the next positive integer not 
occurring in the set of world indexes. 
4. Use the following rules to push the modal connectives as far as possible into the logical 
connectives. 
4.1 Ox(A v B) is replaced by (O,A v OxB) 
4.2 Ox(A 1\ B) is replaced by (OxA 1\ OxB) 
4.3 D(A A B) is replaced by (DA A DB) 
5. Use the following rule to distribute a disjunction into a conjunction: 
(A v (B A C)) is replaced by ((A v B) A (A v C)) 
6. Flatten the conjunctive using the following equivalence: 
6.1 (A A (B A C)) is replaced by (A ABA C) 
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7. Split the <.:onjuncts (if any) into clauses. 
Definition 44 
A j(Jrmula that has been transjiJrmed by means of app~ving the above rules is a clause in modal 
norma/form referred to as am-clause (Chan /987: 162) 
One note of caution: Chan ( 1987) stresses the importance of step 3 only taking place after step 1 and 2. 
This is because the main proposition defined below does not hold if any one of the connectives .....,, ~ 
and~ precedes the connective 0,. 
For example, the formula O(P ~ Q) ~ (OP ~ OQ) can be converted to modal normal form as 
follows. 
I. O(P ~ Q) ~ (OP ~ DQ) 
2. -,O(.....,P v Q) v (.....,OP v OQ) Step 1 
3. 0.....,( ,p v Q) v (0--,P v OQ) Step 2 
4. 0( ,,p A --,Q) v (0--,P v OQ) Step 2 
5. O(P A --,Q) v (0--,P v OQ) Step 2 
6. 01(P A --,Q) v (02--,P v OQ) Step 3 
7. (01P A 01--,Q) v (02--,P v OQ) Step 4 
8. (0 1P v 02--,P v OQ) A (01--,Q v 02--,P v OQ) Step 5 
The following m-clauses are derived from step 8: (0 1P v 02--,P v OQ), (0 1--,Q v 02--,P v OQ) 
Definition 45 
A m-literal is a literal preceded by its binding modalities with respect to a m-clause. (i.e. the variable 
is under their scope) (Chan 1987:1 64). 
For example in them-clause (0 1P v 02--,P v OQ), them-literals are 01P, 02--,P and DQ. 
Definition 46 
A pair ofm-literals such that their respective literals are negations to each other are referred to as a 
complementary pair of m-literals (Chan 1987:1 64). 
For example in the pair of m-literals OQ and 01--,Q the literals Q and --,Q are negations of each other 
and therefore DQ and 01--,Q are a complementary pair ofm-literals. 
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3.3.2 Modal Resolution Criterion 
In the previous section we looked at how to derive corresponding m-clauses. In this section an 
algorithm is described that can determine whether any two m-literals can be resolved with each other. 
Generally when two m-clauses have been identified that contain two complementary m-literals the m-
literals are extracted from the clauses with all their preceding modal connectives. For example, in the 
clause 0(-,P v 01-,Q) them-literals are O,P and 00 1-,Q and in the clause 030(Q v 0-,R) the 
respective m-literals are 030Q and 0300-,R. Once the complementary literals have been extracted 
they are passed to the algorithm which determines if they are, in fact, complementary. If they are then 
the algorithm succeeds, else the algorithm fails. For example, in the clauses 0( ,p v 0102R) and 03P the 
complementary m-literals are: 0-,P and 03P and these m-literals would be passed to the algorithm. In 
this case the reader will note that the algorithm succeeds since the m-literals 0-,P and 03P are indeed 
complementary, that is, there does not exist a reflexive transitive model M=<W, R, V> such that both 
0-,P and 03P are satisfied. 
The algorithm is based on 18 pattern matching lemmas which compare different sequences of 0 and 0 
for the two complementary literals. This algorithm is known as the Modal Resolution Criterion 
Algorithm (MRC). 
Modal Resolution Criterion Algorithm (Chan 1987:164) 
BASE TEST(A,B) 
IF A is a literal THEN 
IF B is a literal THEN 
Return SUCCEED; 
END IF 




IF B is a literal THEN 







END BASE TEST 
TESTI(A,B) 
F I = first modality of A. 
F2 = tis! modality of B: 
IF Fl and F2 are identical 0, THEN 
AI '0 rest of A. 
B I =rest of B: 
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result = result of BASE TEST( A I, B I); 
IF result= FAIL THEN 
return FAIL; 
ELSE IF result= SUCCEED THEN 
return SUCCEED; 
ELSE 
return TESTI(Al, 81); 
END IF 
END IF 
IF Fl = 0, and F2 = Ob and a differs from b THEN 
Return NIL 
END IF 
IFF!= 0 THEN 
Return the list(A,B); 
END IF 
IF F2= 0 THEN 




L I = last modality of A; 
Rl =rest of A; 
L2 =last modality of B; 
R2 =rest of B; 
IF Ll AND L2 are identical 0, THEN 
result= result of BASE TEST(R I, R2); 
IF result= FAIL THEN 
Return FAIL; 
ELSE IF result= SUCCEED THEN 
Return SUCCEED; 
ELSE 
Return TEST2(Rl, R2); 
END IF 
END IF 
IF either Ll = D or L2 = D (or both) THEN 
Return the list (R I. R2): 
END IF 






IF A does not contam any 0, THEN 
return SUCCEED; 
END IF 
IF B is a literal THEN 
return FAIL 
END IF 
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FA =the leftmost 0, of A for any integer c; 
HB = first modality of B; 
RB =rest of B; 
IF FA is not equal to HB THEN 
Return TEST3(A, RB); 
END IF 
RA =tail sublist of A after the 0,; 
IF RA does not contain any 03 THEN 
return SUCCEED; 
END IF 
IF RB is a literal THEN 
return FAIL; 
END IF 
result= TESTI(RA, RB); 
IF result = NIL THEN 
Return TEST3(A, RB) 
ELSE IF result= SUCCEED THEN 
Return SUCCEED; 
ELSE IF result = FAIL 
Return FAIL; 
END IF 
A' = first element of result; 
B' =second element of result; 




result~ result of BASE TEST( A, B) 
IF result ~FAIL THEN 
Return FAIL~ 
ELSE IF result= SUCCEED THEN 
Return SUCCEED; 
ELSE 
result= result ofTESTI(A,B); 
END IF 
IF result= FAIL OR NIL THEN 
Return FAIL, 




result= result ofTEST2(A,B); 
END IF 
IF result = FAIL THEN 
Return FAIL; 
ELSE IF result= SUCCEED THEN 
Return SUCCEED; 
ELSE 
(A, B)= result; 
END IF 
IF 0 occurs in A THEN 






Return TEST3(B, A); 
END MAIN 
Definition 47 
Resolution within Modal Logic XI 
A pair of complementary m-literals LA and L8, satisfying the MRC algorithm, are called a pair of 
MRC m-literals (Chan 1987: 170). 
Definition 48 
Two m-clauses {A, B} are modal-resolvable if and on~r if two m-literals {LA. L8} of A and B 
respective~r are MRC lvf-lilerals (Chan 1987. 170) 
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3.3.3 Resolution Rules 
Once a pair of MRC m-literals have been identified their corresponding m-clauses can be resolved in 
order to obtain a modal resolvent. This modal resolvent is detem1ined by applying two types of rules 
kno\Nll as deletion and special recursion rules. These rules are presented here without justification, since 
justitication for these rules can be found in the section that deals with soundness and completeness. The 
deletion rules are described first: 
Deletion Rules: 
Deletion rules are essentially operational rules that are used to determine which modal connectives can 
be deleted from two m-literals (Chan 1987: 170). 
Definition 49 
A set of two m-literals obtained from applying a deletion rule to the m-literals LA and L8 are denoted 
by De(LA, La). 
Deletion Rule 1: 
Deletion Rule 2: 
Definition 50 
In a m-clause B, 
If LA is OxA' and La is OxB' for any well formed formula A' and B', then delete the 
skolem operator Ox from both LA and La, i.e. De(LA, La)== {A', B'}. 
For all other cases, delete the first operator from either LA or La, but not both, in 
such a way that the two resulting m-clauses in De(LA, La) obtained are MRC m-
literals. 
1. A core-disjunct denoted C(B), relative to an occurrence of a literal L is the disjunct B such 
that L occurs in B. 
2. A side-disjunct, denoted S(B), relative to an occurrence of a literal L is the disjunction 
consisting of all disjuncts in B such that the occurrence of the literal L does not occur in any 
these disjuncts. (Chan 1987: 172.) 
For example consider the clause B: (0 1P v 0-.R v 020-.Q). Here we have the following clauses for 
S(B) and C(B) relative to the literal P. S(B): (0-.R v 020-.Q) and C(B): (0 1P), that is, B is am-clause, 
which is the disjunction ofC(B) v S(B). 
The deletion rules can be applied directly to the core-disjuncts of the m-clauses A and B, disregarding 
the side-disjuncts, in order to obtain the result Del(A, 8 ). 
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Definition 51 
Dei(A,B): Two m-clausesj(Jrmed afier some modalities are deleted from m-clauses {A, B} according to 
the jiJ!lowing. If L 1 and La are two MRC m-literals in m-clauses A and B respectively then delete 
modalities/rom {A, B} ac.xording to the deletion rules as if {A, B} are just {LA. La}. 
For example, if we have the following two m-clauses: A: 01D(Q v 02P) and B: D(Or,P v R) then we 
could form Del(A,B) by defining LA= 01D02P and LB = DOr-.P, and only apply the deletion rules to 
{LA, LB}. Note that the deletion rules are applied to A and Bas if no side-disjunct nor v occurs in A or 
B. 
Special Recursion Rules 
Special recursion rules use the deletion rules in a specified way to obtain a modal resolvent for any two 
m-clauses. 
Definition 52 
Given two m-clauses {A,B}, if there exists a pair of complementary MRC m-literals {LA, L8} 
respectively in A and B, then some Special Recursive Resolution (SRR) rules can be applied to {A, B) to 
construct some Modal Resolvent (MR) of {A,B} denoted by MR(A,B). We call MR(A,B) a modal 
resolvent of A and B. (Chan 1987: 172.) 
Chan (1987:172, 173) defines the following five SRR rules, where {A, B} are two m-clauses: 
SRRl: If {A,B} are just two complementary MRC m-literals, then the MR is empty (denoted by .1). 
SRR2: If one of the m-clauses, say A, is a disjunction of a side-disjunct S(A) and a core-disjunct 
C(A), then MR(A,B) = (S(A) v MR(C(A),B)). 
SRR3: If one of them-clauses, say A, is am-literal and B is DB', then MR(A,B) = MR(A,B'), where 
B' = B without the connective D. 
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SRR4: If one of the m-clauses, say A, is O,A' and B is DB', then we apply the deletion rules to 
delete a modality from either A or B. 
4.1 If we delete the tirst 0 trom B, then MR(A,B) = MR(A,B'), where B' is B without the 
modality D. 
4.2 If we delete the first 0, from A we apply the rule SRR5. 
SRRS: For all the other cases, we delete some modalities from {A,B} by the deletion rules as if 
applying the deletion rules to the complementary MRC m-literals {LA, L8 } in { A,B}. Let * 
be the deleted modality from A orB or both, let {Delet(A), Delet(B)} be the two m-clauses 
in Dei(A,B) obtained after the deletion. Then MR (A,B) = *(MR(Delet(A), Delet(B))), that 
is, we append the* to the recursive part. 
Note that the MR(A,B) derived from the above rules may not be unique. This is because there are a 
number of ways to apply the above rules. For example, if both the m-clauses A and B are of the type 
DA' and DB', SSR3 could be applied to either A or B. 
3.4 Soundness and Completeness 
No formal soundness and completeness results are provided by Chan (1987) since formal proofs may be 
found in previous research articles published by Chan in 1985. He does however provide the following 
justifications which are stated without proof. 
3.4.1 Justification for the Conversion Rules 
Main Proposition 
Let r be a set of formulas and A any formula E r Let A' be the result of applying steps I, 2 and 3 of 
the conversion rules to A. r is unsatisfiable if and only if (F- A) u {A'} is unsatisfiable (Chan 
1987:163). 
The conversion rules guarantee by the main proposition that if we start out with an unsatisfiable set say 
r, and the conversion rules are applied to r to obtain r', then r• will still be an unsatisfiable set once the 
conversion has been completed. 
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3.4.2 Justification for the MRC Algorithm 
Theorem 42 
A pair ol complementary m-literals A and B are unsati4iable iff they satisfY the MRC (Chan 
1987: 166). 
Proof: Essentially the proof includes 18 lemmas which use a pattern matching method to examine 18 
different forms (patterns) ofm-literals. Each of these patterns are proved to be satisfiable, unsatisfiable 
or its satisfiability has to be determined recursively. We refer the reader to Chan (1985) for a formal 
proof.:::: 
3.4.3 Justification for the Deletion Rules 
Justification follows from the following two lemmas. 
Lemma 1 
For any pair of m-literals {LA, L8 } satisfying the MRC algorithm, it is always possible to delete a 
leftmost modality from either LA or L8 or both to get a set De(LA, L8 ) such that De(LA, L8 ) is a pair of 
m-literals that satisfies the MRC algorithm (Chan 1987:171). 
Lemma2 
Applying the deletion rules repeatedly to any two MRC m-literals A and B generates a sequence of 
pairs of m-literals De1(A,B), De2(A,B), ... , De"(A,B) such that each satisfies MRC, and both the m-
clauses in De"(A,B) are complementary literals for some finite n (Chan 1987:171). 
3.4.4 Soundness 
Theorem 43 
A MR(A, B) is locally logically entailed (see definition 24) by them-clauses {A, B) (Chan 1987: 173). 
Roughly what this theorem is saying is that {A, B}oc MR(A, B) where C is the class of reflexive 
transitive standard models and o is local logical consequence, that is, for every M=<W, R, V> inC and 
for every a E W, if o ~A A B then o ~1 MR(A, B), that is, if M satisfies the two m-clauses then M will 
also satisfy their modal resolvent. In other words the SSR rules are sound. 
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3.4.5 Completeness 
Chan ( 1987: 178) notes that completeness is complicated by the fact that the SRR method only 
generates some of them-clauses. For example, if A is them-clause 0 10(P v 0(02P v Q)) and B is the 
m-clause 0(-,P v 030(-,P v R)) then although the m-Iiterals {0 10P, 010002P} in A satisfY the MRC 
with each of them-literals {0-,P, 0030-,P} in B, the SSR method would not compare them-literals in 
A with each of them-literals in B. It may just choose the first m-literal in B or the second but not both. 
There is, however, a more advanced method known as the General Resolution Recursive method of 
which SSR is a subset. This method is known to generate modal resolvents for several literals 
simultaneously and the reader is referred to Chan ( 1985) for further details. 
3.5 Applications 
This resolution system is demonstrated by means of the following example. 
Consider the following two formulas: O(P ~ 0( -,Q 1\ OR)) and 0(0 ( -,Q ~ 0 -,R) 1\ P). We attempt 
to show that these two formulas are unsatisfiable. Before we can do so the formulas have to be 
converted to their corresponding m-clauses: 
1. O(P ~ 0( -,Q 1\ OR)) 
2. 0( ,p v 0( -,Q 1\ OR)) Step 1 
3. 0(-,P v 01(-,Q 1\ 02R)) Step 3 
4. 0(-,P v (0 1-,Q 1\ 0102R)) Step 4 
5. 0( (-,P v 01-,Q) 1\ (-,P v 0102R)) Step 5 
6. 0(-,P v 01-,Q) 1\ 0(-,P v 0102R) Step 4 
Them-clauses corresponding to O(P ~ 0(-,Q 1\ OR)) are therefore 0(-,P v 01-,Q), 0(-,P v OIOzR). 
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Converting 0(0( -.Q ~ 0-.R) AP) to clause form: 
I. 0(0( -.Q ~ 0-.R) A P) 
') 0(0( --,--,Q v 0-.R) A P) Step I .... 
3. O(O(Q v 0-.R) A P) Step 2 
4. OJ{O(Q v 0-.R) A P) Step 3 
5. 030(Q v 0-.R) A 03P Step 4 
Them-clauses are therefore 030(Q v 0-.R), 03P. 
Thus the proof starts with the following m-clauses: 
I. 0(-.Pv01-,Q) 
2. 0( -,P v 0102R) 
3. 030(Q v 0-.R) 
4. 03P. 
From these m-clauses the reader should note that the set of world-indexes is the set { 1, 2, 3}. 
In the proof below the centre column contains the recursive modal resolvent denoted by the function 
MR(Ct. C2) where C1 and C2 are the two m-clauses that are being resolved. The right most column 
contains the SSR rules that were applied to the two m-clauses C 1 and C2• The modal resolvent derived 
in terms of the relevant SSR rules is appended to the left hand side expression, if any. (Chan 1987). 
Consider the m-clauses 0( ,p v 01-,Q), 03P. The corresponding complementary m-literals are 0-,P 
and 03P. Calling the MRC(O-.P, 03P) we find that these literals are MRC m-literals, i.e. the algorithm 
succeeds. It follows therefore that their corresponding clauses can be resolved with each other as 
follows: 
5. MR(O( -,P v 01-.Q), 03P) 
6. o, MR(O(-.P v 01-.Q), P) SSR4 (4.2) 
7.0, MR((-.P v 01-.Q), P) SSR3 
8. 03(0 1-.Q v MR(-.P, P)) SRR2 
9. 03(01-.Q v .l) SRRI 
10.0301-,Q 
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Step 6 is the result of applying the SSR4 (4.2) rule to them-clauses 0(-,P v 0 1-,Q) and 03P. Step 7 is 
the result of applying the SSR3 rule to them-clauses 0( ....,p v 01-,Q) and P. Applying the SSR2 rule to 
them-clauses (-,P v 01-,Q) and P, where the side disjunct with respect to the literal Pis 01-,Q yields 
the resolvent O,....,Q v MR(....,P, P). Appending this result to the left hand side gives the result in step 8. 
By SRR1 MR(....,P, P) is l. and therefore the final clause is 03(0 1-,Q v 1.) which is the same as 030 1-,Q 
since l. denotes the empty clause. 
The clauses 0( ....,p v 0102R) and 03P are now resolved, since the m-literals O....,P and 03P are 
complementary MRC m-literals. 
11. MR(O( ....,p v 0102R), 03P) 
12. 03 MR(O(....,P v 0 102R), P) SSR4 (4.2) 
13.03 MR(( ....,p v 0102R), P) SSR3 
14. 03(0102R v MR(....,P, P)) SRR2 
15. 03(0102R l.) SRR1 
16. 03010zR 
Step 10 is the result of applying the SSR4 ( 4.2) rule to the clauses (0( ....,p v 0102R), 03P). Step 11 is the 
result of applying the SSR3 rule to the clauses (O(....,P v 0102R), P). Step 12 is the result of applying the 
SSR2 rule to the clauses (( ....,p v 0102R), P) where the side disjunct with respect to the literal P is 0102R. 
Since by SSR1 MR( ....,p, P) is l. the modal-resolvent is just 030102R. 
Resolving the clauses 030(Q v 0-,R) and 030102R (from step 16). In this ins"tance the complementary 
MRC m-literals are O..,R and 030102R. 
17. MR(030(Q v O..,R), 030102R) 
18. 03 MR(O(Q v 0-,R), 0102R) SRR4 (4.2) 
19. 0301 MR(O(Q v 0-,R), 02R) SRR4 (4.2) 
20. 0301 MR( (Q v O..,R), 02R) SRR4 (4.1) 
21. 030,(Q v MR(O-,R, 02R)) SRR2 (S(R) = Q) 
22. 030 1(Q v 1.) SRR1 
23. 030,Q 
Similar argLUnents hold here as discussed above. 
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MR(0301Q, 030 1-.Q) 
j_ SRRI 
Since j_ was derived it can be concluded that the original formulas where unsatisfiable. 
A final note on this example. There were many more modal-resolvents that could have been generated 
from this example. The interested reader may want to refer to a similar example in Chan ( 1987) for the 
other variations. 
4. LINEAR MODAL DEDUCTIONS 
4.1 Overview 
In this section the resolution system devised by L.F. del Cerro and A Herzig (1988) is introduced. This 
resolution system is similar to Chan's (1985) resolution system introduced in the previous 'section, since 
both resolution systems operate on clauses and both resolution systems skolemise the modal connective 
0. There are, however, some differences. One is that Chan's (1985) method is of a recursive nature and 
del Cerro & Herzig's (1988) resolution system is of a linear nature. Also the way del Cerro & Herzig 
(1988) skolemise the 0 is different to that of Chan (1985). Del Cerro & Herzig (1988) only presented 
formal results for the normal system of modal logic KT4 although they argue that similar results would 
hold for the other systems of modal logic. Their resolution system will, therefore, only be discussed in 
terms of the system KT 4 and the reader is referred to del Cerro & Herzig's (1988) work for notes with 
regards to the other systems. 
Using this resolution system we can show focA as follows. Let r be any satisfiable set of formulas and 
A any formula, and C the class of transitive and reflexive standard models (since we are only dealing 
with KT 4 ). If we succeed in finding a proof for r u {-.A} using del Cerro & Herzig's ( 1988) resolution 
system then we can conclude focA where o is defined as in definition 24, i.e. local logical entailment. 
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4.2 Syntax 
Del Cerro and Herzig ( 1988) designed a Skolem technique whereby they replaced the 0 by a Skolem 
constant i. Let L denote the modal language as presented in chapter 3 then the language LI is the modal 
language with a set of I of Skolem constants where the unary modal connectives are 0 and <i>, for 
every i E I. Formulas in this language are described as those in definition 18 except for: if A is a 
formula then <i>A, for every i E I are formulas. 
A formula A ofL can be mapped into a formula A1 ofLI by replacing each occurrence ofO in A by <i> 
where i is a new constant (so in A1 every <i> occurs only once, and I is the set of new constants). 
For example, if A is O(OP v O(Q A...., T)) then A1 will be O(<l>P v <2>(Q A...., T)) and I= { 1,2}. 
4.3 Semantics 
The semantics for LI is defined in terms of a model MI = <W,R,V,FI> where FI = {f; I i E I} is a set of 
functions from W into W, where f; ~ R for every i E I. Definitions of W, R, V remain the same. We 
define the truth of a formula A at a world a E W as o ';:1 <i>A if and only if o 7,[a) A. Satisfaction and 
validity are defined for LI as follows: 
Definition 53 
We say that Ml=< W,R, v~FJ> satisfies A or Ml is a model for A if and only if there is an a E W such 
that 0 ~11 A, and A is valid if and only if for every Ml and every a E ~ we have o ';:1 A (del Cerro & 
Herzig 1988:488). 
The following theorem guarantees that if a formula A of L is mapped into a formula A1 of LI (see 
section 4.2) then A is satisfiable in a model for L if and only if A1 is satisfiable in a model for Ll. In 
other words the mapping from A to A1 is sound. 
Theorem 44 
Let A be a modal formula of L. A is satisfiable in a model for L iff A1 is satisfiable in a model for Ll. 
(See del Cerro & Herzig 1988:490 for a proof.) 
Resolution ll'ilhin Modal Logic 
4.4 Rules 
The rules applicable to this system can be summarised as follows and are treated individually below. 
1. Conversion rules. 
2. Inference rules. 
3. Simplification rules. 
4. Resolution rules. 
4.4.1 Conversion Rules 
In order to apply the rules to the formulas, using this resolution system, the formulas have to be 
converted to clausal normal form, defined as follows: 
Definition 54 
A formula of LI is said to be in clausal form if it is a disjunction in which each disjunct is either: 
• a literal, 
• DC, where Cis aformula in clausal form or 
• <i> C where i E I and Cis a formula in clausal form. 
A formula is said to be in clausal normal form if it is a conjunction in which each conjunct is in 
clausal form (del Cerro & Herzig 1988:490). 
For example <l>(P v O(Q v <2>-,Q)) 1\ Q, is in clausal normal form. 
We will denote a conjunction A 1 1\ A2 1\ ... 1\ An by means of the set {A~> A2, ••• ,An}. We will also 
refer to each conjunct as a clause. 
It follows that before we can use this resolution system on a formula A of L we have to map A to A1 of 
LI and then convert A1 to an equivalent formula A' in clausal normal form. In section 4.2 we showed 
how the mapping from A to A1 was possible. In the theorem below the mapping from A1 to A' is 
contirmed. 
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Theorem 45 
There is an effective procedure for the construction of any given formula A of Lf to an equivalent 
formula A ·in clausal norma/form. 
Proof: 
The proof is by induction on the modal degree of A. 
The modal degree d(A) of a formula A is defined as follows. 
• If A is a literal, d(A) = 0 
• d(A *B) = max (d(A),d(B)) if* is v, /\, ~or H 
• d( -.A) = d(A) 
• d(*A) = d(A) + 1 if* is D or <i>, where i E I. 
If d(A) = 0 the proof is obtained using the classical procedure. If A = DB then we normalise B and 
replace instances of D(A 1\ B) by DA 1\ DB. If A= <i>B then we normalise B and replace instances 
of <i>(A 1\ B) with <i>A 1\ <i>B and instances of <i>(A v B) with <i>A v <i>B. Otherwise A is a 
classical combination of modal formulas, then we can normalise the latter and the apply the classical 
procedure. (del Cerro & Herzig 1988:49l.)o 
Although not mentioned in the theorem above this resolution system assumes that the connective -, 
appears immediately before the atom. For instance instead of -,OP we work with 0-,P. 
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4.4.2 Inference Rules 
Inference rules are rules of the fonn C1, C2 ~ C (read Cis inferred from C1 and C2) and are defined 
by means of the following fonnal system (del Cerro & Herzig 1988:491 ): 
axiom: A, --,A ~ l. 
v-rule: if A, B ~ C then A v D, B v E ~ C v D v E 
T-rule: if A, B ~ C then DA, B ~ C 
DO-rule: ifOA, B ~ C then DA, DB~ DC 
O<i>-rule: if DA, B ~ C then DA, <i>B ~ <i>C 
<i><i>-rule: if A, B ~ C then <i>A, <i>B ~ <i>C 
For example given the two clauses O(<l>P v Q) and <1><2><1>-.P we can derive a resolvent as 
follows. The fonnulas will be listed on the left hand side and justifications for their transfonnations will 
be listed on the right hand side. 
1. P,--,P ~ _l Axiom 
2. <1>P,<1>--,P ~ <1>1. 1, <i><i>-rule 
3. <1>P v Q, <1>--,P v _l ~ <1>1. v Q v _l 2, v-rule 
5. 0(<1>P v Q), <1>--,P v _l ~ <1>1. v Q v _l 4, T-rule 
6. 0(<1>P v Q), <2>(<1>-.P v 1.) ~ <2>(<1>1. v Q v 1.) 5, D<i>-rule 
7. 0(<1>P v Q), <1><2>(<1>--,P v _l) ~ <1><2>(<1>1. v Q v 1.) 6, D<i>-rule 
4.4.3 Simplification Rules 
Simplification rules are rules of the fonn C' "" C (read C' can be simplified into C) and are defined as 
follows (del Cerro & Herzig 1988:492): 
• Av_l;:::,A 
• *(_l)"" l. if* is 0 or <i>, for iel. 
• AvAvB,AvB 
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For example applying the simplitication rules to the resolvent <1><2>(<1>1. v Q v l.) derived above 
yields: 
8. <1><2>(<1>1. v Q v l.) from 7 
9. <I ><2>(1. v Q v l.) 
10. <1><2>(Q v l.) 
*(l.)::::: l.where * == 0 
AvAvB:::::AvB 
I I. <1><2>Q Avl.:::::A 
We have shown that <1><2>Q is the resolvent of 0(<1>P v Q) and <1><2>(<1>-.P v l.). Now 
<1><2>(<1>-.P v l.) can be simplified to <1><2><1>-.P by means of the simplification rule A v l.::::: 
A and therefore it follows that <1><2>Q is the resolvent of 0(<1>P v Q) and <1><2><1>-.P. 
4.4.4 The Resolution Rule 
Using the inference and simplification rules a resolvent for two clauses C1 and C2 can be derived as 
follows: 
Definition 55 (Modal Resolution Rule) 
Given two clauses C1 and C2, Cis a resolvent ofC1 and C2 if there is a C' such that Cj, C2 => C' and C' 
cl cz 
zC The modal resolution rule can be denoted by: -c (del Cerro & Herzig 1988:491). 
Unlike other resolution rules discussed in this chapter this modal resolution rule is applied in a linear 
fashion to the clauses in the resolution proof, that is, the resolvent of the previous two clauses is always 
used in the next application of the resolution rule. This process is formally described as follows: 
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Definition 56 
Given a set ofdauses r: a linear deduction ofCnfrom /with top dause C11 is a deduction oftheform: 
en 
where Co E rand ck+J is a resolvent of ck and Dk and each Dk is either in r or is a Cj for some j<k. 
(del Cerro & Herzig 1988:492.) 
Definition 57 
A linear deduction of j_ from r, a set of clauses, is called a refutation of r. 
4.5 Soundness and Completeness 
Theorem 46 (Soundness) 
If there is a linear refutation of Fwith top clause C0 then Tis unsatisfiable. 
Proof: Essentially the proof is based on the fact that the inference rules are sound. Therefore if r is a 
satisfiable (see definition 53) set of formulas then when the inference rules are applied to r, every 
resolvent derived from r will also be satisfiable. It follows that ..L cannot be produced from this set. 
(Refer to del Cerro & Herzig 1988:493 for details of the proof). o 
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Theorem 47 (Completeness) 
Let r he a set of' clauses. If'S is unsatisfiahle and 1-{C0} is satisfiable, then there is a linear refittation 
ofF with lop clauses C11• 
Proof: A formal proof can be found in del Cerro & Herzig (1988), we will provide a sketch only. 
Essentially the proof is based on the notion of trees very similar to that presented in chapter 2 for 
tableaux systems. In particular they make use of the following results which we state without proof: 
I. Lemma 
LetS be a set ofclauses ofLI.IfS is unsatisjiable then S has a closed tree. 
2. Lemma 
Let S be a set of clauses. If S is unsatisfiable and S - {Co} is satisfiable, then S has a closed tree, 
such that in its rootS is closed and S-{C0} is open. 
3. Upward Lemma 
Given a node n of a tree and a subset n' of n, if n' is closed in n and n'-{C0} is open in n, then 
there is linear refutation of n' with top clause C0. 
To prove completeness: LetS be an unsatisfiable set of clauses. By 1 every tree for Sis closed. Let n be 
a root of a tree for S. S will be closed inn and S-{C0} will be open inn by 2. Hence by the upward 
lemma there will be a linear refutation of S with top clause C0.o 
4.6 Applications 
We demonstrate this resolution system by means of a simple example. Assume that the set r = 
{-.(OP~ OOP)} and that we want to show that r is unsatisfiable. From soundness we know that if 
there is a linear refutation of r then r is unsatisfiable. Hence we attempt to perform a linear refutation 
of this set as follows. 
Distributing the negation and using the appropriate conversion rules described in section 4.4.1, r is 
converted to the following clause: {OP, <1><2>--,P} where the set I ofSkolem constants is {1,2}. 
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A linear deduction can now be perfonned on this set. Note that the fonnulas are listed on the left hand 
side and the justifications for their transfonnation are listed on the right hand side. 
I. DP 
2. <1><2>--.P 
Since there are only two clauses in this set we attempt to resolve them with each other. Looking at the 
two atoms we notice the complementary literals (P, -.P). Hence we attempt to build the resolvent from 
these complementary literals using the corresponding inference and simplification rules as follows: 
P, -.P => j_ Axiom 
DP, -.P => j_ T-rule 
DP, <2>--.P => <2>j_ D<i>-rule 
DP, <1><2>--.P => <1><2>j_ D<i>-rule 




*(j_) ~ j_where * = <2> 
*(j_) ~ j_where * = <1> 
The resolvent of DP and <1><2>--.P is therefore j_, that is, we have the following linear refutation: 
1. DP 
2. <1><2>--,P 
3. j_ 1,2 
By soundness it follows that the original set r was unsatisfiable. 
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5. DESTRUCTIVE MODAL RESOLUTION 
5.1 Overview 
In some of the previous sections when we used resolution we converted the formulas into clausal form 
and then proceeded with the resolution reduction rules. In destructive modal resolution Fitting does the 
conversion as he progresses through the proof making use of the following two types of rules: 
1. Replacement rules: - rules where a formula is removed and one or more new ones are added in 
its place. 
2. Addition rules: - rules where formulas are added but none are removed. 
Fitting's (1990a) resolution system is based on the notion of a context shift best described by means of 
the following example: 
Assume that P denotes the sentence Garfield eats Tweety and that the formula DP ~ P is interpreted in 
a KT4 model M = <W, R, V> where W = {Earth, Moon}, R = {<Earth, Earth>, <Moon, Moon>, 





Clearly from this model we can see that P is true at the world denoted by Earth but not at the world 
denoted by Moon. (Tweety is therefore well advised to take the next space shuttle to the moon!), that is, 
as we shift from the Earth to the Moon we lose information. In destructive resolution the application of 
the rules result in a similar context shift which in turn results in the loss of information. It is because of 
this phenomenon that Fitting's ( l990b) system is referred to as destructive resolution and is therefore 
only applicable to those logics whose standard models do not involve symmetry. 
Although Fitting ( 1990a) covers additional normal systems we will only be looking at the systems KT 4 
and KT5 and we refer the interested reader to his work for the other systems. Also note that although 
Fitting doesn't cover the system KT4L we have taken the liberty to extend his method to the system 
KT4L. 
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Let r be the empty set and C any dass of standard models corresponding to the normal system of modal 
logic L:. Then we can condude frJcA (or just 1 rcA) for any fonnula A if we tind a destructive 
resolution proof for -,A. 
5.2 Syntax 
As mentioned in chapter 2 (see section 3.3), Fitting (1990a) makes use of different types of fonnulas, in 
particular he distinguishes between four types: a, ~. v and 7t. The a and ~ type fonnulas were defined 
in chapter 2 and will therefore not be repeated here. 
Necessary or v formulas: - If a fonnula of type v is true at a possible world, say y, then v0 is true at 





Possible or 1t formulas:- If a fonnula of type 1t is true at a world say y, then 7to is true at some 





We introduce a special notation for generalised disjunctions and conjunctions. We will treat [AI. A2, 
... ,An] as synonymous with A1 v A2 v ... vAn and (AI. A2, ••• An) as synonymous with A1 1\ A2 1\ ..• 
1\ An. 
Definition 58 
If A1, A1, ... , An are formulas, we will refer to [A~o A2, ••• , A,J as a clause (Fitting 1990a:86). 
Note that this definition is not in accordance with definition 10 which defined the notion of a clause for 
the propositional case. The main difference is that in the propositional case a clause is a literal and in 
this case a clause is a fonnula. 
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Definition 59 
/{each C, is a clause, we will refer to (C1, C2, ... , C,J as a clause list (Fitting l990a:86). 
Definition 60 
If L1, L2, ... , Ln are clause lists, we call [L 1, L2, ... , L,J a block (Fitting J990a:86). 
Definition 61 
We call a list containing the empty clause (denoted by[]) closed, and a block closed if every clause list 
in it is closed. We call a block closable if a closed block can be derived by using the replacement and 
addition rules as defined below. 
Definition 62 
We say A is a theorem if the block [([-,A])] is closable (Fitting 1990a:86). 
5.3 Rules 
As mentioned at the start of section 5 Fitting makes use of replacement and addition rules. We defme 
the replacement rules first. 
5.3.1 Replacement Rules. 
Double Negation: 
..,..,A where A is any formula. 
A 
This rule says that any formula A that has the structure -,-,A can be replaced by the formula A. For 
example the formula ...,...,Op can be replaced by the formula DP. 
Resolution within ,Hudal Logic 101 
Conjunction: 
Where A is any formula, and a is any a-type formula (see chapter 2). 
From this rule it should be clear that if a clause contains a a-type formula then the clause can be 
replaced by two additional clauses say C1 and C2 where C1 contains the a 1 formula of a and C2 
contains the a 2 formula of a. For example, if we have [D(P 1\ Q), ...,(P v Q)] then this clause can be 
replaced by the two clauses [D(P 1\ Q), ...,p] and [D(P 1\ Q), .Q]. 
Disjunction: 
f3 
Where Pis any P-type formula (refer to chapter 2, section 3.3) 
If there exists any occurrence of a p type formula in a clause we can replace the P formula by its 
corresponding ~ 1 and P2 formulas. For example, if the p formula is (DP~v •Q) then its corresponding 
P1 and ~2 formulas are DP and .Q. Hence, if we have the clause: [DP v ...,Q] then we can replace this 
clause with the clause [DP, ...,Q]. 
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Special Case Rule: 
Unlike the rules above this rule operates on clause lists and uses the notion of a partition. We say P" P2 
is a partition of the clause C if P1 and P2 are disjoint and the members of P1 and P2 together are exactly 
the members of C. We define the special case rule as follows. 
Note that the partitions are P1 ==[A~. ... , An] and P2 == [B~. ... , Bk] which gives C == [A~. ... , An, B~. ... , 
Bk ]. 
For example, if the special case rule is applied to the clause list ([ -,0-,P, -,0-,Q], [ -,OP], [ -,OQ]) then 
the two clause lists will be: ([-,0-,Q], [-,OP], [-,OQ]) and ([-,0-,P], [-,OP], [-,DQ]). 
KT4-n Rule: 
Although, Fitting (1990a) describes two rules for the system KT4 we will only be looking at the rule he 
calls KT 4-n. 
Let L be a clause list containing a clause C consisting entirely of n-formulas. Create a new clause C". 
For each n formula in C place its corresponding n0 formula into C". Rlen L can be replaced by L * 
where L * is a clause list which consists of the clauses: C", and each clause C; in L that consists entirely 
of v formulas. 
([;r1 , ••• ,;rn],[ v1 , ••• , vm], ... ,[v1 , ••• , vn],c, , ... ,Ck) 
([lro
1 
, ••• ,Jro" ],[ v, , ... , vm], ... ,[v, , ... , vn]) 
For example, consider the following clause list: ([-,OP, OQJ, [DP, -,OQ], [DQ], [P, Q]). Applying the 
KT4-7t rule to this clause list results in the following clause list: ([-,P, Q), [DP, -,OQ], [DQ]). 
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KT4L Rule: 
Fitting (1990a) does not provide a rule for the normal system of modal logic KT4L. However, the 
following rule, which we call the KT4L rule, is sound in his system. 
Let L be a clause list containing clauses C; for i ~ 1 consisting entirely of 7t-formulas. For each C; 
create a new clause C ~ For each 1t formula in C; place its corresponding 7to formula into its 
corresponding clause C ~. For each C ~ create a clause list L; that contains the following: 
• Each clause C in L that consists entirely of v formulas. 
• c~ 
• Each clause Ci in L that consists entirely of 1t formulas such that Cj =t:. C;. 
L can now be replace by L *where L *is the list ofL;. 
([ ;r1, TC2 ••• , TC; J, ... ,[TC1,TC2, ... ;r k ],[ v 1,v2, ••• , vm ], ... ,[ v 1,v2, ••• , vn ],c 1 ,C 2 , ... C q) 
([TCo, ,TC02 , ... ,TC0, ], ... ,[TC1,TC2 , ••• ,TCk ],[v1, v2 , •.• , vm], .. ,[v1,v2 , ••. ,vn]) 
For example, if the initial clause list is: ([ -,DP], (OQ], [DR], [P, OQ], [O...,P]) then this clause list is 
replaced by the following two clauses after the application of the KT4L rule: ([-,P], (OQ], [DR], 
[0-,P]), ([-,DP], (Q], [DR], [0-,P]). 
Resolution within Modal Logic J(J.I 
5.3.2 Addition Rules 
The resolution rule is the first addition rule that is defined. This rule is defined for all the normal 
systems of modal logic, that is, a separate resolution rule is not required for each system. 
Resolution Rule: 
[Z, A1 , ••• , Ak ],[ -.z, B, , ... , Bd 
where Z and -.z are complementary literals and the A;'s and B;'s are formulas. 
For instance, if we have the two clauses in a clause list ([-,P, DQ], [P, OR]) then if we apply the 
resolution rule the clause list becomes: ([DQ, OR], [ -.P, OQ], [P, OR]). 
T-v Rule: 
The T-v rule is an addition rule that is applicable for all reflexive models and is defined as follows: 
If a clause list contains a clause C with an occurrence of a formula v then another clause may be added 
to the clause list that is like C except that it contains occurrences ofv0 where C has v. 
where the A;'s are formulas and v, v0 are a v-type formulas defined above. 
For example, consider the v-type formula O(P 1\ Q); its corresponding v0 formula is just (P 1\ Q). 
Hence if we have the clause ([D(P 1\ Q), -.P, R]) then we will have ([(P 1\ Q), -.P, R], [D(P 1\ Q), -.P, 
R]) after the application of the T-v rule. 
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5.3.3 Summary 
The following table provides a summary of the rules that are applicable for the systems KT4 and KT4L. 
System Rules 
KT4 • Double negation 
• Conjunction 
• Disjunction 
• Special case rule 
• T-v rule 
• KT4-1t rule 
• Resolution Rule 
KT4L • Double negation 
• Conjunction 
• Disjunction 
• Special case rule 
• T-v rule 
• KT4Lrule 
• Resolution Rule 
5.4 Soundness and Completeness 
5.4.1 KT4 
Theorem 48 (KT4-1t Soundness) 
If A, some formula, is a theorem then A is valid in the class of reflexive and transitive standard models. 
Proof: Only a proof sketch is provided here, the reader is referred to Fitting (1990a, 1983) for details. 
But first we require the following definition: 
Definition 
A block B is called satisfiable if there is some reflexive and transitive model M=< W, R, V> and some 
world a E W such that B is true at a 
To prove soundness we show that if we start with a satisfiable block then after applying the replacement 
and addition rules for the system KT4 we will still have a satisfiable block. From this we can conclude 
that if we derive a closed block from the initial block of clause lists then the initial block was not 
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satisfiable. It follows therefore that if the empty block was derived from the initial block [ (-.A)] then 
-,A was not satisfiable and therefore A is valid in the class of reflexive transitive models. o 
Theorem 49 (KT4-1t Completeness) 
/fa formula A is valid in a class of reflexive and transitive models then A is a theorem. 
Proof: We provide a brief sketch for this proof (the reader is referred to the work of Fitting 1990a & 
1983 for the technical details). Similar to the proof of theorem 41 this completeness proof is based on a 
set of consistency properties and its corresponding model existence theorem. The consistency property 
and model existence theorem are defined as follows: 
1. Definition 
We call a finite set {A~. ... , An} of formulas consistent if the block [([AI}, ... , [AJ )] is not 
closable. 
2. Model Existence 
The consistent set {A~. ... ,An} is satisfiable (Fitting !990a:5!). 
For completeness: If A is not a theorem then by definition the block [ ([-,A])] is not closable. It follows 
from 1, that {-.A} is consistent. Then by 2, [ ([-.A])] is satisfiable and hence A is not valid in the class 
of reflexive and transitive models. o 
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5.4.2 KT4L 
We do not prove a formal soundness and completeness result here due to the fact that the above KT4L 
rule is similar to that given by Gore ( 1995) in the next chapter and a formal proof can be found in his 
work. 
Gore shows that his KT4 tableau system is both sound and complete with respect to the class of all 
reflexive and transitive standard models. In the previous section it was shown that KT4 is both sound 
and complete for destructive modal resolution. Now KT4L is merely an extension of KT4, that is, the 
only difference between the two systems is the addition of the rule KT 4L and the removal of the rule 
KT4. Gore (1995) shows that this extension is sound and complete with respect to the class of all 
reflexive, transitive and weakly connected standard models. Since the KT4L rule above is identical to 
his KT4L rule (except for some notational alterations) we have that KT4L for destructive modal 




In this section an application of the resolution system for KT4 is demonstrated. Assume that we want to 
show that formula O(P ~ Q) ~ O(OP ~ OQ) is valid in the class of all reflexive transitive models (i.e. 
we want to show that 0KT40(P ~ Q) ~ O(OP ~ OQ). By definition 62 this means that we need to 
show that the block [ ([ -,(O(P ~ Q) ~ O(OP ~ OQ))])] is closable. The proof is given below with the 
justification for the results on the left given on the right. 
[([-,(O(P ~ Q) ~ O(OP ~ OQ))])] 
[([O(P ~ Q)], [-,O(OP ~ OQ)])] 
[([O(P ~ Q)], [-,(OP ~ OQ)])] 
[([O(P ~ Q)], [OP], [-,OQ])] 
[([O(P ~ Q)], [P], [-,OQ])] 
[([P~Q], [-,Q], [O(P ~ Q], [P], [-,OQ])] 
[ ([ -,P, Q], [ -,Q], [O(P ~ Q)], [P], [ -,OQ])] 
[([-,P], [-,P, Q], [-,Q], [O(P ~ Q)], [P], [-,OQ])] 





T-v rule applied twice 
Disjunction rule 
Resolution rule [ -,P, Q], [ -,Q] 
Resolution rule [ -,P], [P] 
Since every clause list in the block contains the empty clause, the block is closed and it follows that the 
formula, D(P ~ Q) ~ 0 (OP ~ OQ) is valid in the class of all reflexive and transitive models. 
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5.5.2 KT4L 
Similar to the example above we use definition 62 to show that the formula O(P " DP ~ Q) v O(Q " 
OQ ~ P) is a theorem. 
[ ([ -.(O(P" DP ~ Q) v O(Q" DQ ~ P))])] 
[ ([ -.O(P" OP ~ Q)),[ -.O(Q" DQ ~ P)])] 
[([--,(P" DP ~ Q)), [-.O(Q" OQ ~ P)]), 
( [-.O(P" OP ~ Q)),[-.(Q" OQ ~ P)])] 
[ ([P" OP], [ -.Q), [ -.O(Q" OQ ~ P)]), 
( [-.O(P" DP ~ Q)), [Q" DQ], [-.P))] 
[ ([P], [OP], [ --,Q], [ -.O(Q" OQ ~ P)]), 
( [ -.O(P" OP ~ Q)), [Q], [OQ], [ -.P])] 
[([OP], [-.(Q !\ OQ ~ P)]), 
([--,(P" OP ~ Q)],[OQ])] 
[([OP], [Q" OQ], [ -.P]), 
([P " OP], [ --,Q], [OQ])] 
[([OP], [Q], [OQ], [-.P]), 
([P], [OP], [ -.Q], [OQ])] 
[([OP], [P], [Q], [OQ], [-,P]), 
([P], [OP], [-.Q], [OQ], [Q))] 
[ ([OP], [P], [Q], [OQ], [ ...,P], []), 
([P], [OP], [ -.Q], [OQ], [Q], [])] 
Conjunction Rule 
KT4L Rule 
Conjunction Rule applied twice. 
Conjunction rule applied twice. 
KT4L rule applied twice. 
Conjunction rule applied twice. 
Conjunction rule applied twice 
T-v Rule (OP) 
T-v Rule (OQ) 
Resolution Rule applied twice 
From the above block we can see that both the clause lists are closed and hence the block is closed and 
therefore we can conclude that the initial formula is valid in the class of all reflexive, transitive and 
weakly connected models. 
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5.5.3 Special Case Rule 
We include one more example in order to demonstrate the use of the special case rule. We show that the 
formula -,(OP v DQ) v ( -,0-,P v -,0-,Q) is valid in the class of all reflexive and transitive standard 
models, that is, we will use the rules defined for the normal system of modal logic KT 4. 
[ ([ -,( -,(OP v DQ) v ( -,0-,P v -,0-,Q))])] 
[((-,-,(OP v OQ)], [-,(-,0-,P v -,0-,Q)])) 
[([OP v OQ], [ -,( -,0-,P v -,0-,Q)])] 
[ ([OP v DQ], [ -,-,0-,P], [ -,-,0-,Q))] 
[([DP v DQ], [0-,P], (0-,Q])] 
[([OP, DQ], (0-,P), [0-,Q])] 
[([OP], (0-,P], [0-,Q]) 
([DQ], [0-,P], [0-,Q])] 
[ ([OP], [ -,P]) 
([DQ], [ -,Q])] 
[([OP], [P], [ -,P]) 
([OQ], [Q], [ -.,Q])] 
[([OP], [], [P], [ -,P]) 




Negation Rule applied twice 
Disjunction Rule 
Special Case Rule 
KT4-7t rule applied twice 
T-v rule applied twice 
Resolution Rule applied twice 
From the above block we can see that both the clause lists are closed and_.hence the block is closed and 
therefore, we can conclude that the initial formula is valid in the class of all reflexive, transitive 
standard models. Also note that without the use of the special case rule we would not have been able to 
close the above block. 
5.6 Propositional Modal Logics KT5. 
Fitting (1990a) notes in his article that destructive modal resolution is not applicable for modal logics 
whose models require symmetry. This means that it is not possible to apply destructive modal resolution 
directly to the modal logic KT5 since its models are symmetric. Alternatively it is possible to convert 
every formula in KT5 to a formula of modal degree one (i.e. a formula with no nested modal operators). 
An algorithm for this conversion can be found in Fitting (1983). Since the propositional logics KT5 and 
KT4 have the same valid formulas of degree one (see Fitting 1983) the resolution system for KT4 can 
therefore be applied to KT5. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
If we survey the above resolution systems we will find that they can be divided into essentially two 
groups. Those that use translation-based methods and those that don't. In other words, those systems 
that convert the connective 0 to some other connective and those that keep the connective as is and 
apply rules that manipulate the connective accordingly. Del Cerro & Herzig (1988) and Chan (1987) 
are examples of techniques that use translation based proofs. As shown above these techniques translate 
the modal connective 0 into an alternative connective before applying the appropriate resolution rules. 
Unfortunately this translation still requires special rules in order to accommodate the new connective, 
that is, even though the translation simplifies the formulas into clauses, it is not always intuitive which 
clauses to resolve with one another. For instance in classical propositional resolution we replace P and 
..,p with the empty clause. In the above methods we would have to either derive the clause l. or run the 
clauses through a complex algorithm in order to determine whether the two clauses are unsatisfiable. It 
is interesting to note that both these techniques use clause forms, that is, similar to conventional 
resolution systems, they provide routines for converting formulas into clause form, choosing to apply 
their resolution rules to the clausal forms as opposed to the formulas. This reduction of formulas into 
clause form results in lists of clauses whose computational complexity is less than that of their initial 
formulas. Ophelders & De Swart (1993) argue that it is this reduction in computational complexity that 
is responsible for the success of most resolution-based theorem provers and not necessarily the use of 
resolution itself. It is not clear, however, whether this reduction in complexity would add to the 
efficiency of these systems were they to be automated. 
Examples of resolution systems that don't use translation based method~ are those of Fitting (1990b) 
and Abadi & Manna (1986). Once again it is interesting to note that both these techniques do not make 
use of clausal forms but chose instead to convert the formulas while applying the appropriate rules. 
Although Fitting (1990b) introduced new notation for the application of resolution (e.g. clause lists, 
blocks) his resolution rule appeared to be the most intuitive or closely related to the conventional 
application than any of the other approaches. In other words, his rules resolved complementary literals 
with each other as opposed to m-literals or other modal variations of complementary literals. 
All the resolution systems introduced special rules for the normal systems of modal logic. They were all 
able to show soundness and completeness for at least S4. Abadi & Manna provided soundness and 
completeness for KT5 and Fitting (1990b) and del Cerro & Herzig (1988) noted that their systems 
could be extended to KT5. 
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Very little can be said about the efficiency of these systems since no implementation results where 
provided with the description of these systems. Chan ( 1987) did provide an implementation of his 
pattern matching algorithm in Franz LISP but no conclusive results where provided with regards to the 
overall efficiency of this algorithm. The discerning reader may also have noted that some of resolution 
proof systems described above make use of non deterministic rules for instance, Abadi & Manna's 
(1986) resolution rule and Fitting's (1990b) special case rule. The application of these rules, if 
implemented, will result in search spaces that require a great deal of backtracking and therefore result in 
proof procedures that may not perform optimally. However, as Ian Gent (1993) noted in his thesis, there 
is very little information available with regard to the implementation resolution proof systems, and 
therefore, we can merely speculate when it comes to the efficiency of the above techniques. 
Conclusive results can only be derived once these resolution systems have been implemented and their 
applications towards resolving reasoning problems in modal logics have been efficiently demonstrated. 
Resolution proof systems are not the only proof systems available for the determination of local and 
global logical entailment in propositional modal logic. Tableau proof systems, as introduced in chapter 
2 (see section 3.3), have also been used with much success in propositional modal logic. The next 
chapter will survey these proof systems providing examples of applications of these systems for the 
normal systems of modal logic KT4, KT4L and KT5. 
TABLEAUX SYSTEMS WITHIN MODAL LOGIC 
Just because genume science would be impossible without an ordered and regular world which humans can to some extent get 
to know, does not prove that science is properly grounded. Its much vaunted success may be illusory. 
-RTrigg. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 2 we noted that tableau systems are essentially refutation systems that decompose a given set 
of formulas into a network of formulas which can be represented by trees. In this chapter we extend this 
notion to modal logic, in such a way that the trees of formulas now also incorporate possible worlds in 
the associated modal models. Similar to the previous chapter we have selected various articles that 
represent the current work in modal logic with regards to tableau systems. We chose Melvin Fitting 
(1983) in particular because his work is well known, provides a good introduction to tableau systems 
within modal logic and is often referred to by other authors of modal tableaux systems. Rajeev Gore 
(1995) has probably provided the most current and complete analysis of modal tableau systems and we 
therefore provide an overview of his tableau systems here. We recommend strongly that the interested 
reader refer to his report for a complete exposition on his work. 
The work of the authors will be presented in terms of the following headings: 
• Overview - a brief description of the system 
. 
• Syntax and semantics - definitions and descriptions of terminology not defined before. 
• Rules - applicable rules for each system 
• Soundness and completeness 
• Applications- examples of how to apply the different tableau systems 
• Decidability results. 
Similar to chapter 4, chapter 5 is by no means a formal expose on the tableau systems introduced here 
but merely a description on how they work. For the sake of conformity to previous chapters notational 
alterations have been made to the different tableau systems. 
Chapter 5 is concluded with a brief comparison of the two approaches and some comments on their 
efficiency. 
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2. TABLEAU SYTEMS- MELVIN FITTING 
Fitting's ( 1983) tableau systems are similar to the tableau systems described in chapter 2, with the 
exception that over and above the propositional classical tableau rules the nodes in the tableaux have 
modal formulas as well. We will only review that section of his work that covers the propositional 
modal systems KT4 and KT5. 
2.1 Syntax and Semantics 
For the sake of convenience Fitting (1983) describes his formulas in terms of types. In the propositional 
case he describes two types of formulas namely a and ~ formulas. These formulas are exactly those 
which we encountered in chapter 2. In the modal case he extends his sets of formulas to also include v 
and 1t formula types. We encountered Fitting's (1983) v and 1t formulas when we discussed Destructive 
Modal Resolution in chapter 4, and will therefore not repeat them here. For the interested reader the 
majority of Fitting's (1983) syntax is based on the ideas ofKripke (1959, 1963). 
In the following discussion L is KT4, KT4L or KT5. Note that for the sake of convenience we will 
make use of the terms L-model, L satisfiable and L tableau system. By L-model we mean the class of 
standard models corresponding to L. By L satisfiable we mean (see definition 21) that the L-model 
M=<W, R, V> satisfies some formula A; that is, for some a E W, o ~A. By a L tableau system we 
mean a tableau system for a particular modal logic L. 
As mentioned in chapter 2 (see definition 16) a tableau proof of a formula A from a set of formulas r, is 
a closed tableau for r u {-,A}. Fitting (1983), however, distinguishes between two types of tableau 
proofs. One in which we only deal with a single formula A, that is, a tableauproojfor a formula A is 
just a closed tableau for {-.A}. Effectively we are showing oc A where o is local logical entailment, C 
the class of standard models corresponding to L and r is the empty set. However, it is not always 
possible to only work with one formula at a time, sometimes we require several sets of formulas. A 
tableau using this variation is described by means of the following definition (Fitting 1983:70): 
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Definition 63 
Let r. rL and rc be arbitrary sets offormulas. By an L tableau for r using members rL as local 
assumptions and members of rc as global assumptions (denoted rc 0 rL ~f) we mean any tableau 
that: 
• Begins by putting down a finite subset of F(Fmay be infinite) in any order. 
• Proceeds according to the usual tableau rules for L. 
• But allows the following two assumption rules: 
/. Local assumption rule:- Before any of the usual tableau rules for L are applied, any member 
of FL may be added to the end of the branch. 
2. Global assumption rule:- At any point in the tableau construction, any member of Fe may be 
added to the end of any branch. 
In effect this definition says that for every model M=<W, R, V> in the class of standard models 
corresponding to L, in which all the formulas of r G are true r L ~ r must also be true in M. Now r L ~ 
r means that if all the members of r L are true at a world a. E W then at least one member of r is also 
true at a.. In other words r G 0 r L ~ r is a combination of global and local logical entailment as 
specified in chapter 3, where o denotes global logical entailment and ~ denotes local logical 
entailment. 
A proof therefore, for a set of formulas r, using the set of formulas r 0 as global assumption and r L as 
local assumptions, would be a closed tableau for the set -,r = {-,A I A E r}, that is, in order to 
COnclude r G 0 r L ~ r We need tO find a closed tableau for -,r. 
2.2 Tableau Systems For KT 4 
2.2.1 Rules 
Essentially there are two types of rules in the tableau systems defined by Fitting (1983). The first set of 
rules could be considered as 'expansion' rules, that is, when the tableau rules are applied the current 
tableau is effectively expanded by new nodes that contain new formulas. The second type is the set of 
'modification' rules. As with the 'expansion' rules these rules also expand the tableau by new nodes but 
at the same time these rules modify the current branch by deleting formulas that are no longer 
applicable. For the purpose of this thesis a formula that has been deleted will be denoted by a formula 
that has been crossed out, e.g. -BA-,A....SB~ 
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Note that only formulas that have not been deleted are available for the remainder of the proof, that is, 
if -,A and A occur on the same branch then we cannot conclude that the branch is closed since -,A has 
been deleted. 
The following rules are applicable to the tableau system KT4. 
• All the tableau expansion rules for the propositional case (refer to chapter 2) 
These rules are modification rules as discussed above, that is, once the propositional rules have been 
applied to the current node (the node we are currently working with), the current node is deleted. 
For instance if the node on the tableau contains the formula -,OP v DDP then the tableau can be 
expanded by means of the ~ rule (see tableau expansion rules in chapter 2) to create two new 
branches with nodes ...,OP and DOP respectively. Illustrated by: 
·DP v GOP 
~ 
-,Op OOp 
• The repetition rule. 
This rule is applicable when a number of branches share a common set of formulas. In such a case 
the common formulas can be copied to each separate branch, deleting the original formula, so that 
the branches can be updated separately without affecting the other branches which share the same 
formulas (Fitting 1983). In the example below the formula ...,OP v P has been copied to each 








• The v rule: 
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v 
- where v and v0 are as defined previously. 
vo 
116 
The v rule is an instance of an expansion rule, that is, no modifications are required to the tableau 
other than the addition of a new node. For example, if the current node contains the formula OO(P 
A Q) the tableau can be expanded by means of the v rule to create the new node containing the 
formula O(P A Q). Illustrated by: 
• The 1t rule: 
OO(P A Q) 
I 
O(P A Q) 
-,---r_, -,n,---- where r is the set of formulas currently on the branch and n, 7to and v 
{vjv Ef},n 0 
is as was previously defmed. 
In other words, let r be the set of formulas that are currently on the branch and let 1t be some 
formula on the same branch as r that is not in the set of formulas r. For instance in the tableau 
below r = {OP, -.OQ, R, OR} and 1t = 0-.P. After the application of the 1t ruler is replaced by all 
the v formulas in r, i.e. the set {OP, --,OQ} and 1t is replaced by -.P. Implementing this result on the 
tableau involves deleting the formulas R, 0--,P and OR and extending the tableau by an additional 
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Note that we could also have used 1t =OR. In other words the 1t rule is not deterministic. Therefore it 
is possible that when we get to the end of the tableau that we may have to backtrack if we have not 
been successful in finding a proof. By backtracking we mean that we will have to remove all the 
branches of the tableau until we reach the node where we discarded a 1t formula and restart the 
tableau from this point. So in the example above we would remove -,P and apply the 1t rule using 1t 











There are a number of alternative ways to deal with this issue of non-determinism. Another 
alternative would be to create a separate tableau for each application of the 1t rule. For instance, in 
the above example we would be working with two different tableaux in parallel after the application 
of the 1t rule. If either of the tableaux became closed we would have a proof. In other words both 
tableaux do not need to be closed. The same holds true for the generic case, that is, if we are 
working with n tableaux than only one has to close. This issue of non-determinism will not be raised 
in the remainder of this work but the reader should be aware that this Issue .will have to be addressed 
if this system was to be implemented on a computer system. 
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2.2.2 Soundness and Completeness 
Theorem 50 (Soundness) 
For any formula A, if A has a tableau proof (see section 2.1 above) using the respective KT4 rules, 
then A is valid in the class of all reflexive transitive models. 
Proof: The proof is very similar to the one given for soWldness in chapter 4 Wlder destructive modal 
resolution, that is, if the proof is started with a satisfiable set of formulas then after the application of 
the respective rules for the KT4 system the set of formulas will still be satisfiable. From this it follows 
that if the closed tableau (see chapter 2) is derived from the formula -A then -.A is not satisfiable in 
the class of all reflexive transitive models and therefore it follows that A is valid. A complete proof is 
available in Fitting (1983:46). o 
To show completeness Fitting (1983) essentially uses a Lindenbaum (see chapter 3 section 6.3) type 
construction, that is, he defines a consistent set which he extends to a maximal consistent one. He then 
uses the maximal consistent set to construct a model for his tableau systems. 
Theorem 51 (Completeness) 
If a formula A is valid in all the class of all reflexive transitive models, then A has a tableau proof 
using the respective KT4 rules. 
Proof: The proof follows a contrapositive argument, that is, we assume there does not exist a proof for 
a formula A from a KT4 tableau system and then proceed to show that'7\. is !lot valid in the class of 
standard models corresponding to KT 4. A complete proof can be obtained in Fitting (1983 :61-63). o 
We state the theorems for strong soWldness and completeness without proof: 
Theorem 52 (Strong Soundness) 
Let r. rG and fL be sets of formulas. If there is a closed tableau for -.r using the members of rG as 
global assumptions and the members of fL as local assumptions then rGO fL -+ r 
(See Fitting 1983:72 for details of proof.) 
Theorem 53 (Strong Completeness) 
Let r. rG and IL be sets of formulas. If rGO IL -+ r then there is a closed tableau for .....,r using the 
members ofFG as global assumptions and the members of fL as local assumptions. 
(See Fitting 1983:73 for details of proof.) 
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2.2.3 Applications 
In this section we show a tableau proof for a single formula. (A tableau proof that makes use of local 
and global assumptions is demonstrated in the section 2.3.4 below.) Assume that we want to show that 
(DP ~ P) v -.(DP ~ DDP) is valid in the class of all reflexive transitive models. Then by soundness 
we know that if there is a tableau proof for -.((DP ~ P) v -.(DP ~ DDP)) then (DP ~ P) v -.(DP 
~ DDP) is valid with respect to this class. Negating (DP ~ P) v -.(DP ~ DDP) the proof follows. 
,((DP ~ P) ·v· ,(DP ~ DDP) 
,(DP ~ a rule- -,((DP ~ P) v ,(DP ~ DDP) 
,(DP ) DDP a rule- ,((DP ~ P) v -,(DP ~ DDP) 
Qp > DDP tableau expansion rule- ,,(DP ~ DDP 
,Op DDp [}rule - DP ~ DDP 
I 
,(DP ~ -..r,(Dbdi'P~>-- repetition rule - -,(DP ~ 
I I 
Dp DP a rule - ,(DP ~ P) applied twice 
,P ,P a rule - -,(DP ~ P) applied twice 
p p v rule- DP 
Since both branches are closed (both contain P and -,P) we have a closed tableau and it follows that 
(DP ~ P) v -,(OP ~ DDP) is valid in the class of all reflexive transitive models. Note that the left 
most column is not part of the proof but merely an indication to the reader as to what rules where used 
to obtain the required nodes. So for instance nodes -,(OP ~ P) and -,-,(OP ~ DDP) were obtained 
after the application of the a rule to the formula -,((DP ~ P) v -,(OP ~ DDP)). 
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2.2.4 Decidability 
In this section we will show that the KT 4 tableau system, as defined by Fitting( 1983 ), is decidable. 
First the notion of KT4-consistency property is defined. The consistency property was initially 
introduced in chapter 4 (see section 2.5) and can be defined for the KT4 system as follows (Fitting 
1983:50). 
Definition 64 
Let C be a collection of sets of formulas . Cis a KT4 consistency property if it meets the following 
conditions: For each r E C: 
• r does not contain A and -.A for any literal A .. 
• r does not contain .1 or -, T. 
• if a E rthen rv{a,, a2}EC 
• if j3 E r then r V { j]J} E C or r V { j]J} E C 
• ifv E rthen rv{vo} E C 
• if;rErthen{vJ VEl} V{7ro} EC 
The reader will recall that subformulas were defmed in chapter 3 (definition 35) and that it was noted 
that a set of formulas r is closed if and only if r contained all its subformulas. This notion in 
conjunction with the KT4 consistency property lends itself to the following definition. 
Definition 65 
Let C be a set of formulas which is a KT4 consistency property and let r be an arbitrary collection of 
formulas. By C restricted to r, we mean the collection of all sets of the form S n r where S E C 
(Fitting 1983: 115). 
Theorem 54 
Let A be a formula, C a KT4 consistency property and let r(A) be the set of all subformulas of A. A is 
valid in all KT4 models if and only if {-.A} is not a member of any KT4 consistency property of the 
form C restricted to r(A). 
(See Fitting, 1983: 116 for a proof.) 
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Let A be any formula, with n subformulas, f(A) the set of all sub formulas of A, C a KT4 consistency 
property. In order to show that A is KT4-valid (i.e. valid in all classes of standard models that 
correspond to KT4) we need to check, by theorem 54, every KT4 consistency property of the form C 
restricted to f(A) to see if {-,A } is a member. Now if S E (C restricted to f(A)) then S c;; f(A) and 
hence S E P(f(A)) where P is the power set operation, that is, (C restricted to f(A)) c;; P(f(A)). Now 
f(A) has at most 2n members, and therefore any KT4-consistency property of the form (C restricted to 
f(A)) has at most 22" members. 
Since (C restricted to f(A)) c;; P(f(A)) we have that (C restricted to f(A)) E P(P(r(A))). It follows 
22n therefore that there are at most 2 KT4 consistency properties of the form (C restricted to r(A)). 
From this result we note that in order to show that A is KT4 valid we only need to verifY a finite well 
determined number of sets, and hence it follows that there is a decision procedure for KT4. (Fitting, 
1983:116,117.) 
2.3 Tableau Systems for KT5 
2.3.1 Overview 
Although Fitting ( 1983) describes a number of tableaux systems for KT5 we will only be looking at his 
semi analytic KT5 tableau system, that is, his KT5 tableau system that makes use of the semi analytic 
cut rule (see definition below). Also, note that for the sake of convenience we will only be looking at 
strong soundness and completeness, that is, all the tableaux in this section will have been built as 
described by definition 63 . In other words given any set of formulas r (possibly infinite), r a as global 
assumptions and r L as local assumptions We Can deduce f G 0 r L --)- r if We s;an find a closed tableau 
for ...,r = {-,A 1 A e r}. 
2.3.2 Rules 
Semi-Analytic Cut Rule 
Before defining the relevant rules for KT5 we digress to discuss a rule known as the cut rule. 
The cut rule essentially says that at any time during the construction of a tableau we can split the 
tableau into two branches and add A to the one branch and -,A to the other branch for any formula A. 
We can denote this as follows: -~- where A is any arbitrary formula. 
A -.A 
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The cut rule however has some drawbacks, one of them being that it is not possible to show decidability 
when using the cut rule. The cut rule adds arbitrary formulas to the tableau system therefore there is no 
guarantee that the tableau will eventually terminate. It is therefore not surprising that a nwnber of 
researchers have tried to find alternative options to the cut rule. One of these researchers is Osamu 
Sonobe who defined a cut rule which is restricted to sub formulas of formulas already on the branch and 
formulas that can be built up from these formulas by prefixing modal operators to the formulas. This 
restriction is defined in terms of a cut class as follows (Fitting 1983:202, 203): 
Definition 66 
Let r be a set of formulas. We call I:: a cut class if: 
I. Fc is closed under subformulas 
2. Tc is closed under the operation of prefixing modal operators; that is, if A or -,A belongs to 1c then 
so do DA, OA, -DA and --,OA. 
Definition 67 
Let Fc be a cut class. The cut rule restricted to Fc is the rule: at any point in a tableau we may split the 
end of a branch, and add A to the one fork and -,A to the other, for any A E rc. An instance of the cut 
rule, restricted to Fc, is called a Fc -cut, denoted by:-,- where A E rc. 
A-,A 
Now we can further restrict this cut rule to the smallest cut class as follows: 
Definition 68 
Let r be a set of formulas and A any formula. By C(I) we mean the smallest cut class extending rand 
by C(A) we mean C({A}). We call cuts restricted to C(I) and C(A) semi analytical cuts. 
Unlike the ordinary cut rule, semi analytic cuts have the advantage that they place a check on the total 
arbitrariness inherent in the cut rule. 
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Summary Of Rules 
The following rules have been defined for the tableau system KT5. 
• All the propositional tableau expansion rules. 
These rules are applied in a similar fashion to that described for KT4. 




- where v and v0 are as defined previously. 
Vo 
f,7t 
where r is a set of formulas and v, 1t and 7to are as defined previously 
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As with the 1t rule for KT4 this 1t rule is a replacement rule. r contains all the formulas that have not 
been deleted on the branch that is currently being worked on. 1t is also a formula on the branch but is 
not contained in f. After the application of the 1t rule the formulas on the branch are replaced by the 
sets { vJv E f} u { 1t I 1t E f} and the corresponding 1t0 formula of 1t. It follows therefore that all the 
formulas on the branch that are not in the set of all v's or the set of all1t's must be deleted. For 
example, in the tableau below r = {OP, --,OQ, .OR, O(P 1\ Q), R} and 1t = OQ. After the 
application of the 7t-rule r is replaced by the sets {OP, --,OQ} u {,OR; O(P A Q), OQ} and 1t is 














• Semi analytic cut rule: 
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where A is a formula restricted to the cut class ccr u r L u r o). 
The cut class applicable to this rule is defined in terms of local and 
global asstunptions as follows. Let r denote a set of formulas, r L 
the set of local asstunptions and r 0 the set of global asstunptions. 
Then the cut class for the semi analytical cut rule is of the type C(f' 
u rL u f'o). 
For example, iff'= {O(P 1\ Q)}, rL = {P, Q} and 1 0 is the empty set, then the cut class is C(r u 
r L). Since C is a cut class we also know that by definition C is closed under sub formulas and 
therefore (P 1\ Q) also belongs to C. It follows therefore that if A = (P 1\ Q) then we have the 
following application of the semi analytic cut rule: 






-.(P 1\ Q) 
2.3.3 Soundness and Completeness 
Theorem 55 
Let r, If_ and Fe be sets of formulas. There is a closed semi analytic KT~ tableau for --,F = {-,A I A E 
I) using the members of IL as local and the members of Fe as global assumptions if and only ifF cO 
Proof: Soundness for KT5 follows a similar argtunent to soundness of KT4 (see theorem 50). 
Completeness follows a contrapositive argtunent similar to that described by Abadi & Manna (1986) in 
chapter 4, section 2.5. In this instance the consistency property and model existence theorem are 
defined as follows: 
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I. Definition. 
Let C be a collection of sets of formulas. C is a classical consistency property if it meets the 
following conditions. (Fitting /983:48): 
I. S does not contain A and -.Afar any literal A .. 
2. S does not contain .1 or -, T. 
4. if a E S then S u {a" a2} E C. 
5. if f3 E S then S u { fJJ) E C or S u { /32} E C. 
lfS E C. Swill be referred to as C-consistent. 
2. Definition. 
Let Fe be any cut class (see definition 66) . lfC is a classical consistency property then we call 
C an KT5-consistency property with cut class r, if for each S E C: 
I. Cut condition: for any formula A E Fe either S u {A} E Cor S u {-.A} E C, and 
2. if rr E S then {vI v E S} u {rr lrr E S} u rr0 E C. (Fitting 1983:205.) 
3. Definition 
Let C be a KT5-consistency property and let Fbe a set of formulas. We call C F-compatible if 
for each SEC and for each A E r, S u{A} E C (Fitting 1983:51). 
4. Strong Model Existence 
Let r, lL and Fe be arbitrary sets of formulas. Assume that then! is a KT5-tableau for F 
using the members of fL as local assumptions and members of Fe as global assumptions. Let 
C be a KT5-consistency property with cut class Fe = C(F u Fe u FJ that is fL-compatible. If 
Fe extends Fe and IL then, if Fe is C-consistent, Fe is satisfiable at a world in some reflexive 
transitive symmetric model M=<W, R, V> in which the members of fL hold at every possible 
world. (See Fitting 1993:206 for proof.) 
We refer the reader to Fitting (1993 :209) for the details. o 
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2.3.4 Applications 
The tableau system can be demonstrated for KT5 as follows. Let r0 = {OP ~ P}, rL = {OP ~ DOP} 
and r = { 0 p ~ DO p}. We want to show r GO r L ~ r. This means by theorem 55 that we have to show 
that there is a closed tableau for ..,r, i.e . ..,(OP ~ OOP). The prooffollows below: 
member of r ,~er ~ !JeP} 
a rule- ...,(OP ~ DOP) 2 ~ 
I 
a rule- -.(OP ~ DOP) 3 .,!Jer 
delete node I I 
member of rL 4 bJr ~bJbJp I 
13 rule- (DP ~ DDP) 5 ...,Dp 6 -agp... 
delete node 4 I I 
repetition rule - ( 0 P) 7 OP 8 ~ 
delete node 2 I I 
repetition rule - ( ..., Do P) 9 ...,DoP 10 ~ 
delete node 3 I I 
1t rule- ( ...,DOP) II -.OP 
I 
14 Qp...,.p member of ro 
1t rule- ( OP) 12 p 15 ...,Dp 16 -:p- 13 rule - ( DP ~ P) 
delete node 14 
v rule - ( -.OP) 13 ...,p 17 DDp 18 DDp repetition rule-( DDP) 
I I delete node 6 
19 OP 20 OP repetition rule- ( OP) 
I I delete node 8 
21 ...,DOP 22 ...,DoP repetition rule - ( ..., Do P) 
I '" delete node I 0 
23 Tp 1t rule- ( ...,DP) 
24 Dp 
I 
v rule- ( DDP) 
25 p v rule- (DP) 
26 -.OP 1t rule- ( ...,DoP) 
I delete node 16 
27 ...,p v rule- ( -.OP) 
I 
27 DP v rule- (DO P) 
I 
28 p v rule- ( DP) 
Since each branch is closed, the tableau is closed and we have the desired result. Note that the left and 
right most columns as well as the node numbers are not part of the proof but merely an indication of 
how the nodes were derived. The reader may also notice that there was more than one way to show this 
proof. In other words, the proof to show r oor L ~r is not unique. 
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2.3.5 Decidability 
Decidability results are not possible for tableau systems that use variations of the cut rule, such as the 
KT5 tableau system. However, Fitting (1983) does make some interesting observations with regards to 
decidability for the KT5 tableau system. 
Fitting (1983) demonstrates that it is possible to show that a formula is valid in the class of models 
corresponding to KT5 (i.e. KT5 valid) without using the cut rule. This is done by allowing the addition 
of another rule that stipulates that from 7to we can infer 1t. In other words, adding this rule to the KT5 
tableau system means that we can dispense with the cut rule. Fitting calls this tableau system the weak 
KT5 tableau system. The weak KT5 tableau system is exactly the same as the KT5 tableau system 
"o discussed above except that the weak KT5 tableau system contains the rule instead of the semi 
!( 
analytical cut rule: -~-. However, Fitting (1983:226) is only able to show weak completeness for 
A-,A 
this tableau system and notes that strong completeness (where the sets of formulas may be infinite) is 
still an issue open to debate. 
Although we will not discuss this system in detail here (the reader is referred Fitting 1983) we will note 
the following interesting results which provide the basis for the proof of weak completeness of a cut-
free KT5 tableau system. 
Theorem 56 
A formula A, is KT5 valid if and only if COA is KT4 valid. 
(See Fitting 1983:222-225 for details of proof.) 
Theorem 57 
KT5 is decidable. 
Proof: Since KT4 is decidable. (Fitting 1983:222). 
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3. PREFIXED TABLEAU SYSTEMS - MELVIN FITTING 
3.1 Syntax and Semantics 
In the previous sections we discussed tableaux whose rules resulted in shifts from one world to another. 
For instance when we applied the 1t rule for KT4, to a branch B, in a particular tableau, we had to 
update all the formulas on the branch so that the branch reflected the current world that we had shifted 
to, that is, in these tableaux we always moved forward to the next world and erased the results from the 
past worlds. In symmetric models we have the option to return to past worlds, and therefore these 
tableaux are not always ideal. For these systems prefixed tableau systems, as described below, are far 
superior. Essentially prefixed tableau systems are tableau systems that make use of prefixed formulas 
where the prefixes are labels for the worlds at which the formulas are true in a given model, that is, the 
prefixes are used to keep track of the different worlds on the branch. It is therefore not necessary to 
delete formulas every time a rule is applied to the branch since the prefixes provide an explicit 
indication of the worlds. 
Definition 69 
A preftx is a finite sequence of positive integers. A preftxed formula fA is a prefix f followed by a 
formula A {Fitting 1983:388). 
For example, if the formula lA appears on the branch of a tableau then it should be clear that A is a 
formula that is true at a world labelled by 1. 
As with the tableau systems discussed previously we also start a tableau proofft>r a formula fA by f..,A. 
Which essentially means that there is a world labelled by P. at which -,A is true. For the sake of 
convenience we will redefine closure in terms of prefixed tableau systems. 
Definition 70 
A tableau branch is closed if it contains fA and f -,A for some prefix e and some formula A. A tableau 
is closed if every branch is closed. A closed tableau for f-,A is a proof of A (Fitting 1983:389). 
It follows therefore that ifwe find a closed table for f..,A we can conclude ocA where o is local logical 
entailment and C the class of standard models corresponding to L. 
In order to apply the rules that are defined in the next section we require the following terminology with 
regard to prefixes. 
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Definition 71 
We say a prefix f is used on a tableau branch if fA occurs on the branch for some formula A. We say 
prefix f. is unrestricted on a tableau branch if f. is not an initial segment (proper or otherwise) of any 
prefix used on the branch. We say a prefix f.' is a simple extension of f. if f.' = f.,n for some integer n. 
(Fitting 1983:391.) 
Apart from these definitions we also require additional properties that allow us to determine the 
relationship between different prefixes. These properties need to mimic the behaviour of the relation R 
in the different standard models M=<W, R, V> for the normal systems of modal logic. In other words, 
if the relation R is transitive and reflexive then the prefixes need to mimic a transitive and reflexive 
relationship as well. In order to define this relationship between the prefixes we define an accessibility 
relation denoted by accessible from. 
The accessibility relation, accessible from, for prefixed KT4 tableau systems have the following 
conditions (Fitting 1983: 393): 
• Every prefix f.,n is accessible from f. for every integer n. For example 1,2 is accessible from 1. 
• Every prefix f. is accessible from f. For example 1 is accessible from 1. 
• Every prefix f.,f.' is accessible from f. for every non-empty sequence f.'. For example 1,1,2 is 
accessible from 1,1 and 1. 
The reader will recall that in chapter 3 we defmed the class of KT5 models as the class of models 
M=<W, R, V> where R is the equivalence relation. This class can also be defined alternatively as the 
class of models M=<W, R, V> where R is the universal relation. It is this latter definition that forms 
the foundation of the accessible from relation for Fitting's (1983:397) prefi~d KT5 tableau system. 
Essentially the idea is that since R is the universal relation every prefix is accessible from every other 
prefix. Thus for prefixed KT5 tableau systems the following condition has been defined for the 
accessible from relation: 
• Any prefix e is accessible from any other prefix e'. For example, the prefix 2 is accessible from the 
prefix 3 and both prefixes 2 and 3 would be accessible from 1. 
For the remainder of section 3, L will be used to denote the systems KT4 and KT5. 
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3.2 Rules 
Similar to previous tableau systems, we also need to define specific tableau rules for prefixed tableau 
systems. Only the rules applicable to KT4 and KT5 will be addressed in this section. The reader is 
referred to Fitting (1983) for the rules for the other normal systems of modal logic. Once again we 
make use of all the previous propositional tableau expansion rules as defined in chapter 2 (see section 
3.3) with the exception that we need to cater for an additional prefix. Note that the application of the a. 
and 13 rules does not result in a change of worlds. For example, if A is a formula of type a. that is true at 




We will not redefine the rules here, but care should be taken that when applying the tableau rules that 
the same prefix is carried forward. 
For example, if the formula 1 (P 1\ Q) occurs on the branch then the branch will be extended by the 
formulas lP and lQ. 
The repetition rule, as defined previously, is also used in this system except that now the prefix is also 
copied with the formula. 
The v and 1t rules, defined below, are the same for both prefixed KT4 and KT5 tableau systems. 
However, the reader should note that although the rules look the same, the accessibility relation is 
different for these systems. It follows therefore that although the same rules are applicable to both 
tableau systems they will be applied differently. 
• v rule 
R.v 
R.'v 
where f.' is accessible from e and f' has been used on the branch, or is an unrestricted 
simple extension of f. 
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For example, if the formula I O(P 1\ Q) occurs on the branch of a prefixed KT4 tableau then the 
branch can be extended by I (P 1\ Q) since I has been used on the branch and 1 is accessible from 1. 
Alternatively, the branch can be extended by 1 ,2(P 1\ Q) provided that 1,2 is accessible from 1 and 
is an unrestricted simple extension of 1. From the conditions listed above for the accessible from 
relation we know that 1,2 is indeed accessible from 1. Also, it follows by definition 71, that 1 ,2 is a 
simple extension of 1. The only remaining condition that would have to be verified is that 1 ,2 has 
not been used as an initial segment (proper or otherwise) on the branch. 
For a prefixed KT5 tableau system the application of the v-rule to the formula 1 O(P 1\ Q) would 
result in the branch being extended by the formula n(P 1\ Q) for any integer n that has either been 
used on the branch or is new to the branch. This follows from the condition of the accessible from 
relation that says that any prefix is accessible from any other prefix and from the v rule that states 
that the prefix has either been used on the branch or is an unrestricted simple extension of another 
prefix. So in this case we could have extended the branch by: 1 (P 1\ Q), 1 ,2(P 1\ Q) or just 2(P 1\ Q) 
etc. 
• 1t rule 
where €' is an unrestricted simple extension of f. 
For example, in a prefixed KT4 tableau system a tableau branch with the formula 30Q can be 
extended by the formula 3,4Q after the application of the 1t rule provided that the prefix 3,4 was an 
unrestricted simple extension of 3. If, for instance, the formula 3,4Df appeared somewhere on the 
branch then we would not have been able to use the prefix 3,4 but would nave had to used another 
prefix such as 3,5, once again with the condition that 3,5 must be an unrestricted simple extension of 
3. 
In a prefixed KT5 tableau system the application of the 1t rule to the formula 30Q would result in the 
current branch being extended by the formula nQ for any new integer n. So in this case we could 
extend the branch by 4Q, 3,4Q etc. provided 4 and 3,4 have not appeared on the branch before. It 
should be clear to the reader that we would not have been able to extend the branch by 3Q since the 
prefix 3 has been previously used on the branch. 
Global and local assumption rules, also defined previously, are also applicable to Fitting's (1983) 
explicit tableau system. In this case any member of the global assumptions can be added to a tableau 
branch as f'A where f' is a prefix that has been used on the branch. Members of the local 
assumptions are added as 1 A to the tableau branch. 
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3.3 Soundness 
Theorem 58 (Soundness) 
!fA has a prefixed L-tableau proof, then A is valid in all L-models. 
Proof: Proof is by contradiction. Asswne that A has a L-tableau proof but that it is not valid in the 
classes of standard models corresponding to L. Show that there does not exist a labelled tableau for A, 
thus contradicting the initial asswnption that A had a tableau proof. Details can be found in Fitting 
1983:400,401. 0 
3.4 Completeness 
3.4.1 Systematic Tableau Procedure 
Although it is possible to establish the completeness of the various prefixed tableau systems by using 
maximal consistent sets, as we did with the previous tableau systems, we will use an alternative 
argwnent to prove the completeness for the prefixed tableau systems. This argwnent essentially makes 
use of a systematic-tableau construction procedure that describes how to build a tableau proof for a 
formula A, that is, we keep applying the rules in the systematic procedure until we either find a proof 
for A or a counter-model for A. 
Fitting (1983) makes use of a device originated by Smullyan who worked with each occurrence of a 
prefixed formula only once, but whenever he worked with a formula of J:he form ev he added a fresh 
. 
occurrence of it at the end of the branch, that is, once a formula has been used it will be marked in 
some way to ensure that the prefixed formula is not used again except if the formula is of the type fv. A 
formula, which has been marked, will be called finished. 
Only formulas that have the same prefix may be resolved with each other regardless of their markings. 
For example, if 1,2A and 1,3-.,A appear on the same branch then the branch cannot be closed. However, 
if 1,2A and 1,2-.,A marked finished, appear on the same branch then the branch will be closed. 
Note that we will refer to a prefixed formula as atomic if it is of the form eA or e-,A where A is any 
atomic formula. 
Let A be a formula. We describe a systematic procedure to produce a proof for A in the logic L as 
follows. The proof is in stages (Fitting 1983:403, 404 ): 
Stage I 
Stage n+1 
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Begin by placing 1--.A at the origin. 
This concludes stage I. 
Suppose n stages of the construction have been completed. 
IF the tableau we have constructed is closed THEN 
Stop. 
END IF 
IF all occurrences of prefixed formula are finished THEN 
Stop. 
END IF 
Otherwise go on to stage n + 1. 
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Choose an occurrence of a prefixed formula as high up in the tree as possible that has not 
been finished, for instance f.A. 
IF fA is atomic THEN 
Declare the occurrence finished. 
This ends stage n+ 1. 
END IF 
Otherwise extend the tableau as follows: 
FOR each open branch B through the occurrence of f.A DO: 
IF f.A is of the form f.a. THEN 
Add fa.1 and f.a.2 to the end of B. 
END IF 
IF fA is of the form f.f3 THEN 
Split the end of branch B into two. 
Add €[3 1 to the end of one branch 
Add f.f3 2 to the end of the second branch. 
END IF 
IF fA is of the form f.v THEN 
FOR each prefix f.' that has been used on B and that is accessible from f. (if any) DO 
Add e'v0 to the end of B 
END FOR 
Add a fresh occurrence of fv to the end of B. 
END IF 
IF fA is of the form f1t THEN 
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Let k be the smallest integer such that f,k is unrestricted on B 




Having done this for each branch B through the particular occurrence of f.A being 
considered, declare that occurrence of fA finished. 
This completes state n+ 1. 
3.4.2 Completeness Proofs 
Theorem 59 
If a formula A is L-valid, then A has a proof in the prefixed L-tableau system. 
Proof: The proof follows a contrapositive argument, that is, we asswne that A is not provable and then 
show that a systematic attempt to prove A, using the procedure above, will fail. From this result it 
follows that there is a tableau branch that is still open and as a result all the formulas on the open branch 
(including -,A) are satisfied by the class of models corresponding to L, that is, there is some model 
M=<W, R, V> in the class of models corresponding to Land a world a E W such that all the formulas 
on the branch, including -,A, are true at a. This in turn means that A is not L-valid. We refer the reader 
to Fitting ( 1983:41 0) for the details.o 
Theorem 60 
If A has an L-tableau proof, then A has a systematic L-tableau proof 
Proof: Follows as a corollary of the above theorem (Fitting 1983:410).0 
From the above two theorems we can therefore conclude that if A is L-valid then A has a proof in a 
prefixed L-tableau system which in turn means A has a systematic L-tableau proof. 
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3.5 Applications. 
The systematic procedure is demonstrated below for KT4 and KT5. 
For KT 4 we show that the fomlUla OP ~ 0 OP is valid in the class of standard models corresponding 
to KT4. The formula is negated and the tableau is created as follows. 
Note that the tableau is in the centre; the other columns are there for clarification. The leftmost column 
indicates the stage at which the formula was created. For instance, I OP was created during stage 2. The 
next column indicates which rule was applied to create the new formula. For example, I OP was created 
by the a rule that was applied to the formula I-,(OP ~ OOP) during stage 2. The right most column 
indicates at which stage the formula was marked finished. For example, I-,(OP ~ OOP) was marked 
finished at stage 2. 
I-,(OP ~ ODP) finished 2 
I 
2 a rule (1-,(0P ~ OOP)) 10P finished 3 
I 
2 a rule (1-,(0P ~ OOP)) 1-,00p finished 4 
I 
3 v rule (1 OP) lP finished 5 
I 
3 10P finished 6 
I 
4 n rule (1-,00P) 1,2-,0P finished 7 
I 
6 v rule (1 OP) 1P ~ finished 8 
I 
6 v rule (lOP) I,2 finished 9 
I 
6 10P finished 10 
I 
7 1t rule (1 ,2 -,OP) 1,2,3-,P 
I 
10 v rule (lOP) lP 
I 
10 v rule (lOP) 1,2 
I 
10 v rule (1 OP) 1,2,3P 
I 
10 10P 
Clearly this tableau is closed because both 1 ,2,3-,P and 1 ,2,3P are both on the only branch in the 
tableau. 
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For KT5 the formula OP ~ OOP is shown to be valid in the class of standard models corresponding to 
KT5 (Fitting 1983:397). Once again the proof follows a similar outline as the one described above. 
1-. (OP ~ DoP finished 2 
2 a rule(l-.(OP ~ DoP lOP finished 3 
2 a rule(! ..., (OP ~ DOP) hOOP finished 4 
3 1t rule(! OP 2 finished 5 
4 1t rule (-.DOP 3-.0P finished 6 
6 v rule (-.OP 1--,P 
6 v rule (--,op 2--,P 
6 v rule ( --,op 3--,P 
This tableau is closed since 2--,P and 2P are both on the only branch in the tableau. 
3.6 Decidability 
At this stage there is no guarantee that the systematic procedure, as given .,.above, will ever terminate. In 
other words it is very likely that if there is not a proof for A that this procedure may carry on forever. 
As a result the tableau that is under construction will be infinite. This in turn means that since we have 
an infinite tableau, with a finite number of branches, at least one of tableau's branches must be infinite 
(see Fitting 1983: 406 for proof). 
It follows therefore from the above discussion that the systematic tableau procedure needs to be 
modified in order to ensure that the procedure does in fact terminate with either a counter-model or a 
proof for a given formula A. These modifications are described as follows: 
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• In the FOR loop for stage n + I, add the following note to the end of all statements that start with 
the word ADD: provided an occurrence of it is not already present on the branch. For example the 
ADD statement for the v rule will become: Add f.'v0 to the end of B provided an occurrence of it is 
not already present on the branch. 
• We alter the existing v rule with the following: 
IF fA is of the form fv THEN 
FOR each prefix f' that has been used on B and that is accessible from f. (if any) DO 
Add f.'v0 to the end ofB provided an occurrence of it is not already present on the branch 
END FOR. 
END IF. 
In other words, we do not continually add an occurrence of f.v to the end of the branch. 
Fitting (1983:411-412) shows that these changes are sufficient to show decidability for logics that do 
not involve transitivity. Once logics involving transitivity, such as KT4 and KT5, are considered the 
systematic procedure given above may not terminate and therefore further alterations to the procedure 
are required. Before these changes can be addressed the following technical information is required 
(Fitting 1983:413, 414). 
Definition 72 
By a chain of prefixes we mean a sequence 1,f.J. f.2, ••. in which each is a simple extension of the 
preceding. 
Definition 73 
A chain of prefixes 1, f.j, f.2, •.. from a branch B is periodic if there exists distinct prefixes f.; and f.j in 
the chain (i < j) such that M (A is any formula) is on B iff f. ;A is on B, that is, if {A I f. ;A on B) = {A' I 
f. ;A' on B). A branch is periodic if every infinite chain (of prefixes) on B is periodic. 
Definition 74 
For a particular prefix f and a branch B of a tableau system, we say that the set of formulas B-
associated with f is the set of all formulas A such that f.A occurs on B. 
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Suppose that we are trying to construct a systematic tableau for a formula A, that is, we start 
constructing a systematic tableau with lA as the root node. It follows therefore, that if any prefixed 
formula fZ occurs on a branch 8, that Z must be some subformula of A or the negation of some 
subformula of A. So let f(A) be the collection of all the subformulas of a formula A and all the 
negations of these subformulas. f(A) is finite, say of size n, since there are only a finite number of 
sub formulas for any formula A and only a finite number of negations of these subformulas. It follows 
therefore that if a sub formula of A, say Z, occurs on 8 as P.Z then Z or --,Z must belong to r(A). In other 
words, the set 8-associated with a given prefix f must be a subset of r(A). Thus there are at most 2" 
possibilities for the set of formulas 8-associated with the various prefixes on B. It follows that, for any 
chain of prefixes 1 ,f~. f 2, ••• occurring on 8, there must be two, f.; and f.i where i < j :s; 2", such that both 
have the same set of formulas 8-associated with them, that is, the set of formulas 8-associated with f.;, 
{Z I f;Z is on 8}, equals the set of formulas B-associated with f.i. {Z 1 f.iZ is on B}. The same result 
holds true for the sets B-associated with the prefixes f.i+k and f.j+k for any integer k ~ 1. This in turn, by 
definition 73, means that the chain of prefixes after the prefix f.i becomes periodic. 
Suppose for each chain 1, f.~> f.2, ... that occurs on B (where 1 is the prefix of the root node), we only 
keep the initial segment up to where it begins to become periodic and we discard the remainder of the 
segment, that is, if f.; and f.i (i < j) have the same sets of B-associated formulas, and i and j are the 
smallest numbers for which this is true, we retain only 1, f.~> f.2, ... , f.;, ... , f.i and discard the rest. Then it 
follows that the chain on B will be finite and of maximum length 2". If we repeat this exercise for each 
chain on 8, then every chain on B will be finite and of maximum length 2". If all the chains on B are 
finite B will also be finite. 
Note that the finite branch 8 also guarantees us the existence of a counter-model, that is, if our 
construction has become periodic, and we have not had a closure, we will never get it by continuing 
with B. If we do continue with B we will construct an infinite branch and hence a counter-model. 
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The trick now is to detennine when a branch B becomes periodic. Fortunately we can do this by 
looking at the prefixes of the fonnulas. For any given prefix k, we can tell when all the fonnulas 
prefixed by k have been introduced to the branch B. This is trivial if k is of length 1. Fonnulas with 
prefixes of length k+ I can only be introduced onto B, by using the 7t-rule on fonnulas with prefixes of 
length k that are already on B. Once all such fonnulas have been declared finished, the only new 
fonnulas with prefixes of length k+l that can be added to B, will be by means of the v, u, 13 rules. 
Clearly we will know when all the appropriate applications of these rules will have been made. It 
follows therefore that for any branch we will know when all the possible prefixed fonnulas, of a given 
prefix length, are present, that is, we will be able to tell that a branch has become periodic, without 
constructing a branch infinitely. (Fitting 1983:413-416.) 
In lieu of the above results, we can now return to the systematic proof procedure and make the 
following alternations: 
Declare all prefixed fonnulas of the fonn fA on a branch finished if: 
1. we know these are all the fonnulas prefixed by f that we can get or 
2. if the set of fonnulas associated with f. on the branch duplicates the set associated with some 
proper initial segment of f. 
With this modification the systematic tableau procedure must tenninate, either in a closed tableau or 
with a counter-model. 
4. TABLEAU SYSTEMS - RAJEEV GORe 
In this section we will provide a brief overview of the semantic tableaux methods as described by Gore 
(1995). Gore's work has been based largely on that of Hintikka (1955) and Rautenberg (1983) with 
reference to a number of other researchers in particular Fitting (1983). We will focus on Gore's 
application as it relates to the implicit and explicit tableau systems (as defmed below) of KT4, KT4L 
andKT5. 
Implicit tableau systems are dealt with first. In implicit systems the properties of the reachability 
relation R, such as reflexivity and transitivity, are built into the tableaux rules, that is, we do not reason 
explicitly about R. These systems are similar to Fittings systems discussed in Section 2. 
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4.1 Syntax and Semantics 
Gore's ( 1995) tableau system only uses finite sets of formulas which are defined in terms of the 
adequate set of connectives 0, -, and A. We therefore assume that the formulas are in this format for 
the remainder of this section. 
Note that when it is convenient to do so, we will use L instead of KT 4, KT 4L or KT5, that is, L should 
be read as KT4, KT4L or KT5. We define the tableau rules in terms of Gore's (1995) notation as 
follows(Gore 1995:12): 
Definition 75 
A tableau ruler consists of a numerator N (above the line) and a (finite) list of denominators D1, D2, •.• , 
Dk (below the line) separated by vertical bars. Denoted: 
The numerator N, of each tableau rule contains one or more distinguishable formulas called the 
principal formulas. Each denominator Dh usually contains one or more distinguishable formulas called 
the side formulas. The (r) next to the tableau rule denotes the name of the tableau rule and is usually 
associated with the main connective but may have a more complex name. For example, consider the(-,) 
rule below: This rule has a numerator f;-,-,A with principal formula -,-,A and one denominator f;A 
with A as the side formula: 
( .) f; -,-,A 
r;A 
Note that r is a finite set of formulas, that is, effectively we could rewrite the numerator as r u {-,-,A} 
and the denominator as r u {A} where r is any set offormulas say {A~o A2, .•. ,An}. So if we had the 
set of formulas {P, Q, -,-,R} we could apply the rule(-,) and replace this set with the set {P, Q, R}. In 
this example r would be the set {P, Q}. 
Definition 76 
A tableau system (or calculus) CL is a finite collection of tableau rules r1• r2, ... , <m identified with the 
set of its rule names; thus CL = { r~o r2, .•.• <m }, where L is either KT4, KT4L or KT5. A CL-tableau for 
Tis a finite tree with root Twhose nodes carry finite formula sets (Gore 1995: 13). 
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We extend a tableau using Gore's (1995) method as follows: 
I. Choose a leaf node n with a set of formulas r, where n is not an end node (defined below), and 
choose a tableau rule t such that r = N, the numerator oft. 
2. If t has k denominators then create k successor nodes for n, with successor i carrying an appropriate 
instantiation of a denominator 0;. 
3. If after executing steps 1 and 2 a successor node s, carries a set f' such that f' has already appeared 
on the branch from the root to s, then s is an end node. 
It should be clear from the definition that there is a set of formulas per node rather than just one formula 
as discussed in chapter 2 (section 3.3). For instance, instead of having P, -.Pv Q, as two nodes on a 
branch, we will group them as a set {P, -.P v Q} into one node. As we apply the tableau rules we will 
alter the set according to the rules and carry the set forward to the additional nodes. For example, in 
chapter 2 (section 3) if we had applied the p rule to -.P v Q we would have created two new nodes one 
for -.P and one for Q. In Gore's (1995) tableau we will also create two nodes, the first node will 
contain the set of formulas {P, -.P} and the second node the set of formulas {P, Q}. We illustrate this 
as follows: 





~P Q {P.Q} {P,-.1'} 
We define closure, in terms of Gore (1995) as follows: 
Definition 77 
A branch B in a tableau is closed if its end node is { J.}; otherwise it is open. A tableau is closed if all 
its branches are closed; otherwise it is open (Gar e 1995: 13). 
Definition 78 
A formula A is a theorem of CL if there is a closed tableau for the set {.A}, denoted OCLA (Gore 
1995:13). 
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Gore's tableau system ensures that the notion of theoremhood can be extended to the notion of 
deducibility, denoted by f[]CL A, that is, the deduction theorem: focL(A ~B) if and only if r u {A} 
!JL B is preserved by his system. (Gore 1995:4.) 
Note that in this system if there is a closed tableau for the set r u {-,A} then we can conclude focA 
where C is the class of standard models corresponding to some normal system L, A is any formula, r is 
any finite set of formulas, that may be empty and o is local logical entailment. 
4.2 Rules 
In CL we distinguish between static and transition rules. By static rules we mean rules that do not 
change the worlds at which formulas are true. With transitional rules we change the scope or world for a 
given formula. Intuitively the transition rules are based on the definition of the D. So for instance, if 
we have OA in a L-model = <W,R,V> at aeW we know that for every world ~EW such that aR~, A 
is true at ~· So if we have a tableau rule that performs this shift from a to ~ we have not changed the 
satisfiability of a formula A, but merely shifted its context. The following static and transitional rules 
are available to a CKT4, CKT4L and CKT5. 
4.2.1 Tableau Rules for Propositional Logic 




( --,) f; -,-,A 
f;A 
(v) f;-,(AAB) 
f; -,A!f; -,B 
(-L)f;A;-,A 
j_ 
where r :;; f' are any sets of formulas and A and B are any formulas. As discussed previously in order 
to apply these rules we must match the numerator of these rules to some node and then create a new 
node as specified by the denominator. For instance, if we are at a node that contains the set {OP, OQ, R, 
-,R} we can apply the _i rule to get a new node containing L In this example the numerator is the 
union of the sets r = {OP, OQ}, A= {R} and -,A= {-,R}. 
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Where r is a finite set of formulas that may be empty and A is any formula. 
Applying the T rule to the set {OP, D(P A Q), -.P} where r = {OP, -.P} 
and DA = DP results in the following set {DP, D(P A Q), -.P, P} where r 
= {OP, -,P}, DA = DP and A= P. 
or;-.oA (KT4)---
or;-.A 
Where r is any set of formulas, A any formula and if r denotes the set {A~. 
A2, ••• , An} then Or denotes the set {DA1, DA2, ••• , DAn}, that is, the set 
or denotes all the formulas that occur in the numerator that are of the form 
DA. For example, if we have the set of formulas {DP, O(PAQ), -.P} then 
Dr= {DP, O(P A Q)}. 
For example, applying the KT4 rule to the set {OP, -.DR} results in the set 
{DP, -.R} where Or= {OP}, -.DA =-.DR and -,A= -.R. Also note that 
since we have to match the numerator with the set 6f formulas at the current 
node, we may have to apply the (()) rule to reduce the initial set to a set that 
matches the numerator Dr u -.DA. For example, if the set at the current 
node is the set { OP, -.DR, Q} then applying the (()) rule to this set will 
result in the set {OP, -.DR} to which we can now apply the KT4 rule. 
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( ) of; {-.o A, ,-.o A, , ... ,-.oAk} KT4L -
or; r, ;-.A,I···Io r; r~ ;-.Ak 
where r• = {-,OA1, ,OA2, ••• ,,OAk} and r•i = r' without {-,OAi} and 
or is a set of formulas as defined above. 
For example, applying the (KT4L) rule to the set {O(P /\ Q), -,OP, -,OQ}, 
where Or= {O(P /\ Q)} and {-,OA~. -,OA2 } = {-,OP, -,OQ}, results in 
the sets {O(P /\ Q), -,OQ, -,P}and {O(P /\ Q), -,OP, -,Q} where Or= 
{O(P A Q)}, r·, = {-,OQ}, -,A1 = {-,P}, r' 2 = {-,OP} and -,A2 = {-,Q}. 
4.2.4 Tableau Rules for CKT5tr 
Although Gore ( 1995) considers a number of different CKT5 systems for KTS we will only look at his 
CKTSrc system. This system is similar to Fittings (1983) semi-analytic tableau system for KT5. 
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( KTS) or; -,0 r•; -,[J A 
0 r; -,0['; -,0 A; -,A 
Where A is any fonnula Or is as defined above and -,Of' = {-,OA" 
-,OAz, ... -,DAn}, where['= {A1, Az, ... ,An}. 
For example, if the (KT5) rule is applied to the set {DP, O(P 1\ Q), -,OQ, 
-,0-,P, -,O(P v Q)} where Or = {OP, O(P 1\ Q)}, -,Or' = {-,OQ, 
-,0-,P} and -,OA = {-,O(P v Q)} then the resulting set will be {OP, 
O(P 1\ Q), -,OQ, -,0-,P, -,O(P v Q), -,(P v Q)} where Or, -,Of', -,OA 
are as defined previously and -,A = { -,(P v Q)}. Note that this rule is not 
detenninistic, that is, there is more than one way to apply this rule given the 
initial set. For instance, we could have chosen ...,OA = {-,OQ} or -,OA = 
{-,O...,P}. 
Theorem 61 (CL Soundness) 
Each calculus CL is sound with respect to the class of standard models corresponding to L, that is, for 
any formula A and any finite set of formulas r. rocLA implies roCL A. 
Proof: Essentially the proof involves showing for each rule in CL that if the numerator of the rule is 
satisfiable in the class of standard models corresponding to L then so is at least one of the 
denominators. Clearly the CPC rules are sound since each world behaves cla~ically. The modal rules 
can be shown to be sound with respect to some known property of R as enforced by the class of 
standard models corresponding to L. (Gore 1995:28-31, 50.)o 
4.4 Completeness 
Theorem 62 (CL Completeness) 
Each calculus C L is complete with respect to the class of standard models corresponding to L, that is, 
for any formula A and any finite set of formulas r. ro CLA implies roCLA. 
Proof: The proof is by contrapositive argument, that is, assume that it is not the case that roCLA and 
show that is not the case that r OCLA· Since it is not the case that r OcLA no tableau for r u {-,A} 
closes. 
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Essentially we pick and choose sets with certain special properties from possible different open 
tableaux for r u {-.A} and use them as possible worlds to construct an L-model M for r u {-,A}, safe 
in the knowledge that each of these sets is satisfiable. The model M is constructed in such a way that it 
contains a world a such that o ~1 r and o:; -,A. Hence we demonstrate by construction that it is not the 
case that f OLeA. See Gore ( 1995:36,43,52,53) for details. IJ 
4.5 Applications 
In this example the rules for the KT 4 tableau system are demonstrated by showing that the formula 
-,(OP 1\ ....,OOP) is a theorem ofKT4. Negating the formula the prooffollows. Note that justifications 
for the sets at the different nodes are given on the left of the tableau. 
{ ....,....,(DP 1\ ....,ODP)} 
I 
{DP 1\ -,OOp by the...., rule 
I 
{DP, ....,OOp by the 1\ rule 
{DP, -,Op by the KT 4 rule 
I 
{Dp,....,p by the KT 4 rule 
I 
{DP, P, -,p by the T rule 
j_ by the l_ rule 
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In this example the mles for the system CKT4L are demonstrated by showing that the formula 
(-,(-,0-,(P A DP A -,Q) A -,0--,(Q A DQ A --,P))) is a theorem ofKT4L. 
(..,..,(..,D...,(P AOP A ..,Q) A ..,D..,(Q AOQ A ..,P))} 
I 
(-,) { ..,D...,(P A DP A ..,Q) A ..,D...,(Q ADQ A ..,P)} 
I 
(A) {..,D...,(P AOP A -,Q), ..,O..,(Q ADQ A ..,P)} 
(KT4L) { ..,D...,(P A DP A ..,Q), ..,...,(Q A DQ A ..,P)} { ..,..,(P A DP A ..,Q), ..,D..,(Q A DQ A ..,P)} (KT4L) 
I I 
H { ..,O..,(P ADP A -,Q), Q ADQ A -,P} {P ADP A -,Q, ..,O..,(Q ADQ A ..,P)} H 
I I 
(A) {-,O..,(P ADP A ..,Q), Q,DQ A -,P} {P,DP A -,Q, ...,0-,(Q ADQ A -.P)} (A) 
I I 
(A) { ..,O....,(P ADP A -,Q), Q,DQ, -,P} {P, DP, ..,Q, ...,O..,(Q A DQ A ..,P)} (A) 
I I 
(9) {-,0-,(P ADP A -,Q), DQ} {DP, -,0-,(Q ADQ A ...,P)} (9) 
I I (KT4L) {-,-,(P AOP A ...,Q), DQ} {DP, -,-,(Q ADQ A -,P)} (KT4L) 
I I 
H {P ADP A -,Q, DQ} {DP, Q A DQ A ..,p} (-,) 
I I 
(A) {P, DP A -,Q, DQ} {DP, Q,DQ A ..,P} (A) 
I I 
(A) {P, DP, -,Q, DQ} {DP, Q, DQ,. -,P} (A) 
I I 
(T) {P,DP, ..,Q,DQ, Q} {DP, P, Q,DQ, -.P} (T) 
I I 
(J.) J. J. (J.) 
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In the tina I example the rules for CKT5 are demonstrated by showing that the formula --,( --,0--,P 1\ 
--,0--,0,P) is a theorem of KT5. 
{--,0--,P 1\ --,0--,0--,P} by the--, rule 
{ --,0--,P, --,0--,0--,P} by the 1\ rule 
{--,0---,P, --,0--,0--,P, --,,O....,p} by the KT5 rule 
{ --,0--,P, --,0--,0--,P, 0--,P} by the --,rule 
{0--,P, --,0--,0--,P, --,0--,P, --,--,P} by the KT5 rule 
{0--,P, ....,o....,o....,p, ....,o....,p, P} by the ...., rule 
I 
{--,0--,0--,P, ....,o....,p, P, 0---,P, --,P} bytheT rule 
I 
.l by the .l rule 
4.6 Decidability 
We require the following results in order to show decidability. 
Definition 79 
A finite set of formulas r, and a formula A is CL-inconsistent if the CL-tableau for r u {-.A} is closed, 
denoted ToCLA. otherwise it is CL-consistent (Gore 1995: 13). 
Definition 80 
A set r is closed with respect to a tableau rule if whenever the numerator of the rule is in r so is at 
least one of the denominators of the rule. A set r is CL-saturated if it is CL-consistent and closed with 
respect to the static rules ofCL. (Gore 1995:22.) 
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Theorem 63 
!(there is a closed CL-tableaufor the finite set of r then there is a closed CL-tableaufor rwith all the 
nodes in some finite set r"CL (where the nodes in r"n are either from r or as the result of one of the 
rules ofCL). 
(See Gore 1995:20 for proof.) 
The reader will recall that in chapter 2 we defined a frame as a model M without the mapping V, that 
is, F = <W, R> is a frame. For the sake of convenience we will generalise the term frame to L-frame 
where L is KT4, KT4L or KT5. Similarly we will refer to an L-mode/ instead of a KT4 model, KT4L 
model or KT5 model. 
Definition 81 
A model graph for some finite fixed set of formulas Fis a finite L-frame <W,R> such that all a E W 
are CL-saturated sets with a{;;; l*CL and 
• F{;;; a for some a e: W 
• if -£JA E a then there exists some f3 E W such that aR/3 and -,A E jJ. 
• IfaRjJandOA e: athenA e: /3. (Gore 1995:23.) 
Theorem 64 
Jf<W,R> is a model graph for Fthen there exists an L-Mode/for r 
(SeeGore 1995:23forproof) 
Recall from chapter 3 that we showed that if a modal logic say L is axiomatisable and has the finite 
model property then L is decidable. From the above results we have that CL is axiomatisable and 
therefore all we need to show is that CL contains the finite model property. We can do this by 
constructing a model graph for some finite fixed set of formula r If the L-model ( defmed in the above 
theorem) is chosen as finite for a finite r then L has the finite model property. Hence it follows that 
CL provides a decision procedure for r OLA, for any formula A. 
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5. EXPLICIT TABLEAU SYSTEMS- RAJEEV GORe 
5.1 Syntax and Semantics 
In the ensuing sections we will focus on the syntax and semantics of explicit tableau systems for KT4 
and KT5. L should therefore be read as KT4 or KT5. As with Fitting's (1983) explicit tableau system 
the relation R is represented explicitly by some device. 
Gore (1995) distinguishes between two different ways of representing a reachability relation R. One 
way is to maintain a network with named nodes, where each node contains a set of formulas. In this 
scenario a separate relation R(x, y) is also kept to represent the fact that the node named y is reachable 
from the node named x, where x andy are indices to allow cross-referencing between these two 'data 
structures'. 
The second option, which is the option we will follow in this section, is to incorporate complex or 
structured world names into the syntax. Essentially the approach uses a global set of integers to label 
different formulas at different worlds, in order to distinguish these formulas from each other and their 
different worlds. For example, if a formula is true at a world f. then we label the formula with f. The 
reachability relation is therefore built into the structure of the labels, avoiding the necessity of keeping a 
separate reachability data structure. Note that apart from a couple of alterations here and there Gore's 
explicit tableau system is similar to Fitting's (1983) prefixed tableau system discussed in section 3. 
Definition 82 
.• 
A label (denoted f or fJ is a non empty sequence of positive integers separated by dots. The length of a 
label e is the number of integers it contains. A label f. is a simple extension of a label f' iff = f'.nfor 
some n ~I. A label e is an extension of label f' if e = f.'.n 1.n2 . ••• . nk for some k ~I with each n; ~I. 
(Gore 1995:74.) 
For example 1, 1.2 and 1.2.3 are three labels with lengths 1, 2 and 3 respectively. We will use L to 
denote a set of labels and may omit the dots for convenience. For instance, instead of f 1.f2 we will just 
write f 1f". 
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Definition 83 
A set of labels L is strongly generated (with root fr) if 
I. There is some root labelled fr E L such that every other label in L is an extension offr; and 
2. f,.n E L implies f, E L (Gore /995:74.) 
Intuitively the labels capture a basic reachability relation between the worlds they name. For instance 
the world labelled f. I is accessible from the world named by f. Strongly generated labels can also be 
viewed as trees with root node f, where a node labelled f.l is the immediate child of a node labelled f. 
Definition 84 
A labelled formula is a structure of the form f!::A where f is a label and A is a formula. A labelled 
tableau rule has a numerator and one or more denominators as before except that each numerator is 
comprised of a single labelled formula, and each denominator is comprised of at most two labelled 
formulas. A labelled tableau calculus (denoted LC) is simply a collection of labelled tableau rules. 
(Gore 1995:74, 75.) 
We redefine closure in terms of LC. 
Definition 85 
A labelled tableau for a finite set offormulas F={A~> A2, ... , A,J is a tree, where each node contains a 
single labelled formula. A tableau branch is any path from the root downwards in such a tree. A 
branch is closed if it contains some labelled formula f::A and also contains f::-.A. Otherwise it is 
open. A tableau is closed if every branch is closed, otherwise it is open. {Gorf: 1995:77.) 
It follows therefore that if we find a closed tableau for a r u {-.A} then we can conclude focA where 
r is a finite set of formulas possibly empty, A is any formula, C is the class of standard models 
corresponding to L and o is local logical entailment. 
Definition 86 
A label f is used on a branch if there is some labelled formula f::A on that branch. A label f is new to 
a branch if there is no labelled formula f::A on that branch (Gar e 1995: 77). 
If rL is a set of labelled formulas then we let lab(rL) = { f/ f::A E rJ be the set of labels that appear in 
rL· If we refer to a branch B as the set of labelled formulas on the branch, then lab(B) is just the set of 
labels that is used on branch B. 
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5.2 Rules 
As with implicit tableau systems we can define a number of different rules for explicit tableau systems: 
We will distinguish between three types (Gore 1995). 
I. LCPC rules: 
2. v-rules: 
3. 7t-rules: 
The rules that are needed by any propositional logic (denoted PC). Labels in the 
denominator and numerator of these rules are identical. 
All the rules applicable to formulas of the form f::OA. These rules add formulas in 
the denominator to the already existing worlds named by the label of the 
denominator. 
All the rules applicable to formulas of the form 1:'::-,0A. These rules are known as 
'successor creators' since they are the only rules that are permitted to create new 
worlds. 
In the tableau rules below note that the world named by the label in the denominator is at most one step 
away from that named by the numerator. Also note, that apart form the ( 7t-rule ), all labels in the 
denominator must already exist on the branch, that is, the ( 7t-rule) is the only rule that can add new 
labels. 
5.2.1 Tableau Rules for LCPC 
The following rules are available to all LC propositional logic systems. 
(l,) f:: -,-,A 
f::A 
(I A) f.:: A 1\ B 
f.:: A 
f::B 
(I v) f::-,(A 1\ B) 
f::-.A!f::-,B 
For example, if the (/-,) rule is applied to the tableau that contains the formula I ::-,-,P the tableau can 
be extended by the formula I ::P. 
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5.2.2 Tableau Rules for LCKT4 
We define the following v and 1t rules tor LCKT4: 
v-rules: 
7t-rule: 
(!K) e::o A 
e.n::A 
For example, if the formula 1 ::DP appears on the tableau the tableau can be 
extended by the formula 1.2::P, provided 1.2 is a label that already appears on the 
branch. 
(IT) f::o A 
f::A 
For example, if the formula 3::0(P 1\ Q) appears on the tableau we can extend the 
tableau by the formula 3::(P A Q) after the application of the (IT) rule. 
(14) f::o A 
f.n::DA 
For instance, if this rule is applied to the formula 2::DQ the tableau will be extended 
by the formula 2.3::DQ, provided 2.3 is a label that already appears on the branch. 
(IJr) f::-,o A 
f.n::-,A 
where f .n is new to the current branch. 
For instance, if the formula 1::-,0(P 1\ -,Q) appears on the tableau the tableau can be 
extended by the formula 1.2::-,(P A -,Q), after the application of the 1t -rule. Also 
note that in this case the prefix 1.2 will be new to the branch on which the formula -,( 
P A --,Q) appears. 
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5.2.3 Tableau Rules for LCKT5 





(l4r) f.n::O A 
f::oA 
15.J 
For example, if the (14') rule is applied to the formula 1.2::0P then the tableau can be 
extended by the formula 1 ::OP. 
1t-rules (/1t) 
5.3 Soundness 
Theorem 65 (LC Soundness) 
If the explicit tableau for {-,A} is closed then A is valid in the corresponding classes of standard 
models ofL. 
Proof: It follows as a corollary of the following: If the systematic tab lea~ for r, a finite set of formulas, 
closes then r is L-unsatisfiable (see definition 21, i.e. there is no L-model (where L denotes either KT4, 
KT4L or KT5) that satisfies f). Refer to Gore (1995:83) for details. o 
5.4 Completeness 
A systematic tableau is constructed by means of the construction algorithm as defined by Gore 
(1995:78). This procedure is fundamentally the same as that described by Fitting except for a number of 
differences in the application of the v and 1t rules as well as marking the completion of the formula. For 
comparative purposes we repeat Gore's (1995) procedure here. 
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For the purpose of this algorithm a formula can be marked awake, asleep or finished. By awake we 
mean that the formula is available for use, that is, only awake formulas can be used in the application of 
the rules. By asleep we mean a formula that has been used in a rule and put to sleep until awakened by 
another rule. By finished we mean that a formula can never be used again in the application of a rule. 
Note that these markings do not impact on the closure of a tableau. In other words, if two prefixed 
formula, say 1.2::A and 1.2::--,A occur on the same branch the branch is closed regardless of the 
formulas' markings. 
For the sake of convenience the procedure UPDATE BRANCH (fi::A) has been created below, where 
f::A denotes any formula that needs to be added to the branch. Assume also that the set r = {A~. Az, 
... A0 } is the set of formulas for which we would like to create an explicit tableau. 
Stage 1: 
Stage n+l 
(n ~ 1) 
Put the labelled formulas 1 ::Ai where Ai E r in a vertical linear sequence of nodes, one 
beneath the other, in some order and mark them all as awake. 
n=1. 
WHILE the tableau is open and some formula is awake DO 
Choose an awake labelled formula fi::A as close to the root as possible. 
IF there are several awake formula at the same level THEN 
Choose the one on the leftmost branch 
END IF 
IF fi::A is atomic THEN 
Mark this formula as finished 
Stop stage n + 1 
END IF 
FOR each open branch B which passes through fi::A DO 
IF fi::A is of the form f::P A Q THEN 
UPDATE BRANCH (f::P) 
UPDATE BRANCH (f::Q) 
END IF 
IF f::A is of the form f:: -,(P 1\ Q) THEN 
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Split B 
IF lett branch THEN 
UPDATE BRANCH (f::-,P) 
END IF 
IF right branch then 
UPDATE BRANCH (P::-,Q) 
END IF 
END IF 
IF P::A is of the form P.::-,-,P THEN 
UPDATE BRANCH (P.::P) 
END IF 
IF f::A is of the form t'::OP THEN 
FOR each applicable v rule in LCL DO 
UPDATE BRANCH (corresponding denominator) 
END FOR 
END IF 
IF f::A is of the form -,OP THEN 
k = the smallest integer such that the label t'k is new on the branch 
UPDATE BRANCH (fk::...,P) 
Mark all formulas on B of type t'::OA awake 
END IF 
END FOR 
IF P::A is of the form t'::OP THEN 
Mark f: :A as asleep 
ELSE 




UPDATE BRANCH (f::A) 
/56 
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IF f'::A does not already appear on the branch (with any mark) THEN 
Add the formula P::A to the end of the branch 
Mark P::A as awake 
END IF 
END UPDATE BRANCH 
/57 
Notice that this systematic procedure constructs only one tableau and it traverses this tableau in a 
breadth-first manner. 
For the sake of convenience, validity as defined in definition 23, is generalised here to L-validity where 
L denotes either KT4, KT4L or KT5. For example A is KT4-valid in a class C of models, written ocA, 
iff for every KT4 model M in C, oMA. Similarly, a formula A is said to beL-satisfiable (where L is 
either KT4, KT4L or KT5) ifthere exists a L-model M=<W,R,V> that satisfies (see definition 21) A. 
Theorem 66 (LC Completeness) 
If A is L-valid then the systematic tableau for {.A} must be closed. 
Proof: The proof follows from the following result: If the systematic tableau for r does not close then r 
is L-satisfiable. (See Gore 1995:89 for details.)o 
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5.5 Applications 
Gore's (1995) explicit tableau system is demonstrated below. The first example is for the KT4 system 
and the last demonstrates the explicit tableau system for KT5. 
For KT4 we show that the formula -,(OP A ...,OOP) is valid in the class of models corresponding to 
KT4. From soundness we know that if we negate the formula and obtain a closed tableau then this 
formula is valid in the corresponding classes of standard models. In the following proof the right hand 
columns show the stages and the rules that were applied. Note that a denotes awake, s asleep and f 
finished. The column in which the a, s or f appears is the stage at which the formula was marked. For 
example 1: :P was created during stage 4 by using the (In rule on the formula 1:: OP and finished during 
stage 7. 
l Tableau 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Rules 
1::-,...,(0p 1\ ...,OOP) a f 
I 
1 ::(Op 1\ ...,00p) a f l-, 
I 
1::0P a s a s a s /A 
I 
1::--,00p a f fA 
I 
1::P a f IT 
I 
1.2::-,0P a f /7l 
I 
1.2::P a f /K 
I 
1.2::0P a s 14 
I 
1.2.3::-,P a /7l 
I 
1.2.3::P a IK 
I 
1.2.3::0P a 14 
Since both 1.2.3::-,P and 1.2.3::P appear on the same branch the branch is closed. This tableau only has 
one branch therefore the tableau is closed and we can conclude that the formula -,(OP A ...,OOP) is 
valid in the class of standard models that correspond to KT 4. 
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In this example we show that the fonnula -.( -.0-.P A -.0-.0-.P) is valid in the class of standard 
models that correspond to KT5. As described in the example above we negate the fonnula and the proof 
follows: 
I Tableau l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll Rules 
I::-.-.( -.0--,p A -.0-.0-.P) a f 
I 
1 ::-.0--,p 1\ --,0-,0--,p a f 1-, 
I 
I: :-.0--,p a f V' 
I 
I ::-.0-.0--,p a f [/\ 
I 
1.2: ;--,--,p a f [ll 
I 
1.3: ;--,--,0--,p a f [ll 
I 
1.2::P a f [-r 
I 
1.3::0-.P a s t-r 
I 
1.3::-.P -· f IT 
I 
1 ::0--,p a s l4r 
I 
1.2::-.P a !K 
I 
1: :-.P a IT 
I 
1.2::0-.p a 14 
Here both 1.2::A and I.2::-.A appear on the same branch as a result the tableau is closed and it follows 
that the initial fonnula is valid in the class of standard models that correspond to KT5. 
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5.6 Decidability 
Showing decidability for Gore's (1995) procedure is similar to that of Fitting (1983) described in the 
section 3. If the reader was to compare the two procedures the reader will notice that the tirst set of 
alterations have already been implemented into Gore's ( 1995) procedure. Therefore, the only 
alterations that are required are the changes that accommodate the logics that involve transitivity. The 
technical details are omitted here and the interested reader is referred to Gore's (1995) work for the 
details. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we provide a brief comparative study between the two techniques covered in this chapter. 
Both Fitting (1983) and Gore (1995) provide systems for implicit and explicit tableau systems. Both 
systems use more or less the same tableau expansion rules, with Fitting presenting his tableau rules in 
terms of formula types such as 1t and v and Gore (1995) explicitly defining the rules. Note also that 
although these systems are fundamentally the same Gore (1995) works with sets of formulas and his 
tableau expansion rules therefore incorporate these sets. Fitting's (1983) rules only act on one formula 
at a time. 
As far as the systematic procedures are concerned Gore (1995) differs from Fitting in that he 
implements some of the decidable features mentioned by Fitting (1983) directly into his procedure. For 
instance see the differences in the application of the v and 1t rules. As a result Gore (1995) appears to 
have a more efficient application than Fitting as demonstrated in the examples for KT4 above. 
An additional feature of Gore's (1995) system is that he incorporates a vast number of modal logics that 
Fitting (1983) did not initially include in his work. In particular he provides an expose for KT4L which 
Fitting did not do. 
In lieu of the implementation of these systems the interested reader may want to note that Fitting 
( 1988) has already provided implementation procedures for some of his tableau proof systems. In 
particular he has provided a tableau system for K4 using Prolog, which is essentially a tableau system 
for K with K4 embedded by means of simple mechanisations. He argues that to embed the other logics 
such as KT4, would require a similar exercise. 
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As noted at the start of this chapter Fitting (1983) and Gore (1995) are not the only researchers that 
have tried to implement modal tableau systems using a variety of approaches that incorporate at least 
the logics KT4, KT4L and KT5. Laurent Catach (1991), for instance, developed a tableau system which 
he called TABLEAU. This system was initially implemented in VM!Prolog and appears to 
accommodate KT4, KT4L and KT5 as well as a number of other systems. 
This chapter concludes the survey of tableau and resolution proof systems for propositional modal 
logic. In the next chapter we will demonstrate of how these tableau and resolution proof systems, 
initially defined for the normal systems of modal logic KT4, KT4L and KT5 can be applied to other 
branches of artificial intelligence, such as nonmonotonic logic. 
APPLICATIONS 
What is lmd dawn. ordered, factual, is never enough to embrace the whole truth: life always spills over the rim of every cup. 
- Boris Pasternak 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous three chapters have been concerned with the specific modal logics KT4, KT4L and KT5. 
These systems were defined and an overview of the resolution and tableau systems that are available for 
these logics was provided. Chapter 6 addresses some applications of these logics in other branches of 
artificial intelligence. 
The normal systems of modal logic KT4, KT4L and KT5 have properties that are similar to other logics 
in artificial intelligence, in particular nonmonotonic logic. This chapter will focus will on some of the 
applications of these systems in nonmonotonic logic. The main emphasis being on the relationships 
between KT4 and preferential models, KT4L and ranked preferential models and KT5 and 
autoepistemic logic. As a result of these relationships it should be clear that the theorem provers 
described in the previous chapters can be extended or applied in these other branches of logic as well. 
2. NONMONOTONIC LOGIC 
Nonmonotonic logic is essentially the study of the different ways that we can make inferences from 
information that does not satisfY the monotonicity property, denoted as: 
Aj=B,Bj=C 
Aj=C 
Where the relation o is read as 'logically entails'. 
For instance, if we were given the following premises: 
• Garfield eats most birds. 
• Garfield does not eat ostriches 
• Tweety is a bird 
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We would probably conclude that Garfield will have Tweety for lunch. However, if we added the 
premise that Tweety is an ostrich we would probably want to conclude, without retracting our initial 
premises, that Garfield will have to make alternative arrangements for lunch. Applying monotonicity 
would have lead to the contradiction: Garfield eats Tweety and Garfield does not eat Tweety. 
Nonmonotonic systems generally have at least the following components (Kraus, Lehmann & Magidor 
1990): 
1. A set of premises that describes the facts (e.g. cats are mammals) and definitions (e.g. child = 
-,adult) of the system. 
2. A set of conditional assertions which describes what we normally believe about the world. 
3. Information of the situation at hand. 
It is the second component that is of interest to us in this chapter. That is, the set of conditional 
assertions. 
3. APPLICATIONS OF KT4 
3.1 Preferential Models 
In this section we introduce preferential models as discussed by Meyer, Labuschagne and Heidema 
(1996). In the next section we show how preferential models can be converted into KT4 models. 
Preferential models are essentially models that give a model-theoretic account of the way one performs 
nonmonotonic inferences. The main idea being a partial ordering on. possible states of the world 
. 
(Lehmann & Magidor 1992). The nonmonotonic inferences in these models are based on the binary 
relation 1- which we define as follows (Meyer, Labuschagne & Heidema 1996:3): 
Definition 87 
Let 1- be a binary relation on a classical propositional language, (denoted by LpJ. 1- is a preferential 
consequence relation iff it is closed under the following properties for every formula A, B, C E LPL· 
Reflexivity (Ref): A I-A 
Leji Logical Equivalence(LLE): If A and B are logically equivalent and A 1- C, then B 1- C. 
Right Weakening (RW): If B logically entails C and A 1- B then, then A 1- C. 
Cautious Monotonicity (CM): If A \- B and A 1- C, then A A B 1- C. 
Applications /6-1 
And: /fA 1- B and A 1- C. then A I- B /\ C. 
Or. /fA 1- C and B 1- C, then A v B 1- C. 
Note that we read A 1- B as 'In the context provided by A, B is plausible'. (Meyer, Labuschagne & 
Heidema 1996). Before we define a preferential model we require the following definitions. 
Definition 88 
The triple P=(S, L, R) is called a model where S, the set of states, is any set, L the labelling function, is 
a function from S to I (the set of all interpretations of LpJ and R is a binary relation on S. The set of 
interpretations satisfYing a formula A is denoted by A . That is, for every A E Ln A = {s I I = L(s) 
and !(A) = T} (Meyer, Labuschagne & Heidema 1996:3). 
Definition 89 
Let R be a relation on a set r, and let r. be any subset of r An element A E r. is minimal in r. iff for 
every BE r.. (B, A) ~ R (Meyer, Labuschagne & Heidema /996:3). 
Definition 90 
Let R be a relation on a set r, and let I; be any subset of r I; is defined to be smooth iff for every A 
E r.. either A is minimal in I;, or there is a minimal B E I; such that (B, A) E R (Meyer, Labuschagne 
& Heidema /996:3). 
Preferential models are defined as follows (Meyer, Labuschagne & Heidema 1996:4): 
Definition 91 
Let P = <S, L, -< > be a model with a strict partial order (irrejlexive and transitive) on S. P defines a 
relation 1-p on LPL as follows: A 1-p B iff for every S minimal in A, S E B, for any formula A and B. 
P satisfies the smoothness condition iff for every A E LpL, A is smooth. If P satisfies the smoothness 
condition, it is called a preferential model. 
Alternatively a preferential model P = <S, L, -< > is a triple where (Boutilier 1990): 
• S = a set of possible worlds. 
• L maps propositional variables into 2s, i.e. L(A) is the set of worlds where A holds. 
• -< is a strict partial order on S such that for all propositional formula A, A is smooth. 
We now establish the relationship between preferential consequence relations and preferential models. 
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Theorem 67 
Every preferential model P defines a preferential consequence relation. Conversely, for every 
preferential consequence relation 1- there is a preferential model P such that 1- = 1-p. 
(See Kraus, Lehmann & Magidor 1990 for proof.) 
We stop here and retwn to modal logic. We refer the interested reader to the work of Boutilier (1994 ), 
Meyer, Labuschagne & Heidema (1996), Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990) and de Rijke (1996) for 
more information with regard to preferential models. 
3.2 Relation With Modal Logic 
Provided we are only interested in the relation h , it is easy to see that preferential models P = <S, L, 
-< > are essentially the set of KT4-models. As a result these preferential models can be converted to 
KT4 models, demonstrated as follows: 
Let P = <S, L, -<>be a preferential model. We want to translate P to a KT4 model M=<W,R,V> where 
R is reflexive and transitive. So let W = S. From the previous section we noted that the relation -< is a 
strict partial order and we know from chapter 3 that R is a pre-order relation (i.e. reflexive and 
transitive). We build R from -< as follows: R = -< u { ( a,a) 1 a E S}. Lastly we need to define V for 
M. From the above definition of L we have that for any atom A, A is true at a iff L( a) = I and I(A) = 
T. We use this result to create the mapping V(A) for any A. That is, let V(A) be the set {a I L(a) =I 
and I(A) = T} then V(A) will contain all the worlds at which A is true. This concludes the translation. 
To summarise, we have a KT4 model M = <W,R,V> where: 
• W=S 
• R=-< u{(a,a)laeS}and 
• V(A) ={a I L(a) =I and I(A) = T} for any atom A. 
Applications 166 
Conversely we can convert a KT4 model= <W, R, V> to a preferential model P = (S, L, -<)model as 
follows: 
• For any a E S we define I as follows: for every atom P, I(P) = T if and only if a E V(P). Now set 
L(a) =I. 
• -< = R - ( { ( a,a) I aRa} u { ( a,p) I aRP and PRa} ). That is, we remove all reflexive pairs from the 
model and if there are any symmetric pairs we remove both symmetric pairs as well. 
For instance, the model on the left is a reflexive transitive model and the model on the right is the 
corresponding strict partial order model. 
Clearly just being able to convert a preferential model P to a KT 4 model is of no value if we cannot use 
KT4 to derive any results about plausibility as defined above. That is, ideally we would like to define a 
preferential consequence relation on KT4 that will allow us to derive results about plausibility in the 
same way the relation 1- does. 
Now if we were to define a binary relation 1> on propositional well formed fonbulas such that A 1> B iff 
oM A ~O(A A O(A ~B)) where A and Bare any propositional well formed formulas and M=<W, R, 
V> is any KT4 model, we would have the desired preferential consequence relation defined for KT4. 
Theorem 68 
Every binary relation 1> obtained from a KT4 model M is a preferential consequence relation. 
Conversely, for every preferential consequence relation 1- there is a KT4 model M such that A 1- B iff 
A 1>B. 
(See Meyer, Labuschagne & Heidema 1996 for a proof of a similar result, or refer to Kraus, Lehmann 
& Magidor 1990 for more details.) 
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The advantage of being able to define plausibility using KT4 models is that now we are in a position to 
prove results in preferential models by using the resolution and tableau proof systems for KT4 as 
discussed in the previous chapters. 
4. APPLICATIONS OF KT4L 
4.1 Ranked preferential Models 
Any good nonmonotonic reasoning system will validate all the inference rules for a preferential model. 
However, there are certain principles of reasoning that are not supported by these models. Three of 
these principles are: 
Negation Rationality: If A 1- B then A A C 1- B or A A -,C 1- B. 
Disjl.Ulctive Rationality: If A v B 1- C then A 1- C orB 1- C. 
Rational Monotonicity: If A 1- C then A A B 1- C or A 1- -,B. 
Rational Monotonicity is the strongest principle of the three given. That is, if we have rational 
monotonicity then we have negation and disjl.Ulctive rationality. Lehmann & Magidor (1992) argue that 
any reasonable nonmonotonic inference procedure should, over and above the rules defmed for 
preferential models, also defme a rational relation. They use the following example to justifY this: For 
any propositional atom P and Q, if we have P 1- Q we would expect P !\ R 1- Q to follow from a 
knowledge base where R is a new assertion such that R =t= P and R =t= Q, since we have no information 
about the influence of R on the objects of P and Q it would be sensible to assume that there was no 
influence and that normal P A R objects are just P objects. It follows, theyefore, that it would be 
convenient if the relation 1- had the property of rational monotonicity. Relations represented by a 
ranked preferential models have this desired property. In other words, a new consequence relation can 
be defined that perfotms the same way as the preferential consequence relation except that it is also 
rational. 
Definition 92 
A rational consequence relation is a preferential consequence relation that satisfies rational 
monotonicity (Boutilier 1990: 123). 
Definition 93 
(.¥..5') is a totally ordered set if}for every a <=X and fJ eX either a is accessible to fJ or fJ is accessible 
to a denoted as a .5' fJ or fJ .5' a. 
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Definition 94 
A ranked model (or a K-mode/) is a preferential model K = <S ,L, -<>where the relation -<is such that 
there exists a totally ordered set ?¥. <)and afunctionf: S ~X: where s-< I ijff(s) < f(t) (i.e. f(s) ~ f(t) 
andf(s) ~ f(t)) (Boutilier 1990:123). 
Theorem 69 
1- is a preferential consequence relation that satisfies rational monotonicity iff it is the consequence 
relation defined by some K-mode/. 
(See Boutilier 1990:124 for proof.) 
Note that a preferential consequence relation that satisfies rational monotonicity is called a rational 
consequence relation. 
4.2 Relation to Modal Logic 
Preferential ranked models are strict cases of KT4L models. That is, as with KT4 and preferential 
models above, we can also show that preferential ranked models can be converted into KT4L models 
and vice versa. 
Consider the preferential ranked model K = <S, L, -<). We can convert this model into a KT4L model 
M=<W, R, V> as follows: 
• W=S 
• R=-< u {(a,P)Ia 1< PandP 1< a} 
• V(A) ={a I L(a) =I and I(A) = T} for every atom A. 
Conversely we can convert a KT4L model= <W, R, V> to a K = (S, L, -<)model as follows: 
• S=W 
• For any a E S we define I as follows: for every atom P, I(P) = T if and only if a E V(P). Now set 
L(a)=l. 
• -< = R - {(a,p) I aRP and PRa}. That is, we remove all reflexive pairs from the model and any 
horizontal connections, in order to ensure that models on the same level are not comparable. 
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For example, in the following diagram the model on the left is a KT4L model and the model on the 
right is its corresponding K-model. 
As with KT4 it is possible to define a rational consequence relation for KT4L. Now if we define the 
relation 1> such that only those formulas that satisfy the condition oM A~ O(A ~ O(A ~ B)) satisfy 
the relation 1> we would have a rational consequence relation for KT4L. That is, if A 1> B iff oM A~ 
O(A ~ D(A ~B)) for every formula A and B then 1> is a rational consequence relation. 
Theorem 70 
Every binary relation 1> obtained from a KT4L model M defines a rational consequence relation. 
Conversely, for every rational consequence relation 1- there is a KT4L model M such that A 1- B iff A 
t>B. 
Since it is possible to translate ranked preferential models into KT4L we now have the benefit of 
deriving plausibility results for ranked preferential models using KT4L resolution and tableau proof 
systems. 
5. APPLICATIONS OF KT5 
5.1 Autoepistemic Logic 
Autoepistemic logic is another addition to non-monotonic logic that has applications within the realm of 
modal logic. Technically, autoepistemic reasoning is the drawing of conclusions in the absence of 
some specific information. For instance, consider the following formula: 
t7X Cat(x) "'Mhas-Parents(x) -?Has-Parents(x). 
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If we interpret Mas 'it is consistent to believe', then the following reading is apparent: 'For each x, if x 
is a cat and it is consistent to believe that x has parents, then x has parents.' To accept this reading, from 
an autoepistemic perspective, we must believe that we know all the instances of cats that have no 
parents. That is, if we infer that Garfield has parents, then we are basing our observation on the 
subjective opinion that we know all the instances of cats who have no parents. (Lukaszewicz 1990.) 
In the remainder of this section and the next we will provide a brief overview of autoepistemic logic 
and its applications to modal logic. This exposition will be based on the work of Witold Lukaszewicz 
(1990) and the reader is therefore referred to his work for more details with regards to this subject. 
For the purpose of this thesis the focus will be on propositional autoepistemic logic. In this language the 
0 that we have used previously is now read as 'it is believed' and takes the place of theM in the above 
example. The 0 becomes -,0-, which is similar to the work we have discussed in previous chapters. 
The remainder of the formulas in this language are similar to those defined in chapter 3 with the 
exception that the focus in this section is on a specific set of formulas, referred to as belief sets. These 
sets are viewed as the total collection of beliefs of an agent reasoning about its own beliefs. 
(Lukaszewicz 1990.) 
As with modal logic, model-theoretic semantics can also be defmed for autoepisternic logic. That is, we 
can defme interpretations, truth values of formulas within these interpretations and models, for 
autoepistemic logic. We do so in terms of the following definitions. 
Definition 95 
An autoepistemic interpretation (AE interpretation) for L (the propositjonal language) is a pair V = 
<m, S>, where m is an assignment of truth-values to the atoms occurring in i and S s;;;; L is a belief set. 
Such an interpretation will usually be referred to as an autoepistemic interpretation ofS (Lukaszewicz 
1990:124). 
In other words an AE interpretation <m, S> is essentially a description of a particular world, together 
with an agent situated in it. That is, m specifies what is actually true in the world, whereas S determines 
what the agent actually believes. (Lukaszewicz 1990:124.) 
Applications I 7f 
Definition 96 
Let V=<m, S> be an AE interpretation. The value of a formula A in V. denoted by V(A), is a truth-
value specified by the following rules (where T denotes 'true' and F denotes false'): 
I. V(P) = m(P) for any atom P; 
2. V(-J3) = T iffV(B) = F; 
3. V(B -+C)= T iff V(B) = For V(C) = T; 
4. V(B vC) = T iffV(B) =Tor V(C) = T; 
5. V(B /1 C)= T iff V(B) = T and V(C) = T; 
6. V(OB) = T iffBeS. 
Definition 97 
Let V=<m, S> be an AE interpretation of S and suppose that r is a set of formulas. V is an 
autoepistemic model (AE model) of riff V(A) = T, for each A E r We shall write rosA to indicate 
that a formula A is true in every AE interpretation of S which is an AE model of r (Lukaszewicz 
1990:124). 
Naturally, as with any other logic, inferences are also possible in autoepistemic logic. What these 
inferences are or how they take place are not within the scope of this thesis. However, we will show that 
an initial set of premises or beliefs can be extended to a set of beliefs that any ideal rational agent would 
accept as the basis of any of its inferences. In other words, if we define the set T as the initial set of 
premises, generally referred to as a theory, we can extend T to a set of-beliefs S of an ideally rational 
. 
agent. 
Lukaszewicz (1990) argues that according to Moore there are at least two constraints that have to be 
imposed on a belief set S of an ideally rational agent reasoning on the basis of its set of premises. These 
constraints are soundness and semantic completeness which we define below. 
Definition 98 
A belief set S is sound with respect to a theory T (set of initial premises) if and only if every AE 
interpretation ofS which is an AE model ofT is also an AE model ofS (Lukaszewicz 1990: 124). 
Applications 172 
Roughly speaking from soundness we can infer that if all things in Tare true then all things inS are also 
true. 
Definition 99 
A belief setS is semantically complete if and only ifS contains any formula A, provided that A is true 
in every AE interpretation of S which is an AE model of S (Lukaszewicz 1990: 125). 
That is, in any AE interpretation V = <m, S>, if A is true in V and all the formulas in S are true in V 
then A E S. 
The belief set S of an ideally rational agent can now be defined in terms of soundness, semantic 
completeness and the initial set of premises T (Lukaszewicz 1990: I 25). 
Definition 100 
A belief setS is an AE extension of a theory (set of premises) T iff 
1. S is sound with respect to T; 
2. S is semantically complete; 
3. T s;; S. 
We conclude this section and move to the next section where we will show that an AE extension S ofT 
(as defined above) can be constructed in terms of a KT5 frame. 
5.2 Relation to Modal Logic 
.,. 
. 
Model-theoretic semantics can be defined for autoepistemic logic in terms ofKT5 frames. 
Definition 101 
A complete KT5-frame for L (some language) is a pair < W, m>, where W is a set of possible worlds 
and m is a function which assigns to each pair, consisting of a proposition constant from L and an 
element ofW, an element of {T,F} (Lukaszewicz 1990: 133). 
For instance, m(a,P)=T means that the atom Pis true at the world a. In other words a KT5-frame is 
essentially a universal KT5-model M = <W, R, V> where m takes the place of V and R is the universal 
relation on W, i.e. R = W x W. 
Truth in a KT5-frame is usually defined in terms of specific interpretations. 
.·lpplic.:ations 173 
Definition 102 
A possible-world AE interpretation for Lis a pair PV=<mpv. M>, where mpv is an assignment of truth 
values to the atoms of' L and M is a complete KT5 frame for L. We say that PV is a possible-world 
interpretation ofS, ifS is the set of all.formulas which are true in M (Lukaszewicz 1990: 134). 
To evaluate a formula in this interpretation we require a definition similar to that of definition 96 
(Lukaszewicz 1990:134): 
Definition 103 
Let PV=<mpv. M> be a possible-world AE interpretation. The value of A in PV denoted PV(A), is a 
truth-value defined by the following rules: 
I. PV(P) = mpv(P) for any atom P; 
2. PV( -J3) = T if!PV(B) = F; 
3. PV(B ~C)= T iff PV(B) =For PV(C) = T; 
4. PV(DB) = T if!OB is true in M 
Definition 104 
A possible-world AE interpretation of S s;;;; L in which all the formulas of r (a set of formulas) s;;;; L are 
true is called a possible-world AE mode of r (Lukaszewicz 1990: 134). 
From the above semantics we can show that there exists a set S, defined in terms of KT5 frames, that is 
an AE extension ofT (defined previously). 
Theorem 71 






r DPv A= 
{A E S I A has modal degree of zero} 
{DAIA E So} 
{A I A 0!: So} 
{-.DA I A 0!: So} 
For all models PV in which all the formulas of rare true, A is also true. That is, for 
every possible-world AE interpretation PV in which all well formed formulas in r are 
true, we have that A is true in PV. 
(See Lukaszewicz 1990:139 for proof.) 
)n conclusion note that there is an interesting relationship between autoepistemic logic and K45 modal 
logic. 
Applications 
The modal system K45 is the system KT5 without the axiom schema T: OA ~ A. That is, the 
appropriate models for K45 are those in which the accessibility relation is transitive and euclidean (i.e. 
ifM=<W, R, V> then for any a, p, andy e W, ifaRl3 and aRy then l3Ry). 
To demonstrate the relationship between K45 modal logic and autoepistemic logic we require the 
following definition. 
Definition 105 
We say that a formula A is strongly K45-provable from a theory T. written To ~45 A iff there are 
formulas A 1, A2, ... An E T such that o K45 A 1 /\ A2 /\ ... /\An --+A (Lukaszewicz 1990: 138). 
It can be sho\Vll that the strong K45-provability relation is precisely the syntactic counterpart of the 
relation DPv . 
Theorem 72 
For any T k Lr (language of a theory T) and any A E Lr: T OPvA if and only if To ~45 A. 
(See Konolige 1988 for proof.) 
From the discussion above it should be clear that it is possible to translate an autoepistemic logic into 
an equivalent modal logic and vice versa. This in turn means that we are able to use any of the 




A brief review of what was covered in this thesis is supplied here starting with chapter 1 which 
provided a brief historical exposition of propositional modal logic. Chapter 2 introduced 
propositional logic providing an introduction to both resolution and tableaux proof systems from a 
classical perspective. Chapter 3 introduced propositional modal logic as well as the three normal 
systems of modal logic KT4, KT4L and KT5. Chapter 4 focused on resolution proof systems for 
propositional modal logic, providing details on how to use these systems in order to determine 
local or global logical entailment. The rules applicable to these systems, soundness and 
completeness results and applications of these systems to the normal systems of modal logic KT 4, 
KT4L and KT5 were also supplied. Chapter 5 on the other hand, focused primarily on tableaux 
proof systems for propositional modal logic. Soundness, completeness and decidability results 
where provided for these systems. Applications of these systems were demonstrated for the 
normal systems of modal logic KT4, KT4L and KT5. Chapter 6 concluded this thesis with some 
suggestions for the applications of KT4, KT4L and KT5 to other branches of logic, in particular 
nonmonotonic logic. Relationships between KT4 and preferential models, KT4L and ranked 
preferential models and KT5 and autoepistemic models were also illustrated. 
The writer hopes that the reader found this summary of the relevant resolution and tableau systems 
that are available to modal logic and their respective applications to the logics KT4, KT4L and 
KT5 useful. The writer also hopes that this work will inspire readers to implement the different 
resolution and tableau proof systems, demonstrating that as with the other branches of logic, such 
as propositional logic and predicate logic, modal logic can also make beneficial contributions to 
the realms of artificial intelligence. 
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